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Throughout evolutionary history, a recurring challenge for 
humans has been to avoid potentially fatal pathogens. It has been 
theorized that disgust evolved to alert us to the presence of such 
pathogens. However, people also express feelings of disgust in the 
absence of a direct pathogen threat. A quick search of Twitter reveals 
that disgust is commonly used while referring to people or acts that 
are perceived to be immoral. Harassment, pedophilia, immigrants, an 
unfair tax bill, liberals, conservatives, abortion, cheating on your 
partner, disrespecting one’s nation, bullying, white privilege, stealing, 
and not in the least, Donald Trump. The list of morality-related topics 
that are perceived as disgusting is long.  
The notion that our sense of morality is associated with 
feelings of disgust (among other emotions) also finds support in the 
moral psychology literature. Numerous empirical studies demonstrate 
that moral transgressions and moral transgressors cause feelings of 
disgust (e.g., Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, 
& Haidt, 1999). Researchers have also investigated whether the 
relationship between morality and disgust can work in the opposite 
direction: Can disgust influence moral judgments? (e.g., Eskine, 
Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; 
Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). In the last two decades, a lot of attention 
has been devoted to answering this question, but with mixed results 
(see Landy & Goodwin, 2015). While inducing disgust does not seem 
to cause harsher moral condemnation (also see the section “Disgust as 
an amplifier of moral judgments”, p. 10), individual differences in 
disgust sensitivity (i.e., trait disgust) show more reliable associations 
with moral decision-making. More specifically, it seems that 
individuals high in disgust sensitivity tend to be harsher moral judges 
(e.g., Crawford, Inbar, & Maloney, 2014; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 
2009; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010). While this relationship is well-
established, some questions about the nature of this relationship still 
need to be answered. The first aim of this dissertation is therefore to 
investigate when and why disgust sensitivity affects moral judgments. 




key to a better understanding might lie in improving our 
comprehension of disgust sensitivity. The second aim of this 
dissertation is therefore to provide more insight into what it means to 
be more or less disgust sensitive. 
 
Moral Decision-Making 
How people make moral judgments has been, and still is, a 
topic of much debate in moral philosophy and psychology. Much of 
this literature starts by pitting rational versus emotional routes to 
moral judgment against each other. While some think about moral 
judgments as the result of rational and controlled analysis, others 




 Moral rationalism is the idea that there are a priori moral 
truths that can only be understood through reasoning. Its roots can be 
traced back to ancient Greece: Plato (360 BC/2008) reasoned that 
knowledge of what is morally good can only be obtained when reason 
rules over passions (i.e., what we nowadays refer to as emotions and 
desires). The idea of moral rationalism was for long the dominating 
perspective on morality, although it appeared in slightly different 
forms over the years. For example, in the late 18th century, Kant 
(1797/1998) argued that the motive behind an action determines its 
moral worth. In this view of moral rationalism, only actions arising 
from principles discovered by reason, as opposed to emotions, can 
qualify as morally good.  
What theories of moral rationalism have in common is that 
they disregard emotional input as useful information to the moral 
decision-making process. Emotions (or passions) are perceived as 
distractions and rational reflection is needed to control them. Only 
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moral worth. In this view of moral rationalism, only actions arising 
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What theories of moral rationalism have in common is that 
they disregard emotional input as useful information to the moral 
decision-making process. Emotions (or passions) are perceived as 
distractions and rational reflection is needed to control them. Only 
when reason can control one’s passions, one can lead a moral life. 
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This perspective of emotions as disruptive to the moral decision-
making process can still be found in our modern society. For example, 
in some professions (e.g., judges, doctors), people are required and 
trained to ignore their gut feeling or emotions when making moral 
decisions because we believe their decisions will be better when based 
on rational thinking.  
 
Reason is Slave to the Passions 
 The dysfunctional role of emotions in morality was not 
agreed upon by everyone. Hume was one of the first to acknowledge 
the guiding role of emotions in moral decision-making, stating that 
“reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (1739-
1740/1969, p. 462). According to him, reason is merely a means to 
find structure in our passions. Passions though, provide people with a 
moral compass and direct moral thinking and acting, something 
reason alone cannot do. In a time when religion, which associated 
passions directly with sins, was of utmost importance to many 
individuals, his perspective did not inspire much popular support. 
However, it was picked up again by modern psychologists. For 
example, Haidt (2001) built on the idea of moral sentimentalism with 
his social intuitionist model, suggesting that brief flashes of so-called 
moral intuitions inform us on the approval or disapproval we feel 
towards a given situation. Reason plays a very limited role in this 
perspective on moral judgment making, as it is only activated post 
hoc when justifications for one’s moral intuition are needed. Evidence 
for this perspective is based on instances of moral dumbfounding, in 
which people instantly express strong moral convictions regarding an 
issue or behavior in the absence of rational arguments. In these cases, 
it appears that people’s moral judgments have little to do with 
reflective reasoning, but are the direct result from an automatic and 
highly emotional process.  
 That moral decision-making is not a purely rational process 
also becomes clear from people’s responses to the famous Trolley and 




both thought experiments, one is faced with the dilemma of killing 
one innocent person to save five others, the circumstances are slightly 
different. In the Trolley Dilemma participants read a scenario in 
which a runaway trolley is approaching five people that are tied to 
the tracks. If nothing is done, these five people will be killed by the 
trolley. However, participants are told they can save the five people 
by pulling a lever, which will divert the trolley onto a sidetrack where 
one person is tied to the tracks. In the Footbridge Dilemma, the 
runaway trolley is again approaching five people that are tied up on 
the tracks. Participants are then told they are standing next to a large 
man on a footbridge above the tracks. They can save the five people 
by pushing the large man off the footbridge on the tracks, which will 
stop the trolley. In both cases, participants are thus faced with the 
dilemma of killing one person to save five. 
The question is whether one finds it morally permissible to 
pull the lever/push the large man of the footbridge and thus prevent 
five deaths at the cost of one. If morality is purely based on a rational 
cost-benefit analysis, both actions should be deemed permissible. 
After all, five deaths are clearly worse than one. Yet, while most 
people think it is permissible to pull the lever in the trolley dilemma, 
only a small fraction of people feel the same way about pushing the 
large man off the footbridge (Thomson, 1976; Thomson, 1985). This 
shows that people do not always follow a rational, calculated 
approach when making moral judgments. Instead, it seems that many 
moral situations elicit emotional responses that drive our moral 
evaluation. For instance, neuroimaging studies have shown that 
personal moral transgressions, such as the footbridge dilemma, lead 
to stronger activation of emotion-related brain regions than 
impersonal moral transgressions, such as the trolley dilemma (see 
Greene, 2014 for an overview). Moreover, patients with emotion-
related brain disorders make different moral decisions than healthy 
individuals, even though these patients have a good understanding of 
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to stronger activation of emotion-related brain regions than 
impersonal moral transgressions, such as the trolley dilemma (see 
Greene, 2014 for an overview). Moreover, patients with emotion-
related brain disorders make different moral decisions than healthy 
individuals, even though these patients have a good understanding of 
moral rules and norms (e.g., Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Làdavas, Di 
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Pelligrino, 2007; Mendez, Anderson, Shapira, 2005; also see 
Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2008).  
While moral rationalism views emotions as dysfunctional to 
the moral decision-making process, this is not necessarily the case. 
Functional perspectives of emotions argue that each emotion serves a 
unique adaptive function (e.g., Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006; also see 
Keltner & Gross, 1999). So-called moral emotions are thought to 
function as enforcers of social relationships and commitments (e.g., 
Fiske, 2002; Frank, 2001) and thereby also help uphold a society’s 
norms. However, each moral emotion contributes in a unique way. 
For example, guilt might be felt after hurting someone else, 
motivating the transgressor to repair the relationship (i.e., by 
apologizing). Similarly, someone might express anger in response to 
someone cheating in a game of cards, thereby upholding the norm of 
fair play. Emotions can thus be very useful guides, signaling to oneself 
or others that moral standards have been violated. One of these 
emotions is disgust.  
 
Disgust 
The word disgust is a combination of the Latin words for 
‘opposite of’ (i.e., “dis”) and “to taste” (i.e., “gustare”), and thus 
essentially means “something offensive to the taste” (Darwin, 1872, p. 
257). This reflects the idea that disgust is thought to have originated 
as part of a food-rejection system, defending against oral 
incorporation of potentially harmful foods by motivating avoidance 
and withdrawal from such foods (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). This is also 
expressed in the characteristic facial expression of disgust. Raising of 
the upper lip, sticking out of the tongue, a wrinkling of the nose, and 
narrowing of the eyes are all intended to reject the taste, smell, and 
sight of bad foods (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009; 
Vrana, 1993). However, over time disgust evolved to serve a more 
general disease avoidance function (Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 




the body against a wider range of pathogen threats. Bodily products, 
animals, sexual acts, or death are only a few examples of stimuli that 
trigger disgust because of their contamination potential (Curtis & 
Biran, 2001; Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997).    
Disgust is not only relevant to contamination issues, but it is 
thought to be coopted by the moral domain. Although it is not yet 
clear what explains this exaptation, the rejection impulse and strong 
facial expression associated with disgust lend itself well for moral 
situations. Disgust motivates avoidance of norm violators, thereby not 
only preventing us from getting into contact with physical, but also 
social parasites (Curtis & Biran, 2001, Inbar & Pizarro, 2014; Tybur, 
Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009). Disgust also has a social signaling 
function: Expressing disgust in response to moral transgressions 
signals to others that their behavior is unacceptable (Kupfer & Giner-
Sorolla, 2017; Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013). As 
such, feelings of disgust help uphold moral standards. It is thus not 
surprising that a vast body of literature demonstrates the importance 
of disgust in moral psychology.  
 
Moral Transgressions Elicit Disgust 
As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, people 
express feelings of disgust, alongside other emotions, in response to 
violations of moral norms. This notion also finds support in the 
literature. Studies using self-report measures find that people feel 
disgusted after reading about a wide variety of immoral acts, 
including, but not limited to, stealing, cheating, taboo behaviors, 
transgressions of sexual norms, and behaviors violating the purity of 
the body (e.g., Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Haidt et al., 1994; 
Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; 
Jones & Fitness, 2008; Molho, Tybur, Güler, Balliet, & Hofmann, 
2017; Rozin, Lowery, & Ebert, 1994; Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999; 
Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013).  
Some have questioned whether this so-called socio-moral 
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2017; Rozin, Lowery, & Ebert, 1994; Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999; 
Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013).  
Some have questioned whether this so-called socio-moral 
disgust is equivalent to disgust experienced in response to pathogen 
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cues or whether it is more likely that disgust is used in a metaphorical 
sense (Royzman & Sabini, 2001; Simpson, Carter, Anthony, & 
Overton, 2006). Researchers have therefore directly compared core to 
socio-moral disgust. For example, neurological research shows that 
pathogen and socio-moral stimuli elicit activation in many common 
brain areas (Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008; Moll et al., 2005). 
Similarly, Chapman and colleagues (2009) tested whether facial 
expressions in response to fairness violations are comparable to facial 
expressions elicited by disgusting drinks and disgusting pictures. They 
largely are. All three types of stimuli caused activation in the levator 
labii muscle region, causing the characteristic facial expression of 
disgust (i.e., a raised upper lip and wrinkled nose; also see Cannon, 
Schnall, & White, 2011).  
In one of my own projects, I asked participants to list all 
attributes they think of when they think of disgust (i.e., explain the 
experience of disgust to someone who has no experience of disgust; 
Wagemans, Brandt, & Zeelenberg, in preparation). In line with the 
idea that disgust has a moral component, subjects mentioned 
attributes that can be categorized as moral disgust (i.e., someone 
being immoral, disapproval, breaking social norms) as well as 
attributes typically associated with core disgust (i.e., feeling sick, 
something unappealing, nausea). Although none of these studies 
provides conclusive evidence that socio-moral and core disgust are 
the exact same emotion, they do suggest that 1) there is a large 
overlap in (neuro)physiological responses to elicitors of these two 
subtypes of disgust and 2) people perceive the moral component as 
an intrinsic part of the emotion of disgust.  
 
Disgust as an Amplifier of Moral Judgments 
One proposition regarding disgust’s role in moral decision-
making is that feelings of disgust cause harsher moral judgments. This 
proposition builds on classical psychological principles, such as affect-
as-information and misattribution of arousal (Dutton & Aron, 1974; 




feelings as a basis when forming judgments. In the case of disgust, it 
is thought that people use feelings of disgust as an indication of their 
evaluation of the moral transgression at hand, resulting in a harsher 
moral judgment. Empirical support for this idea was first provided by 
Wheatley and Haidt (2005), who showed that brief flashes of disgust, 
induced by hypnotization, resulted in harsher moral judgments. It did 
not take long before other researchers reported similar effects using 
many different disgust manipulations, including disgusting pictures, 
videos, drinks, smells, sounds, and environments (e.g., Eskine et al., 
2011; Harlé & Sanfey, 2009; Sato & Sugiura, 2014; Schnall, Benton, 
& Harvey, 2008; Schnall, Haidt et al., 2008; Seidel & Prinz, 2013; 
Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012; Van Dillen, Van der Wal, & Van den 
Bos, 2012).  
While some of these studies investigated potential 
moderators, it was largely unclear what could account for the 
amplification effect. When I started my PhD project, the plan was 
therefore to determine the psychological mechanism(s) underlying 
this amplification effect of disgust on moral judgments. The only 
problem we (i.e., me and my supervisors) ran into was that our 
studies did not replicate the original effect of disgust on moral 
judgments. Although our disgust inductions in these studies were 
effective, they did not increase moral condemnation in any reliable or 
systematic manner. 
Not long after our first series of studies, Landy and Goodwin 
(2015) published their meta-analysis on the amplification effect of 
incidental disgust on moral judgments. Their conclusion was that the 
evidence in favor of an amplification effect was scarce. After 
accounting for publication bias, there is no effect of disgust on moral 
judgments. In line with this conclusion, a highly-powered direct 
replication attempt failed to find that inducing disgust by means of a 
recall caused harsher moral judgments (Johnson et al., 2016).  
While it was concluded from the meta-analysis that there was 
no overall effect of disgust on moral judgments after accounting for 
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socio-moral disgust. For example, neurological research shows that 
pathogen and socio-moral stimuli elicit activation in many common 
brain areas (Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008; Moll et al., 2005). 
Similarly, Chapman and colleagues (2009) tested whether facial 
expressions in response to fairness violations are comparable to facial 
expressions elicited by disgusting drinks and disgusting pictures. They 
largely are. All three types of stimuli caused activation in the levator 
labii muscle region, causing the characteristic facial expression of 
disgust (i.e., a raised upper lip and wrinkled nose; also see Cannon, 
Schnall, & White, 2011).  
In one of my own projects, I asked participants to list all 
attributes they think of when they think of disgust (i.e., explain the 
experience of disgust to someone who has no experience of disgust; 
Wagemans, Brandt, & Zeelenberg, in preparation). In line with the 
idea that disgust has a moral component, subjects mentioned 
attributes that can be categorized as moral disgust (i.e., someone 
being immoral, disapproval, breaking social norms) as well as 
attributes typically associated with core disgust (i.e., feeling sick, 
something unappealing, nausea). Although none of these studies 
provides conclusive evidence that socio-moral and core disgust are 
the exact same emotion, they do suggest that 1) there is a large 
overlap in (neuro)physiological responses to elicitors of these two 
subtypes of disgust and 2) people perceive the moral component as 
an intrinsic part of the emotion of disgust.  
 
Disgust as an Amplifier of Moral Judgments 
One proposition regarding disgust’s role in moral decision-
making is that feelings of disgust cause harsher moral judgments. This 
proposition builds on classical psychological principles, such as affect-
as-information and misattribution of arousal (Dutton & Aron, 1974; 




feelings as a basis when forming judgments. In the case of disgust, it 
is thought that people use feelings of disgust as an indication of their 
evaluation of the moral transgression at hand, resulting in a harsher 
moral judgment. Empirical support for this idea was first provided by 
Wheatley and Haidt (2005), who showed that brief flashes of disgust, 
induced by hypnotization, resulted in harsher moral judgments. It did 
not take long before other researchers reported similar effects using 
many different disgust manipulations, including disgusting pictures, 
videos, drinks, smells, sounds, and environments (e.g., Eskine et al., 
2011; Harlé & Sanfey, 2009; Sato & Sugiura, 2014; Schnall, Benton, 
& Harvey, 2008; Schnall, Haidt et al., 2008; Seidel & Prinz, 2013; 
Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012; Van Dillen, Van der Wal, & Van den 
Bos, 2012).  
While some of these studies investigated potential 
moderators, it was largely unclear what could account for the 
amplification effect. When I started my PhD project, the plan was 
therefore to determine the psychological mechanism(s) underlying 
this amplification effect of disgust on moral judgments. The only 
problem we (i.e., me and my supervisors) ran into was that our 
studies did not replicate the original effect of disgust on moral 
judgments. Although our disgust inductions in these studies were 
effective, they did not increase moral condemnation in any reliable or 
systematic manner. 
Not long after our first series of studies, Landy and Goodwin 
(2015) published their meta-analysis on the amplification effect of 
incidental disgust on moral judgments. Their conclusion was that the 
evidence in favor of an amplification effect was scarce. After 
accounting for publication bias, there is no effect of disgust on moral 
judgments. In line with this conclusion, a highly-powered direct 
replication attempt failed to find that inducing disgust by means of a 
recall caused harsher moral judgments (Johnson et al., 2016).  
While it was concluded from the meta-analysis that there was 
no overall effect of disgust on moral judgments after accounting for 
publication bias, it did show a small amplification effect for olfactory 
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and gustatory manipulations of disgust. However, this seems 
primarily due to a particularly large effect size found in one of the 
studies (i.e., Eskine et al., 2011). In this study, it was found that 
moral judgments were harsher after participants consumed a bitter 
(i.e., disgusting) drink as compared to consuming water or a sweet 
drink. As this original study was conducted with a small sample, 
several researchers, including myself, recently conducted a highly 
powered direct replication of this study, facilitated by the 
Collaborative Replications and Education Project (CREP). Although 
data analysis has not been conducted on the full sample, preliminary 
analyses show that no evidence is found for an amplification effect of 
disgust (Ghelfi et al., in preparation). Taking all these studies 
together, it therefore seems unlikely that individuals become harsher 
moral judges after inducing feelings of disgust that are completely 
unrelated to the moral judgment at hand. 
 
Disgust Sensitivity  
 The evidence looks more promising for individual differences 
in disgust sensitivity. Disgust sensitivity, or trait disgust, is an 
individual’s proneness to experience disgust intensely or easily in 
response to aversive stimuli (Haidt et al., 1994). Studies have shown 
that higher disgust sensitivity is related to opposition of, among other 
things, gay marriage, abortion, and premarital sex (Brenner & Inbar, 
2014; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, 
& Hibbing, 2011; Terrizzi et al., 2010), and to support for stricter 
foreign and immigration policies (Brenner & Inbar, 2014; Terrizzi et 
al., 2010). Disgust sensitive individuals make harsher convictions in a 
fictitious murder trial (Jones & Fitness, 2008) and they tend to hold 
less favorable attitudes towards individuals that are thought of as 
deviant or of low status, such as homosexuals, the obese, poor people, 
immigrants, foreigners, and drug addicts (Crawford et al., 2014; 
Hodson & Costello, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009; 




that highly disgust sensitive individuals uphold higher moral 
standards. 
 Although a lot of research has focused on the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral cognition, the nature of this 
relationship is still unclear. For example, it is unclear whether disgust 
sensitive, as compared to less disgust sensitive, individuals are 
harsher moral judges in general or only when it concerns a specific 
type of moral transgressions. Little is also known about the 
psychological mechanisms underlying the relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and moral decision-making in general. Is the 
relationship driven by perceptions of harmfulness? Or are disgust 
sensitive individuals sensitive to any kind of deviation from what is 
normal (i.e., not only in the moral domain)? While investigating these 
questions, it became clear that there is also still a lot to learn about 
basic processes associated with disgust sensitivity itself. How do 
individuals low and high in disgust sensitivity react when confronted 
with disgusting stimuli? Do disgust sensitive individuals have a bias 
towards or away from such stimuli? And is this bias specific to 
disgusting stimuli or is it also triggered by stimuli associated with 
general negativity? In this dissertation, I aim to answer these, and 
related, questions.  
 
The Structure of Morality  
In the search for answers to these questions, I will draw from 
several perspectives on morality and moral psychology. The 
conclusions based on the empirical work presented in this dissertation 
will therefore not only address our initial research question, but will 
also speak to the broader debate on the structure of morality. This 
debate is centered around two distinct perspectives of morality: Moral 
monism and moral pluralism. What distinguishes these two types of 
perspectives is that they each offer their own take on what the 
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psychological mechanisms underlying the relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and moral decision-making in general. Is the 
relationship driven by perceptions of harmfulness? Or are disgust 
sensitive individuals sensitive to any kind of deviation from what is 
normal (i.e., not only in the moral domain)? While investigating these 
questions, it became clear that there is also still a lot to learn about 
basic processes associated with disgust sensitivity itself. How do 
individuals low and high in disgust sensitivity react when confronted 
with disgusting stimuli? Do disgust sensitive individuals have a bias 
towards or away from such stimuli? And is this bias specific to 
disgusting stimuli or is it also triggered by stimuli associated with 
general negativity? In this dissertation, I aim to answer these, and 
related, questions.  
 
The Structure of Morality  
In the search for answers to these questions, I will draw from 
several perspectives on morality and moral psychology. The 
conclusions based on the empirical work presented in this dissertation 
will therefore not only address our initial research question, but will 
also speak to the broader debate on the structure of morality. This 
debate is centered around two distinct perspectives of morality: Moral 
monism and moral pluralism. What distinguishes these two types of 
perspectives is that they each offer their own take on what the 
building blocks of morality are. While advocates of moral monism 
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suggest that morality can be understood by a single, all-encompassing 
element, perspectives of moral pluralism argue that morality can be 
divided into multiple distinct elements.   
 
Moral monism 
Theories of moral monism argue that morality can be 
understood by one all-encompassing value. When faced with a moral 
decision, the objective is to choose the option that maximizes one’s 
outcome on that value. With regard to the work presented in this 
dissertation, this view implies that moral judgments can be reduced 
to, and thus explained by, one overarching value. Over the years, 
several candidates for this value have been proposed. Examples are 
justice (Kohlberg, 1971), well-being (Harris, 2010), and fairness 
(Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013). A monist theory that gained in 
popularity is the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 
2012). This theory states that all moral transgressions consist of a 
dyad, in which a moral agent harms a moral patient (Gray & Wegner, 
2011). Perceptions of harm therefore underlie all morality according 
to this theory (Gray, Young et al., 2012).  
 
Moral pluralism 
Theories of moral pluralism, on the other hand, suggest that 
morality can be divided into anywhere between two and six elements 
(e.g., Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; 
Haidt, 2012; Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2012; Shweder, Much, 
Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). In this dissertation, I will use the 
distinction proposed by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), as it is the 
most widely used theory of moral pluralism. MFT aims to incorporate 
evolutionary and cultural perspectives on morality (Graham et al., 
2013). It poses that each individual is born with the same template of 
“learning modules” for morality, but that cultural factors (e.g., 
upbringing or customs) determine to what extent these learning 
modules are exploited. MFT initially identified five of these learning 




and purity. However, liberty has been suggested as a possible sixth 
candidate (Graham et al., 2013). Each of these moral domains is 
thought to function as an adaptation to recurring social problems and 
by doing so, help us understand our social world (see Table 1.1 for an 
overview of the moral domains and their evolutionary challenges).  
 
Table 1.1 
Names and descriptions of moral domains in the Moral Foundations 
Theory. 
Names Concerns 
Purity Contamination threats and violations of sanctity and 
chastity 
Authority Disobedience and disrespect towards authorities 
Ingroup loyalty Behaviors threatening the in-group, such as betrayal  
Care Harmful acts causing suffering or distress 
Fairness (A lack of) Cooperation and reciprocity  
Liberty Oppression and a lack of individual freedom 
Note: Descriptions based on Haidt (2012); Haidt & Joseph (2007) 
 
In this dissertation, moral purity concerns will be emphasized 
because of their evolutionary link to disgust. Both disgust and the 
purity domain are thought to have originated in response to the 
evolutionary challenge to stay clear of pathogens and parasites 
(Haidt, 2012). However, moral norms related to purity are thought to 
go beyond hygiene concerns alone and extend to serve a social 
function (Graham et al., 2009). That is, purity norms mark a group’s 
cultural boundaries, preventing its members to engage in behaviors 
the group has determined are inhuman or profane. As such, 
homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, or premarital sex are a few 
examples of issues that people disapprove of on the basis of purity 
concerns. Although these purity concerns do not revolve around 
physical contamination alone, some researchers have argued that the 
emotion of disgust is important in shaping the moral domain of purity 
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and purity. However, liberty has been suggested as a possible sixth 
candidate (Graham et al., 2013). Each of these moral domains is 
thought to function as an adaptation to recurring social problems and 
by doing so, help us understand our social world (see Table 1.1 for an 
overview of the moral domains and their evolutionary challenges).  
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Fairness (A lack of) Cooperation and reciprocity  
Liberty Oppression and a lack of individual freedom 
Note: Descriptions based on Haidt (2012); Haidt & Joseph (2007) 
 
In this dissertation, moral purity concerns will be emphasized 
because of their evolutionary link to disgust. Both disgust and the 
purity domain are thought to have originated in response to the 
evolutionary challenge to stay clear of pathogens and parasites 
(Haidt, 2012). However, moral norms related to purity are thought to 
go beyond hygiene concerns alone and extend to serve a social 
function (Graham et al., 2009). That is, purity norms mark a group’s 
cultural boundaries, preventing its members to engage in behaviors 
the group has determined are inhuman or profane. As such, 
homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, or premarital sex are a few 
examples of issues that people disapprove of on the basis of purity 
concerns. Although these purity concerns do not revolve around 
physical contamination alone, some researchers have argued that the 
emotion of disgust is important in shaping the moral domain of purity 
(Graham et al., 2013). In Chapters 2 to 4, I will therefore investigate 
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whether individuals who are more disgust sensitive are also more 
sensitive to transgressions of the purity domain and why that may be 
the case. 
Why do we need to know this? 
There are two reasons why I think the questions raised in this 
dissertation are important. First, many societal and political issues are 
moral issues at their core. Gay marriage, euthanasia, immigration 
policies, abortion, gun control, social security, the death penalty. 
Individuals’ support or opposition of these and many other issues is 
directly fueled by the moral norms and values they endorse. If we 
want to understand how different people get to strongly diverging 
opinions on important societal issues, we have to investigate the 
underlying motivations leading to these moral evaluations. While 
disgust has been identified as an important factor in the moral 
decision-making process, many questions regarding the nature of this 
association still remain (e.g., the ones I raised in the section “Disgust 
sensitivity”, p. 12). Answering these, and related, questions could 
bring us one step closer to understanding and, subsequently, bridging 
political and societal divides.  
Second, while some argue that disgust is a basic emotion 
(Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992), it remained largely understudied for a 
long time (see McKay, 2017). Researchers have focused more on 
disgust in the last few decades, immensely improving our 
understanding of this emotion. For example, many studies have 
shown the relevance of disgust sensitivity to psychological constructs, 
such as moral decision-making, political preferences, and 
psychopathological disorders (e.g., Horberg et al., 2009; Inbar, 
Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012; Olatunji, 
2008; Shook, Oosterhoff, Terrizzi, & Brady, 2017; Terrizzi et al., 
2010). However, a good understanding of the basic information 
processes underlying individual differences in disgust sensitivity is 
still missing. This raises some questions that need to be answered. For 




different information processes when encountering disgust stimuli? 
And are these biases specific to disgust stimuli or they do generalize 
to negative stimuli? Answers to these questions will help us 
understand what it means to be more or less disgust sensitive, which 
subsequently, will provide more insight into disgust sensitivity’s 
relationships with, for example, moral decision-making.   
 
Outline of the dissertation 
The research presented in this dissertation has not been 
conducted by me alone and would not have looked the same without 
the help of my co-authors. The empirical chapters are therefore 
written in the “we-form”. However, because the Introduction and 
General Discussion largely reflect my own thoughts they are written 
in the “I-form”. The empirical chapters are based on individual papers 
that are either published or undergoing peer-review. They can be 
read separately or as a set of studies examining disgust sensitivity and 
its relationship to moral decision-making.  
 
Chapter 2 
This chapter focuses on the question whether the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments is domain-specific or 
exists across moral domains. In the morality literature, researchers 
have argued that disgust sensitivity is related to the moral domain of 
purity specifically. However, some research findings indicate that 
disgust sensitivity might be related to all so-called binding moral 
domains (i.e., moral domains facilitating group cohesion). Yet 
another, more recent, perspective argues that disgust sensitivity is not 
related to specific domains, but relates to moral judgments from all 
moral domains equally. In four exploratory studies, we show initial 
evidence for the first perspective: That disgust sensitivity is primarily 
related to moral judgments of the purity domain. We subsequently 
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read separately or as a set of studies examining disgust sensitivity and 
its relationship to moral decision-making.  
 
Chapter 2 
This chapter focuses on the question whether the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments is domain-specific or 
exists across moral domains. In the morality literature, researchers 
have argued that disgust sensitivity is related to the moral domain of 
purity specifically. However, some research findings indicate that 
disgust sensitivity might be related to all so-called binding moral 
domains (i.e., moral domains facilitating group cohesion). Yet 
another, more recent, perspective argues that disgust sensitivity is not 
related to specific domains, but relates to moral judgments from all 
moral domains equally. In four exploratory studies, we show initial 
evidence for the first perspective: That disgust sensitivity is primarily 
related to moral judgments of the purity domain. We subsequently 
conducted a fifth study, which was highly powered and for which the 
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hypotheses and data analyses were preregistered. This study 
replicates the finding that disgust sensitivity is most strongly related 
to moral judgments of the purity domain.  
Additionally, we discuss whether the presence of pathogen 
cues in purity moral transgressions might cause the strong 
relationship with disgust sensitivity. In two studies, we find that 
adding a pathogen cue to moral transgressions of the care or fairness 
norm does not strengthen their relationship to disgust sensitivity.  
 
Chapter 3 
In this chapter, we investigate two potential explanations for 
the domain-specific relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments of purity. Critics of moral pluralism have questioned the 
existence of a meaningful moral domain of purity. They argue that all 
moral domains can be reduced to perceptions of harmfulness. 
According to them, the relationship between disgust and the moral 
domain of purity is not due to moral content, but can be attributed to 
weirdness. In this chapter, we therefore investigate whether 
perceptions of transgression weirdness and transgression harmfulness 
can account for the domain-specific effect of disgust sensitivity. 
Although both weirdness and harmfulness of a transgression explain 
part of the relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments, they do not explain why disgust sensitivity is more 
strongly related to moral judgments of purity. 
 
Chapter 4 
While the previous chapter has shown that weirdness of 
moral transgressions cannot explain why disgust sensitivity relates 
more strongly to moral purity, we will flip the perspective in this 
chapter. Measures of disgust sensitivity are filled with atypical 
situations and it is therefore plausible that answers to these items are 
predictive of answers towards other weird situations, such as purity 
moral judgments. We find partial evidence for this idea. Weirdness of 




purity, but not care. However, re-analyzing the data of our earlier 
studies does not show a different relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments of purity for highly weird or not so 
weird disgust sensitivity items.  
 
Chapter 5 
 In the fifth chapter, we will look more closely at individual 
differences in disgust sensitivity and the attentional processes that 
they engender. From the literature, we know that this personality 
trait plays a role in many psychological constructs and 
psychopathological disorders. However, we know little about the 
basic underlying mechanisms of disgust sensitivity, such as 
information processing of disgust stimuli. By means of an eye tracker 
task, we will therefore investigate if individuals scoring high and low 
on disgust sensitivity have different visual attentional biases. We find 
they do demonstrate different reactions to encountering disgust 
stimuli, with more disgust sensitivity individuals showing a stronger 
avoidance reaction to disgust stimuli than less disgust sensitive 
individuals. Interestingly, this avoidance reaction is not only observed 
for disgust stimuli, but also for other negative stimuli.  
 
Reproducible, Replicable, and Transparent Research 
Since the start of my PhD project, a lot has and still is 
changing in the field of (social) psychology. Slowly, but steadily, the 
focus is shifting towards publishing reproducible, replicable, and 
transparent research. With these developments in mind, it seems 
appropriate to add a few sentences on how I, together with my co-
authors, tried to improve the reproducibility, replicability, and 
transparency of the research presented in this dissertation.  
Although power analyses were not always feasible given the 
multilevel nature of my analyses, a priori power analyses were 
conducted when possible. Elsewhere, we describe what rule was used 
to determine sample size. We also report all data exclusions (if any), 




hypotheses and data analyses were preregistered. This study 
replicates the finding that disgust sensitivity is most strongly related 
to moral judgments of the purity domain.  
Additionally, we discuss whether the presence of pathogen 
cues in purity moral transgressions might cause the strong 
relationship with disgust sensitivity. In two studies, we find that 
adding a pathogen cue to moral transgressions of the care or fairness 
norm does not strengthen their relationship to disgust sensitivity.  
 
Chapter 3 
In this chapter, we investigate two potential explanations for 
the domain-specific relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments of purity. Critics of moral pluralism have questioned the 
existence of a meaningful moral domain of purity. They argue that all 
moral domains can be reduced to perceptions of harmfulness. 
According to them, the relationship between disgust and the moral 
domain of purity is not due to moral content, but can be attributed to 
weirdness. In this chapter, we therefore investigate whether 
perceptions of transgression weirdness and transgression harmfulness 
can account for the domain-specific effect of disgust sensitivity. 
Although both weirdness and harmfulness of a transgression explain 
part of the relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments, they do not explain why disgust sensitivity is more 
strongly related to moral judgments of purity. 
 
Chapter 4 
While the previous chapter has shown that weirdness of 
moral transgressions cannot explain why disgust sensitivity relates 
more strongly to moral purity, we will flip the perspective in this 
chapter. Measures of disgust sensitivity are filled with atypical 
situations and it is therefore plausible that answers to these items are 
predictive of answers towards other weird situations, such as purity 
moral judgments. We find partial evidence for this idea. Weirdness of 




purity, but not care. However, re-analyzing the data of our earlier 
studies does not show a different relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments of purity for highly weird or not so 
weird disgust sensitivity items.  
 
Chapter 5 
 In the fifth chapter, we will look more closely at individual 
differences in disgust sensitivity and the attentional processes that 
they engender. From the literature, we know that this personality 
trait plays a role in many psychological constructs and 
psychopathological disorders. However, we know little about the 
basic underlying mechanisms of disgust sensitivity, such as 
information processing of disgust stimuli. By means of an eye tracker 
task, we will therefore investigate if individuals scoring high and low 
on disgust sensitivity have different visual attentional biases. We find 
they do demonstrate different reactions to encountering disgust 
stimuli, with more disgust sensitivity individuals showing a stronger 
avoidance reaction to disgust stimuli than less disgust sensitive 
individuals. Interestingly, this avoidance reaction is not only observed 
for disgust stimuli, but also for other negative stimuli.  
 
Reproducible, Replicable, and Transparent Research 
Since the start of my PhD project, a lot has and still is 
changing in the field of (social) psychology. Slowly, but steadily, the 
focus is shifting towards publishing reproducible, replicable, and 
transparent research. With these developments in mind, it seems 
appropriate to add a few sentences on how I, together with my co-
authors, tried to improve the reproducibility, replicability, and 
transparency of the research presented in this dissertation.  
Although power analyses were not always feasible given the 
multilevel nature of my analyses, a priori power analyses were 
conducted when possible. Elsewhere, we describe what rule was used 
to determine sample size. We also report all data exclusions (if any), 
all manipulations and conditions, and all measures used in each of 
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the studies. Predictions for some of our studies were preregistered. 
These preregistration files are available via the Open Science 
Framework, together with the questionnaires, data, and syntax used 
for data analysis of all studies published in this dissertation. Links to 
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Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a 
range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some 
perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity 
and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains 
(i.e., purity, authority, loyalty, care, fairness, and liberty). Other 
perspectives predict that disgust sensitivity is primarily associated 
with judgments of specific moral domains (e.g., primarily purity). 
However, no study has systematically tested if disgust sensitivity is 
associated with moral judgments of the purity domain specifically, 
more generally to moral judgments of the binding moral domains, or 
to moral judgments of all of the moral domains equally. Across five 
studies (total N = 1,104), we find consistent evidence for the notion 
that disgust sensitivity relates more strongly to moral condemnation 
of purity-based transgressions (meta-analytic r = .40) than to moral 
condemnation of transgressions of any of the other domains (range 
meta-analytic r’s: .07  ̶  .27). Our findings are in line with predictions 
from Moral Foundations Theory, which predicts that personality 
characteristics disgust sensitivity make people more sensitive to a 
certain set of moral issues. 
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Making moral judgments is in essence an emotional process 
(Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Automatic intuitive evaluations guide our 
reasoning about and judgments of moral situations. One replicable 
effect from this perspective is the association between individual 
differences in disgust sensitivity and attitudes towards (morally) 
deviant behaviors or individuals (e.g., Brenner & Inbar, 2014; 
Chapman & Anderson, 2014; Crawford et al., 2014; Hodson & 
Costello, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe 
et al., 2009; Jarudi, 2009; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Naverrete & Fessler, 
2006; Olatunji, 2008). People who score higher on trait disgust 
sensitivity tend to judge moral transgressions and other deviant 
behaviors as more morally wrong than people who score lower on 
this trait (e.g., Horberg et al., 2009). It is not clear, however, if this 
association is general or if it is specific to a limited set of moral 
situations. While some perspectives predict that disgust sensitivity 
will be primarily related to moral judgments in specific moral 
domains (e.g., Graham et al., 2013), other perspectives suggest that 
disgust sensitivity will be associated with judgments across multiple 
moral domains (e.g., Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, 2015). However, to 
our knowledge, no study has tested these competing predictions by 
systematically comparing disgust sensitivity’s effect on moral 
judgments across different moral domains. In five studies, we directly 
test if disgust sensitivity is related to moral judgments in the purity 
domain specifically, more generally to moral judgments in the 
binding moral domains, or to moral judgments in all of the moral 
domains. 
 
Disgust & Disgust Sensitivity 
Disgust is the feeling of revulsion in response to an aversive 
stimulus, motivating withdrawal from that stimulus (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 2000). The word disgust is thought to essentially mean 
“something offensive to the taste” (Darwin, 1872, p. 257) and has 
been parsed into different disgust subtypes depending on the specific 
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Disgust & Disgust Sensitivity 
Disgust is the feeling of revulsion in response to an aversive 
stimulus, motivating withdrawal from that stimulus (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 2000). The word disgust is thought to essentially mean 
“something offensive to the taste” (Darwin, 1872, p. 257) and has 
been parsed into different disgust subtypes depending on the specific 
taste that is offended (Haidt et al., 1997; Tybur et al., 2009). For 
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example, one subtype is core disgust (sometimes called pathogen 
disgust) and it relates to the intake of potentially harmful foods. It 
likely evolved because it protects us from infectious diseases (Curtis & 
Biran 2001; Rozin et al., 2000; Tybur et al., 2013). However, disgust 
is also thought to be co-opted by the social and moral domains.  
People experience disgust (along with anger, contempt, and 
other negative emotions) following moral transgressions (Brandt & 
Reyna, 2011; Cannon et al., 2011; Haidt et al., 1997). These feelings 
cue people into the moral transgression that has occurred and 
motivates them to take action. For example, one study shows that 
people make disgusted facial expressions after receiving unfair offers 
in an Ultimatum Game (Chapman et al., 2009). Similarly, 
neurological research shows that core disgust and moral/social 
disgust elicit activation in overlapping brain areas (Borg et al., 2008). 
The basic idea is that disgust, whether it is the core or the moral 
subtype, can arise from moral transgressions and biases behavior 
away from risks due to physical or social parasites (Curtis & Biran, 
2001, also see Inbar & Pizarro, 2014). A more controversial 
proposition is that induced feelings of disgust amplify unrelated 
moral judgments (i.e., make unrelated moral judgments harsher; e.g., 
Schnall, Haidt et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005); however, a 
recent meta-analysis (Landy & Goodwin, 2015) and large scale 
replication attempts (Johnson et al., 2016) indicate that this effect is 
highly unstable and potentially very near zero.  
Here, we sidestep that debate and focus on the association 
between individual differences in disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments. Disgust sensitivity is an individual’s proneness to 
experience disgust intensely or easily in response to aversive stimuli 
(also called trait disgust; Haidt et al., 1994). While state disgust can 
be very informative for specific situations, disgust sensitivity is stable 
over time and is predictive for a person’s tendency to feel disgusted 
across a variety of disgust-eliciting stimuli and situations (Rozin, 
Haidt, McCauley, Dunlop, & Ashmore, 1999). People who score 
higher on disgust sensitivity tend to score higher on neuroticism 
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(Druschel & Sherman, 1999; Haidt et al., 1994; Tybur & De Vries, 
2013) and a variety of fear-related measures, such as trait anxiety and 
animal phobia (De Jong & Merckelbach, 1998; Matchett & Davey, 
1991; Muris, Merckelbach, Schmidt, & Tierney, 1999), and they tend 
to have higher perceptions of vulnerability to diseases (Duncan, 
Schaller, & Park, 2009).  
Disgust sensitivity also has consistently been related to the 
moral domain. For example, it relates to people’s moral values (i.e., 
the moral domains people think are most important; Graham et al., 
2011; Van Leeuwen, Dukes, Tybur, & Park, 2017), the honesty-
humility dimension of the HEXACO model of personality (Tybur & De 
Vries, 2013), and harsher punishments in a mock trial (Jones & Fitness, 
2008). Although there has been a focus on investigating the 
association between disgust and moral cognition, some important 
questions are left unanswered. In this paper, we try to answer one 
such question. Namely, does disgust sensitivity relate to all kinds of 
moral judgments (i.e., the perceived wrongness of specific behaviors 
and situations), or is the association between disgust sensitivity and 
moral judgments domain specific? Although this question has elicited 
considerable discussion, no study, to our knowledge, has yet 
systematically tested the different perspectives in the literature 
against each other. 
We will do so by focusing on moral judgments of concrete 
behaviors and situations, which is important for two reasons. First, 
they allow for the impact of so-called moral intuitions. Moral 
intuitions are the instant feelings of approval or disapproval that 
come with witnessing moral transgressions and are known to play a 
substantial role in moral decision-making (Haidt, 2001). An 
individual’s moral intuition about a given situation is directly fueled 
by that individual’s emotional disposition, such as disgust sensitivity. 
Because making moral judgments of specific situations more strongly 
triggers such moral intuitions than measures focused on broad and 
sometimes abstract moral concerns, such as the Moral Foundations 
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such question. Namely, does disgust sensitivity relate to all kinds of 
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and situations), or is the association between disgust sensitivity and 
moral judgments domain specific? Although this question has elicited 
considerable discussion, no study, to our knowledge, has yet 
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intuitions are the instant feelings of approval or disapproval that 
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provide a more accurate reflection of how people make moral 
judgments in everyday life.  
A second reason why it is important to focus on moral 
judgments of concrete behaviors concerns the five criteria set by 
Graham and colleagues (2013, p. 37) that determine what counts as a 
moral domain. The first of these criteria is “a common concern in 
third-party normative judgments”. More specifically, they argue that 
the existence of a domain can be doubted if there is a lack of response 
to third-party transgressions of that domain, even when people claim 
to endorse that broad moral concern. The idea behind this criterion is 
that people are motivated to enforce a certain norm, even when there 
are no direct implications for the self, thereby showing shared 
intentionality to uphold a certain norm. In order to show domain 
specific effects, it is therefore crucial to focus on moral judgments of 
third-party transgressions of these moral domains.  
 
Disgust Sensitivity & Domains of Moral Judgment: Three 
Hypotheses 
Taxonomies of moral content suggest that the moral domain 
can be split into anywhere from three (Shweder et al., 1997), to five 
(Graham et al., 2009) and six (Haidt, 2012; Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 
2012) moral domains. Some have argued against the existence of 
distinct moral domains, suggesting that all domains are a variation of 
one underlying construct (i.e., perceived harm; Schein & Gray, in 
press). Although there are theoretical benefits and drawbacks to each 
of these taxonomies, in this paper we focus on the Moral Foundations 
taxonomy (for an overview, see Graham et al., 2013) because this 
perspective has most closely considered the role of disgust and is one 
of the most widely used taxonomies. The taxonomy from Moral 
Foundations Theory includes three domains that are often lumped 
together as binding foundations (i.e., moral domains that bind groups 
together and facilitate group cohesion; Haidt, 2008) and three 
domains that are often lumped together as individualizing 
foundations (i.e., moral domains that facilitate individual rights and 
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responsibilities; Haidt, 2008). These six domains are listed and briefly 
described in Table 2.1. It is not clear how disgust sensitivity predicts 
moral judgments across these six domains. The moral psychology 
literature provides three, yet untested, hypotheses about the relation 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments in these domains. 
 
Table 2.1 





Purity Binding Concerns contamination threats and 
violations of sanctity and chastity 
Authority Binding Concerns disobedience and disrespect 
towards authorities 
Loyalty Binding Concerns behaviors threatening the 
in-group, such as betrayal  
Care Individualizing Concerns harmful acts causing 
suffering or distress 
Fairness Individualizing Concerns (a lack of) cooperation and 
reciprocity  
Liberty Individualizing Concerns oppression and a lack of 
individual freedom 
Note: Descriptions based on Haidt (2012); Haidt & Joseph (2007) 
 
Primarily Purity Hypothesis. The primarily purity 
hypothesis is the most specific hypothesis and predicts that disgust 
sensitivity will be associated with harsher judgments of moral 
transgressions of the purity domain more so than with judgments of 
moral transgressions in any of the other domains. This hypothesis is 
consistent with Moral Foundations Theory, which was developed to 
explain why some cultures or people are more sensitive to one set of 
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Primarily Purity Hypothesis. The primarily purity 
hypothesis is the most specific hypothesis and predicts that disgust 
sensitivity will be associated with harsher judgments of moral 
transgressions of the purity domain more so than with judgments of 
moral transgressions in any of the other domains. This hypothesis is 
consistent with Moral Foundations Theory, which was developed to 
explain why some cultures or people are more sensitive to one set of 
moral issues, but not to other sets of moral issues (Graham et al., 
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2013). The degree to which one is morally sensitive to each of these 
domains depends on both cultural upbringing and personality. 
Disgust sensitivity is one such personality trait, and is thought to 
sensitize people to judgments in the purity domain because the 
concerns most relevant to the purity domain likely result from the 
same evolutionary problems as disgust. More specifically, Haidt 
(2012, p. 146) notes that “the original adaptive challenge that drove 
the evolution of the sanctity (i.e., purity) domain […] was the need 
to avoid pathogens, parasites, and other threats that spread by 
physical touch or proximity” and even goes as far as saying that “if we 
had no sense of disgust, I believe we would also have no sense of the 
sacred” (Haidt, 2012, pp. 173-174). The shared motivation of to 
avoid any potential threat of physical and mental contamination 
makes it likely that people most prone to experience disgust will also 
render the harshest judgment of purity-related moral transgressions 
(Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 
2011; Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999).  
This claim that disgust sensitivity relates to moral issues in 
the purity domain specifically, is consistent with some empirical 
studies in both moral and political psychology. Individual differences 
in trait disgust sensitivity predict opposition to gay marriage, 
abortion, and premarital sex (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe et al., 2009; 
Smith et al., 2011), and people scoring higher on disgust sensitivity 
have more conservative attitudes towards homosexuality and other 
threatening or non-traditional sexual practices (Crawford et al., 2014; 
Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Jarudi, 2009; Olatunji, 2008). These 
political issues all have been linked with the purity domain (Koleva, 
Graham, Haidt, Iyer, & Ditto, 2012). More directly, Horberg and 
colleagues (2009) find that while disgust sensitivity is positively 
related to punishment of purity transgressions, it has no such relation 
to punishment of justice transgressions. These studies support the 
possibility that disgust sensitivity is most strongly related to moral 
judgments in the purity domain compared to all of the other moral 
domains. 
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Primarily Binding Hypothesis. The primarily binding 
hypothesis is less specific than the first hypothesis and predicts that 
disgust sensitivity is a better predictor of judgments of all the binding 
moral domains than of judgments of the individualizing moral 
domains. There are at least three reasons for making this prediction. 
First, the binding domains are focused on increasing social 
cohesiveness and social order, and moral cognition in these domains 
is correlated with a preference for intuitive and emotional thinking 
(Garvey & Ford, 2014). Garvey and Ford also find that the 
individualizing moral domains (i.e., domains that concern the 
protection of the individual against harm and injustice) are more 
strongly related to a preference for rational thinking. More directly, 
they find that disgust sensitivity is correlated with support for moral 
values in all three binding moral domains, but not to moral values in 
any of the individualizing moral domains. Although this provides 
some indication that disgust sensitivity might be correlated more 
strongly to moral judgments of the binding moral domains, moral 
values do not correspond perfectly to moral judgments of specific 
situations (e.g., endorsing the moral principle of ‘do no harm’ does 
not mean that there are no instances in which inflicting some harm is 
permissible; Clifford, Iyengar, Cabeza, Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015). It 
should therefore be tested if disgust sensitivity has a similar relation 
to moral judgments tapping into the binding moral domains. 
Second, disgust sensitivity has been associated with 
maintaining a clear separation between the in-group and out-groups. 
The idea is that, evolutionarily speaking, out-groups provide a threat 
of disease that people who are disgust sensitive are particularly tuned 
for. People who score high on disgust sensitivity then may be more 
concerned with moral issues and judgments that help to bind the in-
group together and maintain separation from out-groups. Consistent 
with this idea, Naverrete and Fessler (2006) show that higher scores 
on disgust sensitivity relate not only to more negative perceptions of 
an out-group, but also to more positive perceptions of the in-group. 
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of disease that people who are disgust sensitive are particularly tuned 
for. People who score high on disgust sensitivity then may be more 
concerned with moral issues and judgments that help to bind the in-
group together and maintain separation from out-groups. Consistent 
with this idea, Naverrete and Fessler (2006) show that higher scores 
on disgust sensitivity relate not only to more negative perceptions of 
an out-group, but also to more positive perceptions of the in-group. 
Furthermore, disgust sensitivity predicts one’s stance on issues related 
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to in-group protection, such as immigration, and attitudes towards 
foreign and socially deviant groups (Brenner & Inbar, 2014; Hodson 
& Costello, 2007). More disgust sensitive people agree more with 
statements such as “immigrants are a threat to our society” and 
“immigrants bring more crime”, and are also more in favor of severe 
punishments for criminal offenders (Brenner & Inbar, 2014).  
Third, disgust sensitivity has been associated with overall 
support for political conservative ideologies and belief systems (Inbar 
et al., 2012; Terrizzi et al., 2010; Tybur et al., 2016). The binding 
moral domains are the domains most clearly associated with 
conservatism (Graham et al., 2009). If disgust sensitivity is associated 
with more conservative moral judgments overall, then it should be 
related to harsher judgments across the three binding domains as 
well.  
Considering all these findings, it is surprising that no study 
yet has directly compared disgust sensitivity’s association with moral 
judgments in each of the binding moral domains. As described above, 
previous research did show that disgust sensitivity’s association with 
purity judgments is stronger than its association with judgments of 
individualizing moral domains (i.e., Horberg et al., 2009), but this 
finding would also be in line with predictions following from a 
primarily binding hypothesis as it cannot distinguish a purity domain 
specific effect from a binding domain specific effect. Therefore a study 
that includes multiple binding domains is necessary to distinguish 
between the primarily purity hypothesis and the primarily binding 
hypothesis. 
Equal Strength Hypothesis. The most general hypothesis is 
the equal strength hypothesis, which predicts that disgust sensitivity 
relates to moral judgments in all domains equally. Admittedly, there 
is less support for this particular hypothesis, but it is hinted at by 
several perspectives. For example, constructivist perspectives on 
emotions suggest that emotions are not specifically tied to moral 
transgressions in any specific domain (Cameron et al., 2015). In a 
reanalysis of Hofmann and colleagues’ (Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, 
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& Skitka, 2014) data, Cameron and colleagues (2015) found that 
people experience as much disgust in response to purity 
transgressions as in response to harm transgressions. More directly, 
Chapman and Anderson (2014) have found that disgust sensitivity 
relates positively to condemnation of care transgressions, one of the 
individualizing moral domains. In addition, it has been found that 
more disgust sensitive participants are more likely to judge a suspect 
as guilty and, subsequently, propose harsher sentences (Jones & 
Fitness, 2008). Importantly, this latter study found no differences for 
disgusting compared to non-disgusting crimes. The key idea uniting 
all of these findings is that disgust is negative input into the moral 
judgment process and so, in turn, leads to harsher moral judgments 
regardless of the domain (Brandt & Reyna, 2011; Clore & Palmer, 
2009).  
 
The Current Studies 
We present five studies in which we investigated the domain 
specificity of the relation between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgment, by testing the three mutually exclusive hypotheses 
described above. Distinguishing between these three hypotheses will 
help lend support for theories in moral psychology that emphasize the 
importance (e.g., Graham et al., 2013) or the paucity (e.g., Gray, 
Young et al., 2012) of moral domains.  
One downside of moral judgment research is that researchers 
typically use unstandardized and ad hoc scenarios with unknown 
validity (e.g., Schnall, Haidt et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). 
This makes it difficult for researchers to test for the effects of 
emotions on moral judgments across domains (Clifford et al., 2015; 
Horberg et al., 2009). Therefore, we use moral judgments drawn 
from the Moral Foundations Vignettes (Clifford et al., 2015). This set 
of vignettes provides a standardized and validated set of moral 
judgments that spans much of the moral domain as proposed by 
Moral Foundations Theory, thereby solving common problems 
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Studies 2.1 - 2.4 
In four similar studies, we tested the relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and moral judgments. These data were originally 
collected for other purposes1, but can be used to provide an initial test 
of the three competing hypotheses. In Study 2.1 and Study 2.2 we 
included a measure of trait anger (Spielberger, 1999) and were able 
to use this to test if the effects we observe are specific to disgust. 
 
Method 
The four studies were similar in design, so they are described 
together and deviations are highlighted. In all studies, disgust 
sensitivity was measured with the 27-item Disgust Sensitivity Scale-
Revised (DS-R; Haidt et al., 1994, modified by Olatunji, Williams et 
al., 2007). The first 14 items are answered on a 5-point scale ranging 
from 0 = ‘Strongly disagree (very untrue about me)’ to 4 = ‘Strongly 
agree (very true about me)’. An example item is “If I see someone 
vomit, it makes me sick to my stomach”. The remaining 13 items are 
answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 = ‘Not disgusting at all’ 
to 4 = ‘Extremely disgusting’. An example item of this part of the 
scale is “You see maggots on a piece of meat in an outdoor garbage 
pail”. The scale has two filler items that are excluded from the 
analyses. See Table 2.2 for the reliability of this scale and the other 
scales used in these studies. 
In Study 2.1 and Study 2.2, individual differences in trait 
																																								 																				
1 The exact materials that were used in all studies and the relevant datasets 
can be found in the supplemental materials at the Open Science Framework 
(OSF; Supplemental Materials via https://osf.io/dspvr/). Studies 2.1 to 2.4 
included additional measures of potential moderators (i.e., private body 
consciousness, emotion regulation strategies) and mediators (i.e., sensitivity 
to deviance, approach and avoidance strategies) that ultimately did not 
moderate or mediate the relationships. The data of these studies have not 
been published elsewhere and can be found at the OSF. 
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anger were measured with the State-Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory-2 (STAXI; Spielberger, 1999). The STAXI has been used in 
previous research related to moral cognition (Horberg et al., 2009; 
Jones & Fitness, 2008) and is a well-validated measure of trait anger 
that relates to a variety of anger and aggression expressions (e.g., 
Barbour, Eckhardt, Davison, & Kassinove, 1998; Forgays, Forgays, & 
Spielberger, 1997; Wang, Yang, Yang, Wang, & Lei, 2017; Wittmann, 
Arce, & Santisteban, 2008). In the current research, only the 10-item 
trait anger subscale was used. All questions were answered on a 4-
point scale ranging from 1 = ‘(Almost) Never’ to 4 = ‘(Almost) 
Always’. An example item is ‘I have a fiery temper’. 
In all studies, moral transgressions were taken from a 
standardized set of vignettes based on Moral Foundations Theory 
(Clifford et al., 2015). This measure was chosen as it is the first set of 
moral judgments that is well-validated. Items are developed based on 
domain specific characteristics, and were categorized by subjects as 
belonging to a certain moral domain. Participants could also indicate 
that an item was not morally wrong, making sure that each 
transgression is considered to be violating a moral, instead of a social, 
norm. The authors conducted both exploratory as well as 
confirmatory factor analyses on moral judgments of these items to 
ensure that each item is a distinct indicator of a moral domain. 
Additionally, the moral judgment items in this set are controlled for 
comprehensibility, frequency of the act, imaginability, and strength of 
the emotional response they elicit. The set includes moral 
transgressions from six moral domains: care, fairness, authority, 
loyalty, liberty, and sanctity (which we, for sake of consistency, will 
refer to as purity from now on). Example items are “you see a woman 
clearly avoiding sitting next to an obese woman on the bus” (care 
domain) and “you see a story about a remote tribe eating the flesh of 
their deceased members” (purity domain). Participants indicated for 
each moral transgression how immoral they found the behavior on a 
scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all immoral’ to 7 = ‘Extremely 
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domain specific characteristics, and were categorized by subjects as 
belonging to a certain moral domain. Participants could also indicate 
that an item was not morally wrong, making sure that each 
transgression is considered to be violating a moral, instead of a social, 
norm. The authors conducted both exploratory as well as 
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ensure that each item is a distinct indicator of a moral domain. 
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comprehensibility, frequency of the act, imaginability, and strength of 
the emotional response they elicit. The set includes moral 
transgressions from six moral domains: care, fairness, authority, 
loyalty, liberty, and sanctity (which we, for sake of consistency, will 
refer to as purity from now on). Example items are “you see a woman 
clearly avoiding sitting next to an obese woman on the bus” (care 
domain) and “you see a story about a remote tribe eating the flesh of 
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scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all immoral’ to 7 = ‘Extremely 
immoral’, unless specified otherwise. The number of moral 
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transgressions and the number of moral domains they represent vary 
across studies. 
Study 2.1. Eighty Dutch students (58 females, Mage = 19.55, 
SD = 1.48) participated in this study, as part of a series of studies, in 
return for course credit. Sample size was based on the number of 
students that wanted to participate in our lab study during one week. 
They first filled out the disgust sensitivity scale and then provided 
judgments of eight moral transgressions, equally divided over four 
moral domains: purity, authority, care, and fairness.  
Study 2.2. Participants were recruited via social media and 
online fora. We planned to recruit a minimum of 200 participants. In 
the end, two-hundred twenty-one Dutch participants completed the 
entire questionnaire (171 females, 48 males, 2 unknown, Mage = 
31.45, SD = 13.92). Participants first filled out the disgust sensitivity 
scale and then proceeded with the moral judgments. Participants not 
only indicated how immoral they found each transgression, but they 
also indicated to what extent they would like to punish the person for 
his/her behavior (1 = ‘Not at all’ to 7 = ‘Very much so’). Participants 
made these judgments for ten transgressions from different moral 
domains; three purity, two authority, three care, and two fairness 
items.  
Study 2.3. Two-hundred and four Dutch students (161 
females, Mage = 19.43, SD = 1.86) participated in this study, as part 
of a series of studies, in return for course credit. Sample size was 
based on the number of students that wanted to participate in our lab 
study during two weeks. They filled out the disgust sensitivity scale 
and rated the same ten moral transgressions on immorality as in 
Study 2.2.  
Study 2.4. One-hundred and forty-eight Dutch students (119 
females, Mage = 19.97, SD = 2.29) were recruited on campus and 
participation was voluntary. Sample size was based on the number of 
students that wanted to participate in our study during one week. The 
disgust sensitivity scale was filled out first followed by eight moral 
transgressions: four purity, two care, and two fairness items.    
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Results and Discussion 
 Primary Analyses. Path analysis was used to estimate and 
compare the strength of the relationship between disgust sensitivity 
and judgments of moral transgressions of all the moral domains. 
These analyses were conducted using the ‘sem’ function in the ‘lavaan’ 
package of R (Rosseel, 2012). See Table 2.2 for an overview of 
means, standard deviations, and correlations between all subscales 
described in this section. 
First, a free model including disgust sensitivity as a predictor 
and all moral domains as outcome variables was fitted.2 The 
unstandardized estimates from this model per dataset are in Figure 
2.1. It appears that across the four samples disgust sensitivity is a 
stronger predictor of immorality and punishment ratings of purity 
transgressions than ratings of transgressions in the other domains. 
Similarly, the other binding domain (i.e., authority) looks 
approximately equal in strength to the individualizing domains. These 
initial impressions are consistent with the primarily purity hypothesis, 
but not with the equal strength or the primarily binding hypotheses. 
To test these impressions, we next compared the free model 
with the “all equal” model in which all paths between disgust 
sensitivity and the moral domains are constrained to be equal. Chi-
square tests show that the all equal model fits the data significantly 
worse than the free model in all four studies (see Table 2.3). This 
suggests that there are significant differences in the strength of the 
paths depending on the moral domain. To directly assess the validity 
of the primarily binding and primarily purity hypotheses we 
compared the free model to models in which pairs of paths between 
disgust sensitivity (DS) and judgments in one of the moral domains 
are constrained to be equal (see Table 2.3 for hypothesis-relevant 
constraints). 
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The primarily purity hypothesis predicts that constraining the 
DS-purity link to be equal to any of the DS-moral domain links will 
result in poorer fit as a result of a stronger DS-purity association. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, across 13 of the 14 relevant model 
comparisons the constraint significantly hurt model fit. In the 
remaining relevant comparison (in Study 2.4 where the DS-purity link 
is compared to the DS-care link), the effect was in the direction 
consistent with the primarily purity hypothesis, but the constraint was 
not significant (p = .09).  
The primarily binding hypothesis is an expanded version of 
the primarily purity hypothesis. It also predicts that the DS-purity link 
will be stronger than the DS-care and DS-fairness links; however, it 
differs in that it predicts that the DS-authority link will be larger than 
the DS-care and the DS-fairness links as well and similar in size to the 
DS-purity link. The prior paragraph showed that the DS-authority link 
was never similar in strength to the DS-purity link. The additional 
comparisons between the DS-authority link and both DS-fairness and 
DS-care links were not any more supportive of the hypothesis. Three 
of the eight constraints significantly hurt model fit, but were in the 
opposite direction of the predictions following from the primarily 
binding hypothesis (e.g., the DS-authority link is significantly weaker 
than the DS-care link in Study 2.4). Only one of the eight constraints 
significantly hurt model fit and was in the expected direction (i.e., the 
DS-authority link is significantly different from the DS-fairness link in 
Study 2.2); however, the DS-authority link in this case did not differ 
from zero. The remaining four constraints did not hurt model fit, 
showing no difference in strength for these links. The primarily 
binding hypothesis was thus not supported. Overall, the results 
provide most support for the primarily purity hypothesis. 
Additional Analyses. In Study 2.1 and Study 2.2 we were 
able to use the same model comparison approach as just described, 
but also control for trait anger. See Table 2.2 for an overview of 
means and standard deviations of trait anger, and correlations of trait 
anger with all subscales. To control for trait anger, a model including
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disgust sensitivity and trait anger as predictors and all moral domains 
as outcome variables was fitted. Subsequently, the same constraints 
were applied to the association between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments as described above. Adding trait anger to the models did 
not change the results of any but two model comparisons. In both 
cases, adding trait anger to the model affected the comparison 
between the free model and the model in which the DS-authority and 
DS-fairness links were constraint to be equal. In Study 2.1, the initial 
model comparison showed that the DS-authority and DS-fairness links 
did not differ in strength, but when controlling for trait anger, the DS-
authority link was found to be significantly stronger than the DS-
fairness link (χ2[1, N = 80] = 4.41, p = .04). However, for the 
punishment data in Study 2.2 the exact opposite happened when 
controlling for trait anger. While the DS-authority link was initially 
stronger than the DS-fairness link, including trait anger made both 
links equal in strength (χ2[1, N = 221] = 3.32 , p = .07). Importantly 
though, adding trait anger to the models did not change our 
conclusion that disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to the 
purity domain than to any of the other moral domains. Because the 
inclusion of trait anger did not affect our conclusion, we did not 
include it in our final study. 3 
 
Study 2.5 
In the first four studies, we found that disgust sensitivity is more 
strongly associated with purity moral judgments than to moral 
judgments in the authority, care, and fairness domains. This provides 
support for the primarily purity hypothesis and contradicts the equal 
strength and primarily binding hypotheses. However, these findings 
might be related to the specifics of the studies. For example, purity 
judgments tended to have higher reliability than judgments in other 
																																								 																				
3 See Supplemental Materials for all model comparisons, with and without 
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binding hypothesis (e.g., the DS-authority link is significantly weaker 
than the DS-care link in Study 2.4). Only one of the eight constraints 
significantly hurt model fit and was in the expected direction (i.e., the 
DS-authority link is significantly different from the DS-fairness link in 
Study 2.2); however, the DS-authority link in this case did not differ 
from zero. The remaining four constraints did not hurt model fit, 
showing no difference in strength for these links. The primarily 
binding hypothesis was thus not supported. Overall, the results 
provide most support for the primarily purity hypothesis. 
Additional Analyses. In Study 2.1 and Study 2.2 we were 
able to use the same model comparison approach as just described, 
but also control for trait anger. See Table 2.2 for an overview of 
means and standard deviations of trait anger, and correlations of trait 
anger with all subscales. To control for trait anger, a model including
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disgust sensitivity and trait anger as predictors and all moral domains 
as outcome variables was fitted. Subsequently, the same constraints 
were applied to the association between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments as described above. Adding trait anger to the models did 
not change the results of any but two model comparisons. In both 
cases, adding trait anger to the model affected the comparison 
between the free model and the model in which the DS-authority and 
DS-fairness links were constraint to be equal. In Study 2.1, the initial 
model comparison showed that the DS-authority and DS-fairness links 
did not differ in strength, but when controlling for trait anger, the DS-
authority link was found to be significantly stronger than the DS-
fairness link (χ2[1, N = 80] = 4.41, p = .04). However, for the 
punishment data in Study 2.2 the exact opposite happened when 
controlling for trait anger. While the DS-authority link was initially 
stronger than the DS-fairness link, including trait anger made both 
links equal in strength (χ2[1, N = 221] = 3.32 , p = .07). Importantly 
though, adding trait anger to the models did not change our 
conclusion that disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to the 
purity domain than to any of the other moral domains. Because the 
inclusion of trait anger did not affect our conclusion, we did not 
include it in our final study. 3 
 
Study 2.5 
In the first four studies, we found that disgust sensitivity is more 
strongly associated with purity moral judgments than to moral 
judgments in the authority, care, and fairness domains. This provides 
support for the primarily purity hypothesis and contradicts the equal 
strength and primarily binding hypotheses. However, these findings 
might be related to the specifics of the studies. For example, purity 
judgments tended to have higher reliability than judgments in other 
																																								 																				
3 See Supplemental Materials for all model comparisons, with and without 
controlling for trait anger. 
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domains (e.g., care in Study 2.4). The low reliabilities may be due to 
the characteristics of our particular samples (i.e., from The 
Netherlands) compared to the samples used to create the stimuli (i.e., 
from the United States; Clifford et al., 2015) or because we used a 
relatively small number of moral judgments. Another constraint of 
our studies is that we only included one other binding moral domain 
(authority) in addition to purity. It may be the case that loyalty moral 
judgments, the third binding moral domain, are also particularly 
strongly associated with disgust sensitivity. Disgust and disgust 
sensitivity have been shown to predict opposition to out-groups in 
order to protect the in-group from the potential disease threat out-
groups are believed to possess (Brenner & Inbar, 2014; Hodson & 
Costello, 2007) and so by not including loyalty judgments we might 
have overstated our case. We also did not include any judgments 
regarding liberty or freedom, a domain that people appear to consider 
moral (e.g., Clifford et al., 2015; Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2012; 
Hoffman et al., 2014; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). 
Finally, we did not originally set out to test these particular 
hypotheses with these first four studies and therefore sought out to 
directly test our hypothesis with more reliable measures of moral 
judgments across a wider array of moral judgments. This study and 
our expectation that the primarily purity hypothesis would receive 
most support was preregistered at the Open Science Framework 
before data collection started.4 
 
Method 
Participants. Based on the findings in our previous studies,5 
a conservative a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power 
																																								 																				
4 See Supplemental Materials for all preregistration files. 
5 This includes the first four studies in this article, plus an additional study 
that accidentally excluded 7 disgust sensitivity items and included repeats of 
another 7 disgust sensitivity items. We analyzed this data without the 
repeated items and used the conclusions to inform our power analyses (see 
Supplemental Materials, Study 2.5A).  
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(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Bucher, 2007) to detect a difference in slope 
of .158. This suggested that a sample size of 424 participants was 
necessary to achieve power of 90%. Therefore, we aimed for at least 
450 participants, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. In the end, 
451 MTurkers (208 females, 242 males, 1 other, Mage = 35.31, SD = 
10.66) completed our study in return for a financial reward.  
Materials. Disgust sensitivity was measured with the same 
scale as in Studies 2.1 to 2.4 (i.e., DS-R; Haidt et al., 1994, modified 
by Olatunji, Williams et al., 2007). Sixty moral transgressions were 
taken from the same item set as in Studies 2.1 to 2.4 (Clifford et al., 
2015), ten from each moral domain. All moral domains had high 
reliabilities (see Table 2.2). Participants indicated to what extent they 
found each moral transgression immoral on a scale ranging from 1 = 
‘Not at all immoral’ to 7 = ‘Extremely immoral’.  
 
Results 
See Table 2.2 for an overview of means, standard deviations, 
and correlations between all subscales. Our pre-registered, 
confirmatory analyses used the same data analytic strategy as in 
Studies 2.1 to 2.4. First, a free model including disgust sensitivity as a 
predictor and all moral domains as outcome variables was fitted (for 
the unstandardized estimates, see Figure 2.1). To test the equal 
strength hypothesis, we compared the free model with the “all equal” 
model in which all paths between disgust sensitivity and moral 
domains are constrained to be equal. Contradictory to what is 
expected according to the equal strength hypothesis, a chi-square test 
shows that the all equal model fits the data significantly worse than 
the free model, suggesting that some moral domains are significantly 
stronger related to disgust sensitivity than others (see Table 2.3). As 
in Studies 2.1 to 2.4, we assessed the validity of the primarily purity 
and primarily binding hypotheses by comparing the free model to 
models in which pairs of paths between disgust sensitivity (DS) and 
judgments in one of the moral domains are constrained to be equal 
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of .158. This suggested that a sample size of 424 participants was 
necessary to achieve power of 90%. Therefore, we aimed for at least 
450 participants, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. In the end, 
451 MTurkers (208 females, 242 males, 1 other, Mage = 35.31, SD = 
10.66) completed our study in return for a financial reward.  
Materials. Disgust sensitivity was measured with the same 
scale as in Studies 2.1 to 2.4 (i.e., DS-R; Haidt et al., 1994, modified 
by Olatunji, Williams et al., 2007). Sixty moral transgressions were 
taken from the same item set as in Studies 2.1 to 2.4 (Clifford et al., 
2015), ten from each moral domain. All moral domains had high 
reliabilities (see Table 2.2). Participants indicated to what extent they 
found each moral transgression immoral on a scale ranging from 1 = 
‘Not at all immoral’ to 7 = ‘Extremely immoral’.  
 
Results 
See Table 2.2 for an overview of means, standard deviations, 
and correlations between all subscales. Our pre-registered, 
confirmatory analyses used the same data analytic strategy as in 
Studies 2.1 to 2.4. First, a free model including disgust sensitivity as a 
predictor and all moral domains as outcome variables was fitted (for 
the unstandardized estimates, see Figure 2.1). To test the equal 
strength hypothesis, we compared the free model with the “all equal” 
model in which all paths between disgust sensitivity and moral 
domains are constrained to be equal. Contradictory to what is 
expected according to the equal strength hypothesis, a chi-square test 
shows that the all equal model fits the data significantly worse than 
the free model, suggesting that some moral domains are significantly 
stronger related to disgust sensitivity than others (see Table 2.3). As 
in Studies 2.1 to 2.4, we assessed the validity of the primarily purity 
and primarily binding hypotheses by comparing the free model to 
models in which pairs of paths between disgust sensitivity (DS) and 
judgments in one of the moral domains are constrained to be equal 
(see Table 2.3 for hypothesis-relevant constraints). 
Chapter 2 
	46 
To test the primarily purity hypothesis, the free model was 
compared to models in which the DS-purity link is constrained to be 
equal to each of the other DS-moral domain links. All five alternative 
models resulted in poorer model fit, showing that the DS-purity link is 
significantly stronger than any of the other links between disgust 
sensitivity and one of the moral domains, thereby supporting the 
primarily purity hypothesis. 
 The primarily binding hypothesis predicts that the DS-purity, 
DS-authority, and DS-loyalty links will be stronger than the DS-care, 
DS-fairness, and DS-liberty links. Although the previous paragraph 
already showed that the DS-purity link is stronger than both the DS-
authority and DS-loyalty links, we continued to test support for the 
primarily binding hypothesis by comparing the additional relevant 
paths for the DS-authority and DS-loyalty links. Four of these six 
constraints indeed significantly hurt model fit in the expected 
direction. The DS-authority and DS-loyalty links were significantly 
stronger than the DS-fairness and DS-liberty links. However, contrary 
to the primarily binding hypothesis, constraining the DS-authority 
and DS-loyalty link to be equal to the DS-care link did not 
significantly hurt model fit, suggesting they are equal in strength. The 
primarily binding hypothesis is therefore not fully supported. In line 
with Studies 2.1 to 2.4 and in line with our preregistered 
expectations, most support was found for the primarily purity 
hypothesis.6  
Internal Meta-Analysis 
An internal meta-analysis was conducted to analyze the 
association between disgust sensitivity and purity moral judgments, 
																																								 																				
6 We conducted an exploratory test of political ideology as a mediator 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity. While we 
replicated the pattern reported by Clifford and colleagues (2015) regarding 
the relation between political ideology and each of the moral domains, we 
find no relation between political ideology and disgust sensitivity (in line 
with results reported for pathogen disgust in Van Leeuwen et al., 2017).   
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as compared to the other moral domains, across all our studies. The 
meta-analysis was conducted using the ‘rma’ function in the ‘metafor’ 
package of R (Viechtbauer, 2010). For all studies, the correlations 
between disgust sensitivity and judgments in all the moral domains 
were included using Fisher r-to-z transformations. In addition to the 
five studies above, we also included an additional study where we 
accidentally excluded 7 disgust sensitivity items and included repeats 
of another 7 disgust sensitivity items (see Footnote 5). We analyzed 
this data without the repeated items (see Supplemental Materials, 
Study 2.5A) to include it in the meta-analysis. The correlations 
related to the punishment judgments of Study 2.2 were not included 
because these items do not have multiple measurements across our 
studies. 
 A fixed-effects model confirms that there is a significant 
relation between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments across all of 
the moral judgments (r = .26, p < .001). To test the equal strength 
hypothesis, moral domain was added to the model as a moderator. 
Contrary to what the equal strength hypothesis would predict, moral 
domain moderates the effect (QM[5] = 86.796, p < .001), showing 
that the strength of the effect differs depending on type of moral 
domain. 
 To test the primarily purity hypothesis, the DS-purity link was 
taken as the reference category against which all other links were 
tested. Additionally, country where the study took place was added as 
a moderator to account for the differences in strength of the relations 
(i.e., the relation between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments 
seemed stronger across all moral domains in the US samples than in 
the Dutch samples). By adding it as a moderator we can control for 
this. Conclusions remained the same without this moderator added to 
the model. Consistent with the primarily purity hypothesis, the DS-
purity link (r = .40) was found to be significantly stronger than all 
other links between disgust sensitivity and judgments of moral 
domains (DS-authority: r = .19; z = -5.95, p < .001; DS-loyalty: r = 
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as compared to the other moral domains, across all our studies. The 
meta-analysis was conducted using the ‘rma’ function in the ‘metafor’ 
package of R (Viechtbauer, 2010). For all studies, the correlations 
between disgust sensitivity and judgments in all the moral domains 
were included using Fisher r-to-z transformations. In addition to the 
five studies above, we also included an additional study where we 
accidentally excluded 7 disgust sensitivity items and included repeats 
of another 7 disgust sensitivity items (see Footnote 5). We analyzed 
this data without the repeated items (see Supplemental Materials, 
Study 2.5A) to include it in the meta-analysis. The correlations 
related to the punishment judgments of Study 2.2 were not included 
because these items do not have multiple measurements across our 
studies. 
 A fixed-effects model confirms that there is a significant 
relation between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments across all of 
the moral judgments (r = .26, p < .001). To test the equal strength 
hypothesis, moral domain was added to the model as a moderator. 
Contrary to what the equal strength hypothesis would predict, moral 
domain moderates the effect (QM[5] = 86.796, p < .001), showing 
that the strength of the effect differs depending on type of moral 
domain. 
 To test the primarily purity hypothesis, the DS-purity link was 
taken as the reference category against which all other links were 
tested. Additionally, country where the study took place was added as 
a moderator to account for the differences in strength of the relations 
(i.e., the relation between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments 
seemed stronger across all moral domains in the US samples than in 
the Dutch samples). By adding it as a moderator we can control for 
this. Conclusions remained the same without this moderator added to 
the model. Consistent with the primarily purity hypothesis, the DS-
purity link (r = .40) was found to be significantly stronger than all 
other links between disgust sensitivity and judgments of moral 
domains (DS-authority: r = .19; z = -5.95, p < .001; DS-loyalty: r = 
.24; z = -4.00, p < .001; DS-care: r = .27; z = -4.08, p < .001; DS-
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fairness: r = .11; z = -8.46, p < .001; DS-liberty: r = .07; z = -7.66, 
p < .001).  
Next, we tested the primarily binding hypothesis that disgust 
sensitivity is more strongly related to moral judgments in the binding 
domains (i.e., purity, authority, and loyalty) than in the 
individualizing domains (i.e., care, fairness, and liberty). The 
previous paragraph shows that the DS-purity link is stronger than any 
other DS-moral domain links, regardless of whether the domain is 
classified as individualizing or binding. To test whether the DS-
authority link is stronger than the link between disgust sensitivity and 
the individualizing moral domains, the DS-authority link was taken as 
the reference category. Controlling for country, the DS-authority link 
proved to be significantly stronger than both the DS-fairness (z = -
2.16, p = .03) and DS-liberty (z = -2.62, p = .009) links, but 
significantly weaker than the DS-care link (z = 2.04, p = .04). Taking 
the DS-loyalty link as the reference category revealed a similar 
pattern. The DS-loyalty link proved to be significantly stronger than 
both the DS-fairness (z = -2.81, p = .005) and DS-liberty (z = -3.33, 
p < .001) links, but equal in strength to the DS-care link (z = 0.71, p 
= .48). The primarily binding hypothesis was thus not fully 




The relation between individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity and attitudes related to the moral domain is well 
established (e.g., Crawford et al., 2014; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe et al., 
2009; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Naverrete & Fessler, 2006). A question 
that remained unanswered, however, is whether this association 
between disgust sensitivity and morality is general or if it is specific to 
a certain set of moral domains. We derived three plausible hypotheses 
from the literature. The primarily purity hypothesis states that disgust 
sensitivity is more strongly related to moral judgments in the purity 
DS and purity moral judgments 
	 49 
domain than to moral judgments in any of the other moral domains. 
The primarily binding hypothesis takes a somewhat broader 
perspective by distinguishing binding from individualizing moral 
domains and predicts that disgust sensitivity is primarily related to 
judgments in the binding moral domains. The last and most general 
hypothesis, the equal strength hypothesis, however, predicts that 
disgust sensitivity relates to moral judgments across all domains 
equally. 
In five studies, including one pre-registered study, and an 
internal meta-analysis, we tested these hypotheses against each other 
and found strong support for the primarily purity hypothesis. In both 
Dutch and American samples, we find that disgust sensitivity is more 
strongly related to moral judgments of purity transgressions than to 
moral judgments of transgressions of any other domain. No 
convincing support was found for the equal strength or primarily 
binding hypothesis. 
These findings are in line with Moral Foundations Theory, 
which argues that differences in moral sensitivity to each domain can 
be dependent on an individual’s personality (Graham et al., 2013). 
The general idea is that specific personality traits make specific 
problems in our surroundings salient, and over time, these types of 
problems become the focus of our moral concern. In our case, the 
personality trait of disgust sensitivity seems to make an individual 
especially concerned with transgressions of moral purity.  
 
A Permissive Equal Strengths Hypothesis 
Although these findings are not supportive of the equal 
strength hypothesis as we defined it, we should note that not 
everyone might agree with the strict perspective we took of this 
account. A more permissive version of this hypothesis might predict 
that disgust sensitivity does not relate to one moral domain 
specifically and so correlations might be found with other domains, 
no matter their strength. Without the restriction that all moral 
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domain than to moral judgments in any of the other moral domains. 
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judgments in the binding moral domains. The last and most general 
hypothesis, the equal strength hypothesis, however, predicts that 
disgust sensitivity relates to moral judgments across all domains 
equally. 
In five studies, including one pre-registered study, and an 
internal meta-analysis, we tested these hypotheses against each other 
and found strong support for the primarily purity hypothesis. In both 
Dutch and American samples, we find that disgust sensitivity is more 
strongly related to moral judgments of purity transgressions than to 
moral judgments of transgressions of any other domain. No 
convincing support was found for the equal strength or primarily 
binding hypothesis. 
These findings are in line with Moral Foundations Theory, 
which argues that differences in moral sensitivity to each domain can 
be dependent on an individual’s personality (Graham et al., 2013). 
The general idea is that specific personality traits make specific 
problems in our surroundings salient, and over time, these types of 
problems become the focus of our moral concern. In our case, the 
personality trait of disgust sensitivity seems to make an individual 
especially concerned with transgressions of moral purity.  
 
A Permissive Equal Strengths Hypothesis 
Although these findings are not supportive of the equal 
strength hypothesis as we defined it, we should note that not 
everyone might agree with the strict perspective we took of this 
account. A more permissive version of this hypothesis might predict 
that disgust sensitivity does not relate to one moral domain 
specifically and so correlations might be found with other domains, 
no matter their strength. Without the restriction that all moral 
domains have an equally strong relationship with disgust sensitivity, 
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this account would receive more support. For example, one could 
point to the significant correlations between disgust sensitivity and 
moral judgments of the care and authority domain in Study 2.5 and 
interpret these as evidence in favor of this permissive version of the 
equal strength hypothesis. However, we believe that such an account 
has two major drawbacks. First, this version of the equal strengths 
hypothesis has very little predictive power. It does not identify which 
moral domains should or should not correlate with certain personality 
characteristics and it does not specify a sufficiently strong correlation 
to “count” as evidence in support of the hypothesis. For example, if 
we found a significant correlation between disgust sensitivity and 
non-purity judgments that was a very small r = .05, would that be 
consistent with an equal strengths hypothesis? This seems too 
permissive to be useful.  Second, even when putting aside this 
shortcoming, the evidence for such an account is, according to our 
data, weak at best. Although we identified some significant 
correlations between non-purity domains and disgust sensitivity in 
our studies, they do not appear consistently across all of our studies. 
For example, disgust sensitivity is not significantly related to moral 
judgments in the authority domain in Studies 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, nor to 
the moral judgments of the care domain in Studies 2.1 and 2.2. We 
therefore conclude that, even when taking into account a more 
permissive version of the equal strength hypothesis, our data fit the 
primarily purity hypothesis best.  
 
Moral Foundations Vignettes vs. Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire 
Certainly, we are not the only ones to have proposed and 
tested such a link between disgust and moral purity (e.g., Crawford et 
al., 2014; Horberg et al., 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, 
Pizarro, Knobe et al., 2009; Jarudi, 2009; Olatunji, 2008; Rozin, 
Lowery et al., 1999; Smith et al., 2011). Recently, van Leeuwen and 
colleagues (2017) demonstrated that trait pathogen disgust is related 
to moral purity measured by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
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(MFQ). While their research might look similar at face value, we 
think that there are some important distinctions that should be 
highlighted. One distinction is that the MFQ and the Moral 
Foundations Vignettes (MFV), used in our studies, measure distinct 
components of morality. While the MFQ focuses on the relevance of 
abstract moral concerns, the MFV is set up to test moral judgments of 
specific behaviors and situations. Moral judgments, as compared to 
measures of abstract moral concerns, are important outcomes because 
they allow for the impact of moral intuitions and form the basis of 
one of the criteria determining the existence of a moral domain (see 
Introduction). Even though the second half of the MFQ are said to 
include moral judgment items, it can be doubted to what degree these 
actually assess moral condemnation (i.e., disagreeing with items such 
as “I am proud of my country’s history” does not necessarily imply 
that the participant thinks it is morally wrong to be proud of your 
country’s history) and most items still focus on endorsement of 
abstract situations or values (e.g., “I would call some acts wrong on 
the grounds that they are unnatural”). Although it is likely that such 
broad moral concerns inform moral judgments of specific situations, 
Graham and colleagues (2009, p. 1031) agree that the MFQ “does not 
necessarily measure how people actually make moral judgments”. 
Importantly, correlations between the MFV and MFQ are indeed small 
to medium, which is not surprising since studies show that people 
express different degrees of moral concern depending on situation 
specific characteristics (e.g., Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian, 
2016; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). We believe that the most 
crucial contribution of our research, though, concerns disgust 
sensitivity’s relative relation to each of the moral domains. Although 
previous studies have shown a link between disgust sensitivity and 
the purity domain, none of these have systematically compared the 
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colleagues (2017) demonstrated that trait pathogen disgust is related 
to moral purity measured by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
DS and purity moral judgments 
	 51 
(MFQ). While their research might look similar at face value, we 
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crucial contribution of our research, though, concerns disgust 
sensitivity’s relative relation to each of the moral domains. Although 
previous studies have shown a link between disgust sensitivity and 
the purity domain, none of these have systematically compared the 







Although our data reveal overwhelming support for the 
primarily purity hypothesis, it remains to be tested what psychological 
mechanism accounts for this relation.  
Behavioral Immune System. One potential mechanism that 
has been suggested is the close involvement of the behavioral 
immune system in the experience of both pathogen disgust and moral 
transgressions of the purity domain (Inbar & Pizarro, 2014). Purity 
transgressions often include potential contagion threats (e.g., via 
unusual foods or sexual practices)7 to which more disgust sensitive 
people are more likely to respond with rejection and avoidance (Inbar 
& Pizarro, 2014).  
A similar, but less generous explanation results from an 
ongoing debate on what exactly constitutes the purity domain. More 
specifically, it has been argued that disgust sensitivity’s unique 
relation with purity judgments is not related to moral content, but 
instead is caused by general features of purity scenarios, such as 
direct references to core disgust elicitors (e.g., Cameron et al., 2015). 
However, we have two reasons to believe that such an explanation 
cannot account for the effects found in our studies. First, the moral 
transgressions that were used in our studies do not make direct 
references to core disgust eliciting stimuli such as bodily fluids). 
Second, even if this would be the case, in two additional studies we 
find that the presence of a core disgust elicitor in a moral 
transgression is not sufficient to establish a strong connection to 
disgust sensitivity. In these studies, including a student sample (N = 
144) and a sample from the general population (N = 190), we tested 
																																								 																				
7 Please note that the Disgust Sensitivity Scale – Revised (DS-R) includes only 
1 item referring to sex. Removing this item from the DS-R did not affect any 
of the model comparisons reported in our studies. Similarly, the DS-R relates 
as strongly to purity transgressions referring to sexual activities (6 items) as 
to purity transgressions without such a reference (4 items; both r’s are .39). 
Conducting the analyses without these 6 items did not affect any of the model 
comparisons reported in Study 2.5. 
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whether adding a pathogen cue to non-purity moral transgressions 
results in a stronger relationship with disgust sensitivity (e.g., a 
burglar dropping ink on the carpet vs a burglar urinating on the 
carpet). However, disgust sensitivity does not relate to any of the 
moral judgments in our studies, regardless of the presence of 
pathogen cues (for all main effects of disgust sensitivity and all 
interactions between disgust sensitivity and condition, t’s < 1.34, p’s 
> .18). On the contrary, examining the data using Bayesian analyses 
(in which the fit of the data under the alternative hypothesis is 
compared to the fit of the data under the null hypothesis; Morey & 
Rouder, 2014) returned a Bayes factor of, on average, 0.425 (ranging 
between 0.293 and 0.712) in favor of the null hypothesis. In other 
words, our data were almost 2.5 times more likely to occur under the 
model that predicts no interaction effect of disgust sensitivity and the 
presence (vs. absence) of a pathogen cue on moral judgments than 
under the model predicting such an interaction effect (for more 
information on these studies, see Supplemental Materials). We 
therefore think it is unlikely that the potential presence of core 
disgust elicitors in purity transgressions alone accounts for the 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and purity moral judgments. 
Weird Scenarios. An alternative mechanism that might be at 
play concerns the weirdness of moral scenarios often featured in the 
purity domain. Popular scenarios tapping into the purity domain are 
perceived to be weirder (i.e., more abnormal) than scenarios 
measuring the care domain (Chakroff & Young, 2015a; Gray & 
Keeney, 2015). According to Gray and Keeney (2015) this “weirdness 
may also help account for the oft-discussed link between disgust and 
impurity [..], without referencing distinct moral 
mechanisms”. Although there is yet no empirical evidence supporting 
this claim, it could be that individuals who are more easily disgusted 
are more sensitive to any kind of deviation from what is normal, and 
thus also to these weird or bizarre scenarios representing the purity 
domain. As one preliminary test of this idea, we included an abstract 
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words, our data were almost 2.5 times more likely to occur under the 
model that predicts no interaction effect of disgust sensitivity and the 
presence (vs. absence) of a pathogen cue on moral judgments than 
under the model predicting such an interaction effect (for more 
information on these studies, see Supplemental Materials). We 
therefore think it is unlikely that the potential presence of core 
disgust elicitors in purity transgressions alone accounts for the 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and purity moral judgments. 
Weird Scenarios. An alternative mechanism that might be at 
play concerns the weirdness of moral scenarios often featured in the 
purity domain. Popular scenarios tapping into the purity domain are 
perceived to be weirder (i.e., more abnormal) than scenarios 
measuring the care domain (Chakroff & Young, 2015a; Gray & 
Keeney, 2015). According to Gray and Keeney (2015) this “weirdness 
may also help account for the oft-discussed link between disgust and 
impurity [..], without referencing distinct moral 
mechanisms”. Although there is yet no empirical evidence supporting 
this claim, it could be that individuals who are more easily disgusted 
are more sensitive to any kind of deviation from what is normal, and 
thus also to these weird or bizarre scenarios representing the purity 
domain. As one preliminary test of this idea, we included an abstract 
measure of sensitivity to deviation (Okimoto & Gromet, 2016) in 
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Study 2.4. However, this measure was not correlated with disgust 
sensitivity (r[148] = -.05, p = .58) or purity moral judgments 
(r[148] = -.08, p = .32). 
Moral Character. A related fourth potential mechanism is 
moral character. Recent evidence suggests that disgust is sensitive to 
evidence of a person’s moral character (Giner-Sorrola & Chapman, 
2016). People might be especially likely to use actions that are 
particularly abnormal, as Gray and Keeney (2015) argue purity 
transgressions are, as indicators of a person’s moral character 
(Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011). If disgust sensitivity 
also indexes an interest and sensitivity to moral character, this may 
also help to explain the primarily purity hypothesis. 
 
Disgust Sensitivity Measure 
One potential limitation of our studies is that we use the 
same scale to measure disgust sensitivity in all five of our studies (i.e., 
DS-R; Haidt et al., 1994, modified by Olatunji, Williams et al. 2007). 
Although this is the most widely used measure of disgust sensitivity, 
some might argue it is based on an incomplete definition of disgust. 
The Three Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS; Tybur et al., 2009), for 
example, includes not only pathogen disgust, but also sexual and 
moral disgust. However, because the TDDS is highly correlated with 
all subscales of the DS-R (Tybur et al., 2009) it is likely that using this 
measure of disgust sensitivity would yield results similar to our 
current findings. In line with that reasoning, Van Leeuwen and 
colleagues (2017) find that the pathogen subscale of the TDDS has a 
high correlation with moral values of purity (r = .31), relative to 
correlations with moral values of authority (r = .24), loyalty (r = 
.19), care (r = .20), and fairness (r = .12). In addition, there is 
substantial overlap between the two additional subscales of the TDDS 
(i.e., sexual disgust and moral disgust) and specific moral domains. 
While the sexual disgust scale relates closely to moral transgressions 
in the purity domain (i.e., including items related to promiscuity and 
specific sexual acts), the moral disgust subscale is compatible with 
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moral transgressions of fairness and care (i.e., including items related 
to theft and dishonesty). It is therefore not surprising, and consistent 
with our findings, that the pathogen disgust subscale is strongly 
correlated with the sexual disgust subscale (i.e., purity transgressions; 
r = .38; Tybur et al., 2009, Study 4) and less so with the moral 
disgust subscale (i.e., fairness and care transgressions; r = .17; Tybur 
et al., 2009, Study 4).  
 
Are Moral Domains Distinct Constructs? 
Lastly, we want to address the discussion on whether the 
moral domains suggested by Moral Foundations Theory measure 
distinct constructs (e.g., Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012). Contra Moral 
Foundations Theory, some have argued that the moral foundations 
are not distinct domains and instead are all manifestations of a single 
underlying domain (e.g., typically harm; Gray Young et al., 2012; 
Cameron et al., 2015). Although our paper aimed to distinguish 
between hypotheses about the association between disgust sensitivity 
and moral judgments across domains, our question and its answers 
have implications for this broader debate. For example, one could 
point to the relatively high correlations between moral domains in 
some of our studies (see especially Study 2.5, see Table 2.2) and use 
this to argue that all moral judgments stem from a single domain. 
However, these correlations – and even if they were stronger – would 
not provide reliable evidence in favor of the existence of one common 
construct.  
There are several reasons. First, these high correlations were 
not a feature of every study, suggesting that a single domain account 
cannot parsimoniously describe the pattern of correlations across all 
of our studies. Second, prior validity testing and factor analyses by 
Clifford and colleagues (2015) has shown that all transgressions are 
reflective of distinct moral concerns. Third, and conceptually more 
consequential, even if scales are highly correlated that does not 
preclude that the scales measure different constructs. The idea that all 
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are not distinct domains and instead are all manifestations of a single 
underlying domain (e.g., typically harm; Gray Young et al., 2012; 
Cameron et al., 2015). Although our paper aimed to distinguish 
between hypotheses about the association between disgust sensitivity 
and moral judgments across domains, our question and its answers 
have implications for this broader debate. For example, one could 
point to the relatively high correlations between moral domains in 
some of our studies (see especially Study 2.5, see Table 2.2) and use 
this to argue that all moral judgments stem from a single domain. 
However, these correlations – and even if they were stronger – would 
not provide reliable evidence in favor of the existence of one common 
construct.  
There are several reasons. First, these high correlations were 
not a feature of every study, suggesting that a single domain account 
cannot parsimoniously describe the pattern of correlations across all 
of our studies. Second, prior validity testing and factor analyses by 
Clifford and colleagues (2015) has shown that all transgressions are 
reflective of distinct moral concerns. Third, and conceptually more 
consequential, even if scales are highly correlated that does not 
preclude that the scales measure different constructs. The idea that all 
moral domains can be reduced to one underlying construct implies 
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that these scales are highly correlated because they share a common 
latent variable that causes participants’ responses on the scales. Such 
a model assumes that the scales share common causes, consequences, 
and correlates. If scales have different causes, consequences, and 
correlates then they do not share the same latent variable (see also 
statistical vs. causal uni-dimensionality, Markus & Borsboom, 2013, p. 
148-149). Research on attitude strength illustrates this idea very 
clearly. While some indicators of attitude strength are highly 
correlated, there is robust evidence that they have unique causes and 
correlates, therefore demonstrating that they are unique (but 
correlated) constructs (e.g., Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & 
Carnot, 1993; Visser, Bizer, & Krosnick, 2006). If the different moral 
domains would actually measure only one construct, all domains 
should have common correlates and the results should have favored 
the equal strength hypothesis. However, our studies did not favor this 
hypothesis. Instead, our studies consistently found a stronger 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and the purity domain. This 
finding in itself is an argument against the claim that these domains 
are all based on a common construct.  
 
Conclusion 
 A key task for understanding taxonomies of the moral 
domain is how judgments in these different domains are similar and 
different. One area where some scholars expect differences and where 
others claim similarities are the traits and emotions that are linked 
with judgments across the moral domains. By purposefully 
investigating disgust sensitivity as it relates to several moral domains, 
our data add and speak to this broader debate. We find that although 
making moral judgments is an emotional process, the tendency to feel 
disgust is not consistently related to types of moral judgments. 
Instead, as suggested by domain-centric theories like Moral 
Foundations Theory, disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with 
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Disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to moral judgments in the 
purity domain than to moral judgments in other moral domains. 
While this finding highlights the distinctiveness of moral domains, 
anti-modularity accounts suggest that the relationship is caused by 
the relative weirdness of purity transgressions and come to the 
conclusion that moral domains do not represent distinct mechanisms. 
In two studies (total N = 2,307), we test whether transgression 
weirdness accounts for disgust sensitivity’s stronger association with 
moral judgments of the purity as compared to other moral domains, 
but find little evidence for this claim. The relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity even remains when 
taking into account both (perceived) weirdness and (perceived) 
harmfulness of moral transgressions. These studies show that 
transgression weirdness and harmfulness cannot explain the disgust 
sensitivity–purity link, contradicting predictions following from 
popular anti-modularity accounts. 
 
  
Transgression weirdness and the DS-purity link 
 
	 59 
Are moral domains distinct entities? Some perspectives argue 
for distinct moral domains with different causes and consequences 
(modularity accounts; e.g., Graham et al., 2013), whereas other 
perspectives argue for a single moral domain associated with 
perceived harm (anti-modularity accounts; e.g., Schein & Gray, in 
press). One relevant finding to this debate is the consistently stronger 
relationship between trait disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of 
purity transgressions compared to moral judgments of transgressions 
of other types of moral domains (Horberg et al., 2009; Wagemans, 
Brandt, & Zeelenberg, 2018). The advocates for modularity accounts 
interpret this finding as evidence for the distinctiveness of moral 
domains (Graham et al., in press) because it highlights that purity 
moral judgments have a distinct predictor. However, this distinct 
relationship might not be caused by differences in moral content per 
se, but by other characteristics of purity transgressions. More 
specifically, some propose that a sampling bias of the moral domain 
has resulted in purity transgressions that are substantially weirder 
than other types of moral transgressions (Gray & Keeney, 2015), 
which might explain the stronger relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments of purity versus other moral domains. 
We test this hypothesis.  
 
The Debate 
A substantial number of studies have demonstrated that those 
scoring higher on trait disgust sensitivity show enhanced moral 
condemnation of issues such as abortion, non-traditional sexual 
practices, gay marriage, and homosexuality in general (Crawford et 
al., 2014; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe et al., 
2009; Jarudi, 2009; Olatunji, 2008; Smith et al., 2011). The 
association appears to be domain-specific: Disgust sensitivity has a 
consistently stronger relationship with moral judgments of purity 
issues than with moral judgments of any other moral domain, 
including care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and liberty domains 
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The Debate 
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scoring higher on trait disgust sensitivity show enhanced moral 
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practices, gay marriage, and homosexuality in general (Crawford et 
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2009; Jarudi, 2009; Olatunji, 2008; Smith et al., 2011). The 
association appears to be domain-specific: Disgust sensitivity has a 
consistently stronger relationship with moral judgments of purity 
issues than with moral judgments of any other moral domain, 
including care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and liberty domains 
(Horberg et al., 2009; Wagemans et al., 2018).  
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The consistently stronger association between disgust 
sensitivity and purity judgments provides evidence for the 
distinctiveness of moral domains as proposed by theories advocating 
moral modularity, such as Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 
in press; Horberg et al., 2009). Importantly, these modularity 
accounts are based on the notion that moral domains are 
meaningfully distinct categories that each have their own 
psychological processes and causal factors, such as personality 
characteristics that make individuals more sensitive to a specific 
moral domain (Graham et al., 2013). For the moral domain of purity 
this appears to be disgust sensitivity. The idea is that disgust 
developed from a purely disease avoidance emotion to an emotion 
that is also triggered by perceptions of immorality (Curtis & Biran 
2001; Rozin et al., 2000; Tybur et al., 2013). The joint association 
between disgust and the purity domain specifically likely results from 
the shared pathogen avoidance process thought to underpin the 
evolutionary origins of both feelings of disgust and moral purity 
(Haidt, 2012; Inbar & Pizarro, 2014).  
It is possible, however, to interpret the link between disgust 
sensitivity and purity judgments from another perspective. That is, 
the link between disgust sensitivity and purity judgments might result 
from a sampling bias of the moral domain (Chakroff & Young, 2015a; 
Gray & Keeney, 2015). The idea here is that a bias in the selection of 
purity transgressions resulted in scenarios that are substantially 
weirder than scenarios representing other moral domains. In line with 
this reasoning, Gray and Keeney (2015) show that classic purity 
transgressions (e.g., “someone cooks and eats their dog, after it dies 
of natural causes”) are perceived to be weirder than transgressions of 
the care domain (e.g., “someone kicks a dog in the head, hard”; 
Graham et al., 2009). Both are immoral, both involve dogs, but one is 
perceived to be considerable weirder.  
This finding is interpreted as being consistent with anti-
modularity accounts because it suggests that weirdness, and not some 
distinct moral mechanism, might be responsible for the disgust 
Transgression weirdness and the DS-purity link 
 
	 61 
sensitivity–purity link. It is possible that both disgust sensitivity and 
moral judgments of purity are tapping into a general sensitivity 
towards weird or bizarre situations, and that scenario weirdness 
therefore accounts for the stronger association between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments of purity transgressions. If this 
hypothesis is supported, it would challenge not only the existence of a 
purity domain that is meaningfully distinguishable from other moral 
domains, but it would also question the validity of Moral Foundations 
Theory, one of the most prominent theories in moral psychology. 
 
The Current Studies 
Despite the theoretical importance of the weirdness 
confound, there is no satisfactory empirical study testing the 
possibility. Other studies have examined weirdness and disgust 
(Schein, Ritter, & Gray, 2016; Study 3), but they did not test if 
weirdness accounts for the differential relationships across domains. 
That is, they did not account for the finding that most clearly 
separates the modularity accounts from the anti-modularity accounts. 
In the current paper, we will directly test whether transgression 
weirdness can explain the stronger relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments of the purity domain compared to 
other moral domains.  
 
Study 3.1 
We first test whether we replicate the finding that purity 
transgressions are perceived to be weirder than transgressions from 
other moral domains. Next, we test whether this weirdness moderates 
the relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments over 
and above the moderating effect of moral domain, such that disgust 
sensitivity has a stronger relationship to moral judgments of 
transgressions that are perceived to be weirder. For this, we ask one 
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Study 3.1 
We first test whether we replicate the finding that purity 
transgressions are perceived to be weirder than transgressions from 
other moral domains. Next, we test whether this weirdness moderates 
the relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments over 
and above the moderating effect of moral domain, such that disgust 
sensitivity has a stronger relationship to moral judgments of 
transgressions that are perceived to be weirder. For this, we ask one 
sample of participants to rate how weird they find a number of 
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standardized moral judgments (Clifford et al., 2015) and combine 
these weirdness ratings with published (Wagemans et al., 2018) and 
unpublished existing datasets on the relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments8. In addition, we control for 
transgression harmfulness because it is suggested as an important 
factor underlying moral judgments (Gray & Schein, 2012).  
 
Method 
We aggregated data from studies that include a measure of 
disgust sensitivity and moral judgments from the Moral Foundations 
Vignettes (Clifford et al., 2015). We chose this set of moral judgments 
as it is a well-validated and standardized set of moral judgments 
based on Moral Foundations Theory (see Clifford et al., 2015 for a 
description of the validation process), which includes moral 
transgressions of six moral domains: Purity, care, authority, fairness, 
loyalty, and liberty. In order to make comparisons between moral 
domains, datasets were only included when they measured moral 
judgments of the purity domain and at least one other moral domain. 
Because none of the existing datasets included measures of 
transgression weirdness or transgression harmfulness, a new sample 
was collected to measure these aspects. The existing and new datasets 
were then combined by matching moral transgressions in the existing 
datasets with the average weirdness and harmfulness score per moral 
transgression from the new dataset. 
New Data Participants. To get reliable estimates of a 
transgression’s weirdness and harmfulness, we aimed to collect 
ratings of at least 75 participants for each rating type. In the end, 151 
participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (78 males, 
73 females, Mage = 34.30, SD = 10.37) and completed our study in 
return for a financial reward. 
																																								 																				
8 The exact materials that were used in all studies and the relevant datasets 
can be found in the supplemental materials at the Open Science Framework 
(OSF; Supplemental Materials via https://goo.gl/9SBYYn). 
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New Data Materials. Moral transgressions were taken from 
the Moral Foundations Vignettes (Clifford et al., 2015). A total of 60 
transgressions were used; ten from each moral domain (i.e., purity, 
care, authority, fairness, loyalty, and liberty). Example items are “You 
see an employee at a morgue eating his pepperoni pizza off of a dead 
body” (purity domain) and “You see a woman spanking her child with 
a spatula for getting bad grades in school” (care domain). To allow 
matching of the new dataset with the existing datasets, the moral 
transgressions used in this new study include all moral transgressions 
that were used in the existing datasets.  
Participants were randomly assigned to rate the weirdness or 
the harmfulness of moral transgressions. Depending on the task, 
participants indicated for each moral transgression how weird (i.e., 
unusual, bizarre, odd) they found the situation on a scale ranging 
from 1 = ‘Not at all weird’ to 7 = ‘Extremely weird’, or how harmful 
they found the situation on a scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all 
harmful’ to 7 = ‘Extremely harmful’. Intraclass correlation coefficients 
(ICC) for these sets were calculated using the “icc” function in the 
“irr” package of R (Gamer, Lemon, Fellows, & Sing, 2012). The model 
was set to be “twoway” and the type of ICC was set to “consistency”. 
ICC’s for, respectively, weirdness and harmfulness ratings were .37 
(95% CI [0.30, 0.47]) and .19 (95% CI [0.14, 0.26]). All moral 
transgressions were presented in a random order to each participant.  
Existing Datasets. The new data was combined with six 
published datasets (Wagemans et al., 2018) and three unpublished 
datasets from our lab (total N = 2,008).9 As described above, in each 
dataset, moral judgments were measured with items from the Moral 
Foundations Vignettes (Clifford et al., 2015), but the number of items 
and moral domains measured differs per dataset (see Table 3.1). In 
seven of the datasets, disgust sensitivity was measured with the 27-
item Disgust Sensitivity Scale-Revised (DS-R; Haidt et al., 1994, 
modified by Olatunji, Williams et al., 2007), in one dataset with the 
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ICC’s for, respectively, weirdness and harmfulness ratings were .37 
(95% CI [0.30, 0.47]) and .19 (95% CI [0.14, 0.26]). All moral 
transgressions were presented in a random order to each participant.  
Existing Datasets. The new data was combined with six 
published datasets (Wagemans et al., 2018) and three unpublished 
datasets from our lab (total N = 2,008).9 As described above, in each 
dataset, moral judgments were measured with items from the Moral 
Foundations Vignettes (Clifford et al., 2015), but the number of items 
and moral domains measured differs per dataset (see Table 3.1). In 
seven of the datasets, disgust sensitivity was measured with the 27-
item Disgust Sensitivity Scale-Revised (DS-R; Haidt et al., 1994, 
modified by Olatunji, Williams et al., 2007), in one dataset with the 
																																								 																				
9 These are the same three datasets as used in Study 4.1. 
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30-item London Disgust Scale (Curtis, 2013), and in one dataset with 
the 21-item Three Domain Disgust Scale (Tybur et al., 2009). This 
last disgust sensitivity scale has three subscales; pathogen, sexual, 
and moral disgust. For our study, we excluded the moral disgust 
subscale because this subscale likely has a different relationship with 
purity transgressions than the pathogen and sexual disgust subscales, 
as the items in the scale are conceptually close to moral 
transgressions of fairness and care. The other two subscales, pathogen 
and sexual disgust, were combined into one disgust sensitivity 
variable. An overview of the datasets and the materials that were 
used in each dataset can be found in Table 3.1. 
 
Results  
Data Analytic Strategy. All samples were analyzed together. 
Linear mixed-effects models were used to estimate the effects of 
disgust sensitivity, moral domain, weirdness, and harmfulness on 
moral judgments while taking into account random variance (and 
nesting) of participants, moral transgressions, and samples. The 
analyses were conducted using the “lmer” function in the “lme4” 
package of R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). The 
“lmerTest” package was used to obtain p-values for regression 
coefficients (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2013) and the 
“confint” function in the “stats” package was used to obtain 
confidence intervals for all effects using Monte Carlo simulations 
(drawing 1000 bootstrap samples; R Core Team, 2017). Because not 
all disgust sensitivity scales were measured on the same response 
scale, disgust sensitivity scores were mean centered and standardized 
within each dataset (generating z-scores using the “scale” function in 
the “base” package of R; R Core Team,2017). To improve 
comparability of predictors, also transgression weirdness and 
transgression harmfulness ratings were mean centered and 
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Before testing the moderating effect of transgression 
weirdness, we tested whether purity transgressions are indeed 
perceived to be weirder than transgressions of other moral domains. 
Replicating Gray and Keeney (2015), we found that purity 
transgressions are perceived to be significantly weirder (M = 5.90, SD  
= 1.56) than transgressions of all other moral domains (all means < 
4.73, SD’s < 1.93, absolute values of all t’s > 3.88, p’s < .001; see  
Supplemental Materials).10 
Moral Domain and Weirdness as Moderators. Prior work 
found that disgust sensitivity is more strongly associated with moral 
judgments in the purity domain compared to other moral domains. To 
re-test this, we used disgust sensitivity, moral domain (0 = non-
purity, 1 = purity), and their interaction to predict moral judgments. 
There was a significant main effect of disgust sensitivity (b = 0.32, SE 
= 0.01, t[49360] = 34.44, p < .001, 95% CI [0.30, 0.34]) and moral 
domain (b = 0.86, SE = 0.29, t[59] = 2.98, p = .004, 95% CI [0.29, 
1.42]). Replicating past work, there was a significant interaction 
between disgust sensitivity and moral domain (b = 0.28, SE = 0.02, 
t[24077] = 16.24, p < .001, 95% CI [0.25, 0.31]), indicating a 
stronger association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments 
of purity as compared to non-purity domains (see Figure 3.1, left 
panel).11  
To test if transgression weirdness accounts for this 
interaction, we tested a second model in which transgression  
																																								 																				
10 Purity transgressions were perceived to be equally harmful as 
transgressions of the care, fairness, and liberty domains (absolute values of 
all t’s < 0.58, p’s > .56), but were perceived as significantly more harmful 
than transgressions of the authority and loyalty domains (absolute values of 
both t’s > 3.49, p’s < .001; see Supplemental Materials). 
11 Much of this data was previously published (Wagemans et al., 2018) and 
found the same results. This analysis merely shows that the effect still holds 
after including new data using various measures of disgust sensitivity and 
with a different (but conceptually similar) data analytic strategy, chosen to 




Figure 3.1. The interaction effect of disgust sensitivity (standardized) and 
moral domain (purity vs non-purity transgressions) on moral judgments 
(Study 3.1). The left panel is the initial disgust sensitivity moral domain 
interaction (b = 0.28, SE = 0.02, p < .001). The right panel is the disgust 
sensitivity moral domain interaction controlling for transgression weirdness, 
transgression harmfulness, and interactions between these variables and 
disgust sensitivity (b = 0.27, SE = 0.03, p < .001).  
 
weirdness and its interaction with disgust sensitivity were added. 
There was no main effect of transgression weirdness (b = -0.06, SE = 
0.15, t[57] = -0.36, p = .72, 95% CI [-0.38, 0.25]) and also the 
interaction between disgust sensitivity and transgression weirdness 
was not significant (b = -0.01, SE = 0.01, t[3890] = -0.90, p = .37, 
95% CI [-0.03, 0.01]). The interaction between disgust sensitivity and 
moral domain, however, remained (b = 0.30, SE = 0.03, t[8666] = 
11.74, p < .001, 95% CI [0.25, 0.34]), showing that transgression 
weirdness cannot account for the domain-specific relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity.   
Finally, we tested whether controlling for transgression 
harmfulness and its interaction with disgust sensitivity affects our 
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main effect of transgression harmfulness (b = 0.72, SE = 0.06, t[60] 
= 11.98, p < .001,95% CI [0.60, 0.84]) and a significant interaction 
effect of disgust sensitivity and transgression harmfulness (b = -
0.07, SE = 0.01, t[11030] = -8.47, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.08, -0.05]), 
the interaction between disgust sensitivity and moral domain still 
remained (b = 0.27, SE = 0.03, t[8601] = 10.66, p < .001, 95% CI 
[0.22, 0.32]; see Figure 3.1, right panel). We replicated and 
reproduced prior work and showed that neither weirdness nor 
harmfulness of a moral transgression can account for the domain-
specific relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments 
of purity. Notably, the effect size of the interaction between disgust 
sensitivity and moral domain barely changed across models. This can 
be seen by comparing the remarkably similar panels in Figure 3.1.  
 
Discussion 
In the first study, we tested whether transgression weirdness 
can account for the moderating effect of moral domain on the 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments. It 
cannot.  
The methods of the first study made it possible to test the 
influence of weirdness in a large sample, but it also has a 
shortcoming. We calculated average weirdness scores for each moral 
transgression and subsequently matched these scores with existing 
data on the relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments. While this set-up assumes transgression weirdness to be a 
constant factor across participants, this assumption might be faulty. 
For instance, the relatively low intraclass correlation coefficients of 
transgression weirdness and transgression harmfulness found in 
Study 3.1 suggest that individuals do not fully agree on what is or is 
not weird. It is possible that more disgust sensitive individuals judge 
moral transgressions of the purity domain to be more immoral 
because they perceive them to be more deviant from what is normal 
(i.e., weird). The idea is that weirdness mediates the relationship 
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main effect of transgression harmfulness (b = 0.72, SE = 0.06, t[60] 
= 11.98, p < .001,95% CI [0.60, 0.84]) and a significant interaction 
effect of disgust sensitivity and transgression harmfulness (b = -
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the interaction between disgust sensitivity and moral domain still 
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[0.22, 0.32]; see Figure 3.1, right panel). We replicated and 
reproduced prior work and showed that neither weirdness nor 
harmfulness of a moral transgression can account for the domain-
specific relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments 
of purity. Notably, the effect size of the interaction between disgust 
sensitivity and moral domain barely changed across models. This can 
be seen by comparing the remarkably similar panels in Figure 3.1.  
 
Discussion 
In the first study, we tested whether transgression weirdness 
can account for the moderating effect of moral domain on the 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments. It 
cannot.  
The methods of the first study made it possible to test the 
influence of weirdness in a large sample, but it also has a 
shortcoming. We calculated average weirdness scores for each moral 
transgression and subsequently matched these scores with existing 
data on the relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments. While this set-up assumes transgression weirdness to be a 
constant factor across participants, this assumption might be faulty. 
For instance, the relatively low intraclass correlation coefficients of 
transgression weirdness and transgression harmfulness found in 
Study 3.1 suggest that individuals do not fully agree on what is or is 
not weird. It is possible that more disgust sensitive individuals judge 
moral transgressions of the purity domain to be more immoral 
because they perceive them to be more deviant from what is normal 
(i.e., weird). The idea is that weirdness mediates the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of the purity 
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domain, such that more disgust sensitive people perceive purity 
transgressions to be weirder than less disgust sensitive people and, as 
a result, judge these transgressions as more immoral. In Study 3.2, we 
tested this mediation hypothesis by obtaining disgust sensitivity 
scores and ratings of immorality and weirdness all from the same 
participants. We also tested the potential of perceived harmfulness as 




Participants. Students could participate in our lab study for 
one week (usually yielding between 100 and 150 participants). In the 
end, 148 Dutch students (33 males, 115 females, Mage = 20.16, SD = 
2.85) participated in our study in return for course credit. Because a 
power analysis for our multilevel mediation model would likely be 
inaccurate as it requires a priori information of various unknown 
factors (e.g., intra-class correlation coefficients and estimations of 
multiple path coefficients), we used two rough estimations of power. 
First, using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), we calculated the size of the 
difference in slopes (i.e., difference between disgust sensitivity’s 
relationship to moral judgments of the purity and non-purity 
domains) this sample allows us to detect given 80% power. This 
resulted in a difference in slopes of .232 and higher. As a second 
estimation of power, we used Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes’ (2007) 
power estimates for single-level moderated mediation analysis, which 
shows that a sample size of 100 is sufficient to detect medium effects 
with close to 95% power.   
Materials. To help avoid consistency effects, our study was 
divided into two parts that were separated by an unrelated study on 
attitudes towards social groups. In the first part of our study, 
participants rated a total of 48 moral transgressions that were taken 
from the same set of moral transgressions as in Study 3.1 (i.e., Moral 
Foundations Vignettes; Clifford et al., 2015). These 48 moral 
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transgressions were equally divided over six moral domains: Purity, 
care, authority, fairness, loyalty, and liberty. For each transgression, 
participants used three items to indicate to what degree they found 
the situation immoral (“I find this immoral”), weird (“I find this weird 
[unusual, bizarre, odd]”), and harmful (“I find this harmful”) on a 
scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all” to 7 = ‘Very much”. All moral 
transgressions were presented in a random order to each participant.  
Participants then participated in the unrelated study before 
continuing with the second part of our study in which participants 
filled out the 27-item Disgust Sensitivity Scale revised (Haidt et al., 
1994; modified by Olatunji, Williams et al., 2007; α = .85). This is 
the same disgust sensitivity scale used in many of the samples in 
Study 3.1. The first 14 items are answered on a 5-point scale ranging 
from 1 = ‘Strongly disagree (very untrue about me)’ to 5 = ‘Strongly 
agree (very true about me)’. An example item is “It bothers me to 
hear someone clear a throat full of mucus”. The remaining 13 items 
are answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not disgusting at 
all’ to 5 = ‘Extremely disgusting’. An example item is “While you are 
walking through a tunnel under a railroad track, you smell urine”. 
The scale includes two filler items that are excluded from all analyses.  
 
Results  
Data Analytic Strategy. As in Study 3.1, linear mixed-effects 
models were used to estimate the effects of disgust sensitivity, moral 
domain, perceived weirdness, and perceived harmfulness on moral 
judgments while taking into account random variance (and nesting) 
of participants and moral transgressions. Regression coefficients, p-
values, and confidence intervals were obtained in the same manner as 
in Study 3.1. Following recommendations by Zhang, Zyphur, and 
Preacher (2009), disgust sensitivity (i.e., Level-2 predictor) was 
grand-mean centered by subtracting the overall mean from each 
individual’s disgust sensitivity score, while perceived weirdness and 
harmfulness (i.e., Level-1 predictors) were cluster-mean centered by 
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the situation immoral (“I find this immoral”), weird (“I find this weird 
[unusual, bizarre, odd]”), and harmful (“I find this harmful”) on a 
scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all” to 7 = ‘Very much”. All moral 
transgressions were presented in a random order to each participant.  
Participants then participated in the unrelated study before 
continuing with the second part of our study in which participants 
filled out the 27-item Disgust Sensitivity Scale revised (Haidt et al., 
1994; modified by Olatunji, Williams et al., 2007; α = .85). This is 
the same disgust sensitivity scale used in many of the samples in 
Study 3.1. The first 14 items are answered on a 5-point scale ranging 
from 1 = ‘Strongly disagree (very untrue about me)’ to 5 = ‘Strongly 
agree (very true about me)’. An example item is “It bothers me to 
hear someone clear a throat full of mucus”. The remaining 13 items 
are answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not disgusting at 
all’ to 5 = ‘Extremely disgusting’. An example item is “While you are 
walking through a tunnel under a railroad track, you smell urine”. 
The scale includes two filler items that are excluded from all analyses.  
 
Results  
Data Analytic Strategy. As in Study 3.1, linear mixed-effects 
models were used to estimate the effects of disgust sensitivity, moral 
domain, perceived weirdness, and perceived harmfulness on moral 
judgments while taking into account random variance (and nesting) 
of participants and moral transgressions. Regression coefficients, p-
values, and confidence intervals were obtained in the same manner as 
in Study 3.1. Following recommendations by Zhang, Zyphur, and 
Preacher (2009), disgust sensitivity (i.e., Level-2 predictor) was 
grand-mean centered by subtracting the overall mean from each 
individual’s disgust sensitivity score, while perceived weirdness and 
harmfulness (i.e., Level-1 predictors) were cluster-mean centered by 
subtracting each individual’s mean weirdness or harmfulness score 
Chapter 3 
	72 
from the weirdness or harmfulness ratings. Each individual’s mean 
weirdness or harmfulness score (i.e., Level-2 predictors) was grand-
mean centered by subtracting the overall weirdness or harmfulness 
mean from each individual’s mean weirdness or harmfulness score. 
All models using perceived weirdness and/or harmfulness as 
predictors include both the Level 1 and Level 2 versions of the 
variables, but only the effects of the Level 2 variables are reported as 
these are relevant to our predictions (also see Zhang et al., 2009; see 
Supplemental Materials for full model results). To test for multilevel 
moderated multiple mediation in a 2-1-1 model, we followed the 
steps described by Zhang and colleagues (2009) for multilevel 
mediation and, following the hypotheses, test the moderating effect 
of moral domain in steps 1 and 2.  
Step 1. Disgust Sensitivity and Moral Judgments. First, we 
tested whether disgust sensitivity is a predictor of moral judgments. A 
positive relationship was found (b = 0.27, SE = 0.08, t(146) = 3.35, 
p = .001, 95% CI [0.10, 0.42]), showing that higher scores on disgust 
sensitivity are associated with harsher moral judgments across 
domains. To test for the moderating effect of moral domain, the 
model was extended with moral domain (non-purity = 0, purity = 1) 
and its interaction with disgust sensitivity as predictors. In line with 
Study 3.1 and previous findings (Wagemans et al., 2018), moral 
domain moderated the effect of disgust sensitivity on moral 
judgments (b = 0.71, SE = 0.13, t(146) = 5.44, p < .001, 95% CI 
[0.45, 0.95]), such that disgust sensitivity was more strongly related 
to moral judgments of purity (b = 0.86, SE = 0.14, t(146) = 6.10, p 
< .001, 95% CI [0.61, 1.14]) than to moral judgments of non-purity 
domains (b = 0.15, SE = 0.08, t(146) = 1.87, p = .06, 95% CI [-
0.01, 0.33]; see Figure 3.2).  
Step 2A. Disgust Sensitivity and Perceived Weirdness. We 
then tested whether disgust sensitivity is a predictor of the first 
potential mediator, perceived weirdness. A positive relationship was 
found (b = 0.22, SE = 0.08, t(146) = 2.62, p = .01, 95% CI [0.06, 
0.39]), showing that higher disgust sensitivity scores are associated 
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with higher perceptions of weirdness across all moral domains. To 
test the potential of perceived weirdness as a mediator of the 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of the 
purity domain specifically, the moderating effect of moral domain 
was again tested by including moral domain and its interaction with 
disgust sensitivity in the model. No interaction effect of moral domain 
and disgust sensitivity on perceived weirdness was found (b = -0.02, 
SE = 0.11, t(189.68) = -0.22, p = .82, 95% CI [-0.21, 0.17]), 
showing that perceived weirdness cannot account for the stronger 
association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity 
transgressions as compared to moral judgments of non-purity 
transgressions. It is therefore no longer considered as a potential 
mediator of the disgust sensitivity-domain interaction effect. To be 
conservative, we controlled for perceived weirdness in all subsequent 
models with moral judgments as the outcome variable (see Figure 3.2 
and the Supplemental Materials).  
Step 2B. Disgust Sensitivity and Perceived Harmfulness. 
We then tested whether disgust sensitivity was related to the second 
potential mediator, perceived harmfulness. A positive relationship 
was found (b = 0.30, SE = 0.10, t(146) = 2.88, p = .005, 95% CI 
[0.08, 0.50]), showing that higher disgust sensitivity scores are 
associated with higher perceptions of harmfulness across all moral 
domains. To test whether perceived harmfulness can account for the 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of the 
purity domain specifically, the moderating effect of moral domain 
was again tested by including moral domain and its interaction with 
disgust sensitivity in the model. This revealed a significant interaction 
effect of disgust sensitivity and moral domain on perceived 
harmfulness (b = 0.73, SE = 0.14, t(146) = 5.03, p < .001, 95% CI 
[0.45, 1.01]). In line with the idea of perceived harmfulness as a 
mediator of the disgust sensitivity–purity link specifically, disgust 
sensitivity relates to perceived harmfulness of purity transgressions (b 
= 0.90, SE = 0.16, t(146) = 5.52, p < .001, 95% CI [0.58, 1.20]) but 
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sensitivity relates to perceived harmfulness of purity transgressions (b 
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not to perceived harmfulness of non-purity transgressions (b = 0.18, 
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SE = 0.11, t(146) = 1.69, p = .09, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.38]); see Figure 
3.2).  
Step 3. Perceived Harmfulness and Moral Judgments. 
Because moral domain moderates the paths of disgust sensitivity to 
both moral judgments and perceived harmfulness, we further test the 
potential for perceived harmfulness as a mediator for each level of 
moral domain (purity vs non-purity) separately. A model including 
disgust sensitivity, perceived harmfulness, and perceived weirdness as 
predictors and moral judgments as the outcome variable was fitted to 
the data on purity transgressions and the data on non-purity 
transgressions. Perceived harmfulness related positively to both purity 
(b = 0.47, SE = 0.07, t(180.12) = 6.53, p < .001, 95% CI [0.33, 
0.62]) and non-purity moral judgments (b = 0.31, SE = 0.05, 
t(144.97) = 5.86, p < .001, 95% CI [0.20, 0.41]), showing that 
transgressions that are perceived to be more harmful are also 
considered to be more immoral (see Figure 3.2).  
Indirect and Direct Effects. Indirect and direct effects were 
calculated for each level of moral domain (purity vs non-purity) 
separately. In line with the idea of perceived harmfulness as a 
mediator of the disgust sensitivity–purity link specifically, perceived 
harmfulness did not mediate the relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments for non-purity transgressions 
(indirect effect: 0.06, SE = 0.04, z = 1.58, p = .11), but it did do so 
for purity transgressions (indirect effect: 0.42, SE = 0.10, z = 4.31, p 
< .001). However, even when controlling for perceived weirdness 
and the mediating effect of perceived harmfulness, the association 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity 
transgressions remained (b = 0.19, SE = 0.08, t(185.76) = 2.27, p = 
.02, 95% CI [0.03, 0.35]). Importantly, these findings mean that 
perceived harmfulness, together with perceived weirdness, can only 
account for part of the relationship between disgust sensitivity and 
moral judgments of the purity domain. A graphical representation of 
this mediation, for purity and non-purity transgressions separately, 
can be found in Figure 3.2. 




Moral transgressions of purity are perceived to be weirder 
than moral transgressions of care (Gray & Keeney, 2015), but can this 
weirdness account for the stronger association between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments of purity compared to non-purity 
transgressions? In two studies, using a total of 2,307 participants, we 
tested this claim, but found little evidence.   
Study 3.1 shows that transgression weirdness cannot account 
for the moderating effect of moral domain on the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments. In Study 3.2, we 
further investigate whether perceived weirdness can explain the 
disgust sensitivity – purity link by testing its potential as a mediator, 
but find no support for this idea. Together, these studies show that 
although purity transgressions are indeed weirder than other types of 
transgressions, this weirdness cannot account for the stronger 
association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of the 
purity domain.  
While we find no evidence for perceived weirdness as an explanation 
of the stronger relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments of the purity domain, perceived harmfulness appears to be 
a better candidate. This is in line with predictions following from anti-
modularity accounts, such as the Theory of Dyadic Morality, stating 
that moral judgments of all moral domains can be reduced to 
perceptions of harmfulness (Gray & Schein, 2012; Schein & Gray, in 
press). When it comes to the disgust sensitivity-purity link, it is 
thought that more disgust sensitive people perceive more harm in 
transgressions of the purity domain compared to less disgust sensitive 
people, and subsequently, they show stronger moral condemnation of 
these transgressions. Importantly, this view of morality, in which 
perceived harmfulness underlies all moral judgments, also implies 
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Figure 3.2. Unstandardized regression coefficients representing the effect of 
disgust sensitivity on moral judgments, mediated by perceived weirdness and 
perceived harmfulness of transgressions, for each level of moral domain (i.e., 
purity vs non-purity transgressions). The dashed line and its regression 
coefficient represent the direct effect of disgust sensitivity on moral 
judgments, controlling for perceived weirdness and perceived harmfulness. † p 
< .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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contradicting popular theories of moral modularity (e.g., Moral 
Foundations Theory).  
However, we should also note that the evidence in favor of 
such an account is limited. If all moral judgments can be reduced to 
harmfulness perceptions, one would expect that perceived 
harmfulness fully accounts for any relationship between a personality 
trait and a specific moral domain. This is not what we find. Although 
Study 3.2 shows evidence for perceived harmfulness as a mediator of 
the disgust sensitivity-purity link, it accounts for only part of the 
variance. Even when controlling for perceived harmfulness and 
perceived weirdness, disgust sensitivity’s direct relation to moral 
judgments of purity transgressions remains, suggesting that other 
factors play an important role in explaining the domain-specific 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and the purity domain. 
Interestingly, this means that even when two explanations suggested 
by anti-modularity accounts (i.e., weirdness and harmfulness) are 
taken into account, the moral domain of purity can be distinguished 
from other moral domains by its unique association to disgust 
sensitivity. This supports expectations following from modularity 
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Disgust sensitivity predicts judgments of moral issues. This 
relationship is especially pronounced for transgressions of the purity 
domain, but the reason for this domain-specific relationship is 
unclear. One potential explanation is that measures of disgust 
sensitivity and purity transgressions share an important characteristic: 
They are weird. Here we test this “weirdness overlap” hypothesis by 
examining whether weirdness of disgust sensitivity items relates to 
moral judgments of purity transgressions (total N = 805). Weirder 
disgust sensitivity items were more strongly associated with moral 
judgments of purity, but not care, transgressions, suggesting support 
for the weirdness overlap hypothesis. However, we also find that the 
implications of this finding are limited. Eliminating the weirdest items 
from disgust sensitivity measures does not affect the tendency for the 
association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments to be 
especially pronounced for purity transgressions. Therefore, although 
the weirdness of disgust sensitivity items is associated with the 
disgust sensitivity-purity link, it does not explain why disgust 
sensitivity is more strongly related to moral judgments of purity 
transgressions.
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Disgust sensitivity influences moral decision-making (e.g., 
Laakasuo, Sundvall, & Drosinou, 2017; Van Leeuwen et al., 2017). 
The relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral issues is 
especially pronounced for moral transgressions of the purity moral 
domain (Horberg et al., 2009; Wagemans et al., 2018). While this 
disgust-purity link is established, it is not yet clear what psychological 
mechanism can account for the domain-specific relationship. Some 
argue that the relative weirdness of transgressions representing the 
purity domain plays a role (Gray & Keeney, 2015), but previous 
research investigating this possibility has focused solely on the 
weirdness of moral transgressions (Wagemans, Brandt, & Zeelenberg, 
2017). In the current paper, we flip the perspective and test a 
“weirdness overlap” hypothesis: Does weirdness of items in disgust 
sensitivity measures predict their relationship to moral judgments of 
purity (i.e., weird) transgressions?  
While disgust is thought to have evolved to protect us against 
diseases by distinguishing harmless from toxic foods, it has extended 
to moral contexts (Haidt et al., 1997; Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999; 
Tybur et al., 2009). One recurring finding is that individual 
differences in disgust sensitivity predict opposition to various moral 
and political issues, including homosexuality, abortion, and 
euthanasia (Crawford et al., 2014; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; 
Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe et al., 2009; Jarudi, 2009; Olatunji, 2008; 
Smith et al., 2011; Terrizzi et al., 2010). This relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and the moral domain is especially strong for acts 
violating a purity norm, with studies (Horberg et al., 2009), including 
pre-registered studies (Wagemans et al., 2018), showing a 
consistently stronger relationship between disgust sensitivity and 
moral judgments of purity transgressions than moral judgments of 
transgressions of any other moral domain (i.e., care, authority, 
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Weirdness Overlap Hypothesis 
What psychological mechanism can account for the disgust 
sensitivity-purity association? The “weirdness overlap” hypothesis is 
one potential explanation and involves the relative weirdness of 
moral transgressions of the purity domain. Gray and Keeney (2015) 
argued that a sampling bias of the moral domain resulted in purity 
transgressions (e.g., “Someone signs a piece of paper that says: I 
hereby sell my soul, after my death, to whoever has this piece of 
paper”) that are substantially weirder than transgressions 
representing other moral domains (e.g., care: “Someone shoots and 
kills an animal that is a member of an endangered species”). While 
empirical studies do confirm that transgressions representing the 
purity domain are perceived to be weirder than other types of 
transgressions, they either do not test (Gray & Keeney, 2015) or do 
not find (Wagemans et al., 2017) that transgression weirdness 
explains why disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to purity 
moral judgments.  
However, perceived weirdness might not only be relevant for 
moral judgment items, but might also be important for items 
measuring disgust sensitivity. Disgust is often experienced in response 
to atypical situations or stimuli, such as unknown or abnormal foods 
(e.g., insects, chocolate shaped as dog feces), close contact with 
strangers, and other unfamiliar situations (e.g., Curtis et al., 2004; 
Rozin, Haidt et al., 1999; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986). The 
reason that these situations and objects elicit disgust can be attributed 
to an overgeneralization of our behavioral immune system. In terms 
of survival, it is costlier to risk contact with infectious pathogens than 
it is to refrain from eating harmless foods or to avoid contact with 
potential cooperators (Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Park, Faulkner, & 
Schaller, 2003). When dealing with negative situations characterized 
by atypicality, the behavioral immune system thus biases towards risk 
avoidance (resulting in a disgust response) as we do not know 
whether these weird stimuli carry diseases. 
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Because many real-life disgust situations are atypical, 
measures of disgust sensitivity also include hypothetical situations 
that are weird; however, the level of weirdness varies. The frequently 
used Disgust Sensitivity Scale (Haidt et al., 1994) includes scenarios 
we find relatively normal (e.g., “I never let any part of my body touch 
the toilet seat in public restrooms”), but also scenarios we find 
substantially weirder (“I might be willing to try eating monkey meat, 
under some circumstances”). Disgust reactions to these weird disgust 
situations may be a good predictor of moral judgments of other weird 
situations, such as those of the purity domain. Hence, weird disgust 
sensitivity items should be more strongly related to moral judgments 
of purity (i.e., weird) transgressions. Put differently, we expect that 
the relationship between a disgust sensitivity item and moral 
judgments of purity transgressions depends, partly, on how weird that 
disgust sensitivity item is.  
 
Weird or Infrequent?  
Notably, many situations that elicit disgust are weird in the 
sense that they occur infrequently because people are generally 
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contaminating objects or situations (e.g., Mortensen, Becker, 
Ackerman, Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2010; Olatunji, Haidt, McKay, & 
David, 2008). In line with the reasoning above, one could therefore 
argue that all disgust sensitivity items characterized by infrequency 
are more strongly related to weird purity moral judgments than 
disgust sensitivity items that occur more frequently. However, this 
assumes that weirdness and (in)frequency are similar constructs. This 
is not necessarily the case. Following Chakroff and Young (2015a), 
we distinguish between prescriptive abnormality (which we call 
weirdness) and statistical abnormality (which we call frequency). 
Weirdness is the degree to which a certain behavior deviates from a 
norm or social rules and frequency refers to how often a behavior 
occurs. While acts that are considered weird typically occur 
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measure of disgust sensitivity is the item, “Sharing an elevator with a 
man with a disfigured face” (London Disgust Scale; Curtis, 2013). 
Although this situation might not occur frequently in daily life, our 
data (below) show that it is not considered to be weird either.  
 
Current study 
We test our hypothesis that weirdness, but not (in)frequency, 
of disgust sensitivity items relates to the strength of their relationship 
with moral judgments of purity transgressions. We expect this 
relationship to be specific to transgressions of the purity domain (i.e., 
weird transgressions) and therefore use care moral judgments as a 
comparison domain that is not characterized by weirdness. We will 
also investigate whether the inclusion of weird disgust sensitivity 
items has consequences for the relationship between overall disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments by testing if the stronger relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity versus care 
transgressions found in prior work (e.g., Wagemans et al., 2018) 




We collected data on the relationship between disgust 
sensitivity items and moral judgments of purity and care 
transgressions in Sample 1 and combine these with data from Sample 
2 that rated disgust sensitivity items on their weirdness and 
frequency. 12 
Sample 4.1. 
Participants. Based on the studies of Chapter 2 and 
guidelines on the minimum sample size needed to detect a stable 
																																								 																				
12 All materials, data, and syntax used for analyses can be found in the 
supplemental materials at the Open Science Framework (OSF; Supplemental 
Materials via https://goo.gl/ZtLJqu). 
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correlation (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013), we planned to recruit 200 
participants per disgust scale. As such, 600 MTurkers completed our 
study in return for a financial reward (316 males, 282 females, 2 
other, Mage = 35.37, SD = 11.25).13  
Materials. Participants judged 20 moral transgressions from 
a standardized set of vignettes based on Moral Foundations Theory 
(Clifford et al., 2015). Ten transgressions were from the purity 
domain (α = .89) and ten from the care domain (α = .91). Example 
items are, respectively, “You see a story about a remote tribe eating 
the flesh of their deceased members” and “You see a woman clearly 
avoiding sitting next to an obese woman on the bus”. Participants 
indicated for each moral transgression how immoral they found the 
behavior on a scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all immoral’ to 7 = 
‘Extremely immoral’. 
Next, participants were randomly assigned to fill out one of 
three disgust sensitivity measures: The 32-item Disgust Sensitivity 
Scale (DSS; Haidt et al., 1994; N = 201, α = .92), the 30-item 
London Disgust Scale (LDS; Curtis, 2013; N = 199, α = .94), and the 
21-item Three Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS; Tybur et al., 2009; N = 
200, α = .91). Example items for the DSS and LDS are, respectively, 
“You see maggots on a piece of meat in an outdoor garbage pail,” and 
“Watching a woman pick her nose.” The TDDS has three very distinct 
subscales; pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust. Example items are, 
respectively, “Standing close to a person who has body odor,” 
“Finding out that someone you don’t like has sexual fantasies about 
you,” and “Deceiving a friend.” Items of all scales were measured on a 
7-point scale. Anchor labels for the first 17 items of the DSS were 1 = 
‘Strongly disagree (very untrue about me)’ and 7 = ‘Strongly agree 
(very true about me)’. For the remaining 15 items of the DSS and all 
																																								 																				
13 Another 199 participants filled out the Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity 
Scale (Van Overveld, De Jong, Peters, Cavanagh, & Davey, 2006). This scale 
was not used in the current study, because it focuses on introspection (e.g., “I 
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find something disgusting”) and does not include hypothetical scenarios. 
Chapter 4 
	86 
items of the TDDS and LDS these were 1 = ‘Not at all disgusting’ and 
7 ‘Extremely disgusting’.  
Sample 4.2. 
 Participants. To get reliable estimates of a disgust sensitivity 
item’s weirdness and frequency, we aimed to collect ratings of at least 
100 participant per set. In the end, 205 MTurkers completed the 
study in return for a financial reward (139 males, 65 females, 1 other, 
Mage = 33.78, SD = 9.77).  
Materials. The 83 items of the abovementioned disgust 
sensitivity scales were divided into two sets (of 41 and 42 items) and 
each participant was randomly assigned to provide weirdness and 
frequency ratings of one of these sets (with order of items 
randomized across participants). Weirdness and frequency were 
assessed by asking participants to “Please indicate how weird (i.e., 
unusual, bizarre, odd) you find these situations” and to “Please 
indicate how frequently (i.e., typical or common) these situations 
occur in everyday life.” Answers were given on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 = “Not at all weird [frequent]” to 7 = “Extremely weird 
[frequent].” Reliabilities of these ratings were for weirdness ICCset1 = 
.34 and ICCset2 = .42, both p’s < .001, and for frequency ICCset1 = 
0.35 and ICCset1 = .32, both p’s < .001. 
 
Results 
 The analyses proceed in three steps. First, in Sample 1, we 
replicate the finding we aim to explain, that disgust sensitivity is more 
strongly related to moral judgments of purity than care transgressions 
(Wagemans et al., 2018). Second, by combining the data from 
Sample 1 and 2, we investigate whether disgust sensitivity items’ 
weirdness and frequency ratings predict their relationship to moral 
judgments of purity and care transgressions. Finally, we re-analyze 
the data of Sample 1 by testing disgust sensitivity’s relationship to 
moral judgments of purity and care transgressions separately for 
highly weird and more normal disgust sensitivity items.  
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Disgust Sensitivity and Moral Domain Interaction. Linear 
mixed-effects models were used to test whether the data of Sample 1 
replicate the finding that disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to 
moral judgments of purity than care transgressions, using the “lmer” 
function in the “lme4” and “lmerTest” packages of R (Bates et al., 
2015; Kuznetsova et al., 2013). Confidence intervals were obtained 
using the “confint” function in the “stats” package using Monte Carlo 
simulations with 1000 bootstrap samples (R Core Team, 2017). All 
models take random variance of participants and moral judgment 
items into account. For the TDDS, analyses were conducted for each 
subscale separately, as is often the case with this scale (e.g., Park, Van 
Leeuwen, & Stephen, 2012; Tybur, Merriman, Caldwell Hooper, 
McDonald, & Navarrete, 2010). There is substantial overlap between 
the moral disgust subscale of the TDDS and transgressions of the care 
domain, which makes it more likely that this subscale shows the 
reversed pattern: A stronger relationship to moral judgments of care, 
as compared to purity, transgressions. 
A model including disgust sensitivity (mean-centered), moral 
domain (1 = purity, 0 = care), and their interaction revealed an 
interaction effect of disgust sensitivity and moral domain on moral 
judgments for each of the disgust sensitivity (sub)scales. The 
coefficients for the interaction effects and their confidence intervals 
are presented in Figure 4.1. As expected, the DSS, the LDS, and the 
pathogen and sexual disgust subscales of the TDDS replicate the 
finding that disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to moral 
judgments of purity (DSS: b = 0.74, SE = 0.08, p < .001; LDS: b = 
0.47, SE = 0.08, p < 001; TDDS-Pathogen: b = 0.43 SE = 0.07, p < 
.001, TDDS-Sexual: b = 0.36, SE = 0.05, p < .001) than care 
transgressions (DSS: b = 0.50, SE = 0.08, p < 001; LDS: b = 0.20, SE 
= 0.08, p = .02; TDDS-Pathogen: b = 0.22, SE = 0.07, p = .002, 
TDDS-Sexual: b = 0.22, SE = 0.05, p < .001). Although marginally 
significant, the moral disgust subscale of the TDDS followed the 
expected reversed pattern, with a stronger relationship between 
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0.04, p < .001), as compared to purity (b = 0.21, SE = 0.05, p < 
.001). 
Consistent with the weirdness overlap hypothesis, there was a 
significant correlation between the weirdness of disgust sensitivity 
items and the strength of their relationship to purity moral judgments 
(r[83] = .36, p < .001, Figure 4.2, Top-Left Panel). Thus, the weirder 
a disgust sensitivity item is, the stronger that item’s relationship is to 
moral judgments of purity transgressions. As expected, this 
relationship is specific to the purity domain, as no relationship was  
found between weirdness of disgust sensitivity items and the strength 
of their relationship to moral judgments of care transgressions (r[83] 
= -.02, p = .87. Figure 4.2, Bottom-Left Panel). Conducting the same 
analyses for frequency of occurrence did not yield any substantive 
results. A disgust sensitivity item’s frequency was not correlated with 
the strength of its relationship to moral judgments of purity (r[83] = 
-.11, p = .32, Figure 4.2, Top-Right Panel), nor care (r[83] = -.03, p 
= .81, Figure 4.2, Bottom-Right Panel) transgressions. 
Reanalysis of Disgust Sensitivity and Moral Domain 
Interaction. Are there consequences for including weird items in 
disgust sensitivity measures for research on the relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and moral judgments? We investigated this by 
testing whether the interaction between disgust sensitivity and moral 
domain depends on the inclusion of weird disgust sensitivity items. 
We re-analyzed the data from Sample 1 separately for disgust 
sensitivity items scoring below and above the median weirdness 
rating (i.e., 3.38) and compared the findings.  
A model including disgust sensitivity (measured with items 
scoring high or low on weirdness; mean-centered), moral domain (1 
= purity, 0 = care), and their interaction was fitted to the dataset of 
each (sub)scale. An interesting pattern emerged (see Figure 4.1). For 
the DSS, the LDS, and the pathogen subscale of the TDDS, the 
interaction between disgust sensitivity and moral domain tended to 
be slightly stronger when disgust sensitivity was measured with 




Figure 4.2. The relationship between weirdness and frequency of occurrence 
of disgust sensitivity items and their correlation with moral judgments per 
moral domain (purity versus care). Only the correlation displayed in the 
upper left panel, between weirdness of disgust sensitivity items and the 
strength of their relationship to purity moral judgments, is significant, r(83) 
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when disgust sensitivity was measured with items scoring low on 
weirdness. However, these differences were quite small and well 
within the confidence intervals of the other estimates. 
We conducted z-tests to test whether these interaction effects 
differed in magnitude for disgust sensitivity items scoring high and 
low on weirdness. For all but one sub(scale) no significant differences 
were found (all z’s < 0.88, all p’s > .38). Although we found a 
significant difference for the sexual disgust subscale of the TDDS (z = 
2.15, p = .03), this was in the opposite direction of what was 
expected. Rather than becoming stronger and more positive, the 
interaction effect became non-significantly negative. That is, although 
at an item level, the weirdness of disgust sensitivity items may affect 
the size of the disgust sensitivity-purity judgment association 
(consistent with the weirdness overlap hypothesis), when used as a 
combined scale the effects of disgust sensitivity weirdness do not 
affect conclusions about the link between disgust sensitivity and 




We investigated whether the weirdness of disgust sensitivity 
items helps explain the finding that disgust sensitivity is more 
strongly related to moral judgments of purity, as compared to other 
types of, transgressions. Previous research showed that moral 
transgressions of the purity domain are substantially weirder than 
other types of moral transgressions, suggesting that weirdness might 
account for the disgust-purity link (Gray & Keeney, 2015). We tested 
a “weirdness overlap” hypothesis, which predicts that the weirdness 
of disgust sensitivity items relates to moral judgments of purity (i.e., 
weird) transgressions. The results of our study support that prediction 
and show that the relationship is specific to the moral domain of 
purity (i.e., weird transgressions) and not found for the care domain. 
Importantly, however, we find no evidence that the inclusion of weird 
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disgust sensitivity items explains the interaction between disgust 
sensitivity and moral domain.  
 In our study, we distinguished between a disgust sensitivity 
item’s weirdness and frequency of occurrence. As expected, many of 
the disgust sensitivity items occurred relatively infrequently (no 
average frequency rating exceeded 4.90 on a scale ranging from 1 = 
‘Not at all frequent’ to 7 = ‘Extremely frequent’, Mfrequency = 2.37, SD 
= 0.86, median = 2.21), but were not necessarily perceived to be 
weird (on a scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all weird to 7 = 
‘Extremely weird, Mweirdness = 3.67, SD = 1.13, median = 3.38). Even 
though the two constructs were highly correlated (r[83] = -.80, p < 
.001), they showed two distinct patterns of results. While disgust 
sensitivity items’ weirdness ratings had a moderately strong 
correlation with the strength of items’ relationship to moral 
judgments of purity transgressions, there was no such relationship for 
disgust sensitivity items’ frequency of occurrence. 
We tested the “weirdness overlap” hypothesis on the level of 
items. One limitation of this approach is that we treat an item’s 
weirdness score as a constant factor and ignore potential individual 
differences in perceptions of weirdness. It could be that some 
individuals are more sensitive to weird situations in general, and 
because of that sensitivity react more negatively to both weird disgust 
sensitivity items (i.e., with more disgust) and weird moral judgment 
items (i.e., with more moral condemnation). However, while this 
logic explains why disgust sensitivity relates to moral judgments in 
general, it cannot explain why disgust sensitivity has a stronger 
relationship to moral judgments of purity specifically. In other words, 
it is not exactly clear why such weirdness sensitive individuals would 
react differently to variation in weirdness of purity and other types of 
transgressions. 
Additionally, we want to note the potential importance of 
cultural norms on perceptions of weirdness and frequency. What may 
be weird or occur infrequently in one culture, might be relatively 
normal or even norm-abiding in another culture (e.g., the item “You 
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are served a dish made of cow’s tongue and cheek”). In our study, we 
used an American sample because previous research on the 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments and on 
the weirdness of purity transgressions has also mostly used American 
subjects. However, what is considered weird or not will likely shift 
from culture to culture. 
Conclusion. The link between disgust sensitivity and purity 
issues has been found in many studies (Crawford et al., 2014; 
Horberg et al., 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, 
Knobe et al., 2009; Jarudi, 2009; Olatunji, 2008; Smith et al., 2011; 
Terrizzi et al., 2010; Wagemans et al., 2018), but it is unclear what 
psychological mechanism explains why disgust sensitivity has a 
stronger relationship with moral judgments of purity as compared to 
other types of transgressions. We tested a weirdness overlap 
hypothesis. We reasoned that the presence of weird scenarios in 
disgust sensitivity scales might explain why disgust sensitivity relates 
more strongly to moral judgments of other weird scenarios (i.e., 
purity transgressions) as compared to moral judgments of relatively 
normal scenarios (i.e., care transgressions). However, even though we 
find that weirdness of disgust sensitivity items predicts their 
relationship to purity moral judgments, we do not find any evidence 
that the interaction between disgust sensitivity and moral domain is 
dependent on the inclusion of highly weird scenarios in disgust 
sensitivity scales. We therefore conclude it to be unlikely that the 
stronger relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments 
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are served a dish made of cow’s tongue and cheek”). In our study, we 
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Individual differences in disgust sensitivity relate to a wide variety of 
psychological constructs (e.g., moral decision-making, political 
ideology, person perception) and are thought to play a role in the 
onset and maintenance of several psychopathological disorders (e.g., 
anxiety disorders, obsessive compulsive disorder, eating disorders). 
Despite its importance, research has yet to uncover the basic 
information processing styles that are associated with individual 
differences in disgust sensitivity. In the present article, we aimed to 
provide more insight into these processing styles and examined three 
attentional biases (vigilance, maintenance, and avoidance) for disgust 
stimuli as a function of disgust sensitivity. Using eye tracking 
methodology, two studies (total N = 284) found that the processing 
of disgust stimuli by disgust sensitive individuals is characterized by 
avoidance, but not by vigilance or disengagement difficulties in 
response to disgust stimuli. This finding is in line with the idea that 
more disgust sensitive individuals have a more sensitive pathogen 
threat alert system. Surprisingly though, disgust sensitive individuals 
showed the exact same attentional avoidance bias for other negative 
stimuli, suggesting that disgust sensitivity may be indicative of a more 
general defensive strategy than previously thought. 
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A considerable amount of theoretical and empirical research 
has focused on determining the function, elicitors, and behavioral 
consequences of disgust (e.g., Curtis & Biran, 2001; Rozin & Fallon, 
1987; Tybur et al., 2013). Interestingly, the field still lacks a good 
understanding of the basic information processes underlying 
individual differences in disgust sensitivity. This is surprising given 
the evidence for the involvement of disgust sensitivity in many 
psychopathological disorders (for an overview, see Olatunji & McKay, 
2009) and other important psychological constructs (e.g., Crawford et 
al., 2014; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Horberg et al., 2009; Inbar, 
Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar et al., 2012; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe et 
al., 2009; Olatunji, 2008; Shook et al., 2017; Terrizzi et al., 2010; 
Wagemans et al., 2018). In the current paper, we aim to provide 
more insight into these information processes by investigating 
whether individuals high and low in disgust sensitivity have different 
attentional biases for disgust stimuli. Based on existing literature we 
specify three hypotheses, each predicting their own relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and patterns of attention regarding disgust 
stimuli (i.e., vigilance, maintenance, and avoidance). The three 
hypotheses are then tested simultaneously in two eye tracking 
studies. 
 Disgust is thought to have originated as part of a food 
rejection system, discouraging the intake of harmful foods (Darwin, 
1872; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). However, researchers have observed 
disgust responses to a substantially wider range of stimuli, including 
body products, animals, sex, death, and even norm violations 
(Chapman et al., 2009; Curtis & Biran, 2001; Haidt et al., 1997). It is 
therefore likely that disgust has evolved to serve a more general 
disease protection function and, as such, is experienced when 
encountering any type of situation that poses a contamination threat 
(Curtis & Biran, 2001; Oaten et al., 2009; Tybur et al., 2013). In line 
with this disease protection function, disgust’s primary behavioral 
motivation is to avoid contact between the body and potential 
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encountering any type of situation that poses a contamination threat 
(Curtis & Biran, 2001; Oaten et al., 2009; Tybur et al., 2013). In line 
with this disease protection function, disgust’s primary behavioral 
motivation is to avoid contact between the body and potential 
contaminants (Curtis & Biran, 2001). This avoidance reaction is not 
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only evident in actual withdrawal behaviors (Woody, McLean, & 
Klassen, 2005), but also in the facial expression accompanying a 
disgust experience, characterized by a raised upper lip, wrinkling of 
the nose, and narrowing of the eyes (Chapman et al., 2009; Vrana, 
1993). 
 Although disgust is experienced by people across cultures, 
there is considerable individual variation in the extent to which 
people are prone to experience disgust intensely or easily (Haidt et 
al., 1994). This so-called disgust sensitivity or trait disgust is 
associated with various psychological constructs. Research in the field 
of social and political psychology has found that individual 
differences in disgust sensitivity are relevant for moral decision 
making (Horberg et al., 2009; Wagemans et al., 2018), and relate to 
political ideology (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar et al., 2012; 
Shook et al., 2017; Terrizzi et al., 2010; however, also see Tybur et 
al., 2010) and attitudes towards a variety of groups, including 
homosexuals, foreigners, and immigrants (Crawford et al., 2014; 
Hodson & Costello, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe et al., 2009; Olatunji, 
2008). Similarly, a vast body of empirical and theoretical work has 
highlighted disgust sensitivity’s involvement in many 
psychopathological disorders, such as animal phobias and general 
anxiety (De Jong & Merckelbach, 1998; De Jong, Peters, & 
Vanderhallen, 2002; Matchett & Davey, 1991; Mulkens, De Jong, & 
Merckelback, 1996; Muris et al., 1999), eating disorders (Aharoni & 
Hertz, 2011; Davey, Buckland, Tantow, & Dallos, 1998), and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; Moretz & McKay, 2008; Muris 
et al., 2000; Olatunji, Lohr, Sawchuk, & Tolin, 2007; Tolin, Woods, & 
Abramowitz, 2005; Woody & Tolin, 2002). 
 Together, these findings show the many ways in which 
individuals high and low in disgust sensitivity can be distinguished. A 
question that follows, though, is what mechanism explains disgust 
sensitivity’s relationship to many of these constructs. Although a lot of 
attention has been devoted to improving our understanding of disgust 
in the last decades, some of the basic cognitive processes associated 
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with disgust sensitivity still have to be examined. One such basic 
process that needs investigation is the information processing of 
disgust stimuli by individuals differing in disgust sensitivity. Knowing 
whether attentional biases are associated with individual differences 
in disgust sensitivity, and if so which biases, can not only further 
improve our understanding of disgust sensitivity itself, but it would 
also help clarify the mechanisms by which disgust sensitivity is related 
to many constructs (i.e., such as the ones described above).  
For example, several studies have indicated that disgust 
sensitive individuals hold more negative attitudes of a variety of 
“deviant” groups (e.g., homosexuals, foreigners; Crawford et al., 
2014; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe et al., 2009; 
Olatunji, 2008). One explanation for this relationship is that groups 
that deviate from the norm might pose a greater risk for disease and 
this contamination threat may be especially salient to disgust sensitive 
individuals (e.g., Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 2007; Terrizzi et al., 
2010). However, two different information processing styles may 
underlie this explanation. One possibility is that the heightened 
perception of a contamination threat could lead disgust sensitive 
individuals to excessively focus on this threat. According to this 
explanation, negative attitudes towards these groups are thus the 
result of an inability to dissociate the contamination threat from the 
group. Alternatively, the heightened perception of a contamination 
threat could lead disgust sensitive individuals to avoid contact with 
members of these groups. This avoidant response not only prevents 
them from potential infectious diseases, but also impedes any chance 
of positive contact. If this is true, the negative attitudes towards these 
groups might primarily result from a lack of positive knowledge about 
this group (i.e., in line with the contact hypothesis; Allport, 1954; 
Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Importantly, although both information 
processing styles ultimately lead to the exact same relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and attitudes of these groups, the 
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with disgust sensitivity still have to be examined. One such basic 
process that needs investigation is the information processing of 
disgust stimuli by individuals differing in disgust sensitivity. Knowing 
whether attentional biases are associated with individual differences 
in disgust sensitivity, and if so which biases, can not only further 
improve our understanding of disgust sensitivity itself, but it would 
also help clarify the mechanisms by which disgust sensitivity is related 
to many constructs (i.e., such as the ones described above).  
For example, several studies have indicated that disgust 
sensitive individuals hold more negative attitudes of a variety of 
“deviant” groups (e.g., homosexuals, foreigners; Crawford et al., 
2014; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe et al., 2009; 
Olatunji, 2008). One explanation for this relationship is that groups 
that deviate from the norm might pose a greater risk for disease and 
this contamination threat may be especially salient to disgust sensitive 
individuals (e.g., Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 2007; Terrizzi et al., 
2010). However, two different information processing styles may 
underlie this explanation. One possibility is that the heightened 
perception of a contamination threat could lead disgust sensitive 
individuals to excessively focus on this threat. According to this 
explanation, negative attitudes towards these groups are thus the 
result of an inability to dissociate the contamination threat from the 
group. Alternatively, the heightened perception of a contamination 
threat could lead disgust sensitive individuals to avoid contact with 
members of these groups. This avoidant response not only prevents 
them from potential infectious diseases, but also impedes any chance 
of positive contact. If this is true, the negative attitudes towards these 
groups might primarily result from a lack of positive knowledge about 
this group (i.e., in line with the contact hypothesis; Allport, 1954; 
Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Importantly, although both information 
processing styles ultimately lead to the exact same relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and attitudes of these groups, the 
explanation for this relationship greatly depends on the underlying 
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process, and also impacts which strategies for intervention may be 
most effective.  
One way to reveal these automatic and non-conscious 
cognitive processes is by investigating the attentional biases involved 
with the processing of disgust stimuli. While attentional biases have 
been found for other personality traits (e.g., trait anxiety) and for 
some disorders (e.g., depression), it remains largely unclear what 
attentional biases are associated with disgust sensitivity, if any. Based 
on the existing literature, we specify three hypotheses that each 
predict a distinct attentional bias in information processing of disgust 
stimuli associated with individual differences in disgust sensitivity.  
 
Vigilance Hypothesis 
The vigilance hypothesis is based on the more general 
observation that emotionally salient stimuli draw attention (e.g., 
Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Philippot, & 
Bradley, 2004; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Richards & 
Blanchette, 2004; Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986). It 
predicts that disgust sensitive individuals, for whom disgust stimuli 
are more motivationally salient, will be more attentive towards 
disgust stimuli. This vigilant attention consists of two components: A 
quick initial drawing of attention to the disgust stimulus when it 
appears, and continuous monitoring following the onset of this 
disgust stimulus.  
There is, to our knowledge, no direct evidence supporting the 
idea that disgust sensitive individuals are more vigilant towards 
disgust stimuli. However, research on the attentional biases 
associated with individual differences in trait anxiety shows that these 
influence individuals’ vigilance towards related stimuli. Several 
studies have found that more anxious individuals have a stronger 
initial drawing of attention towards threatening stimuli (i.e., faces or 
words) compared to less anxious individuals (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & 
Hamilton, 1998; Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & De Bono, 1999; 
Fox, 1993; MacLeod & Matthews, 1988; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 
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2000). Additionally, Mogg and colleagues (2000) show some 
indication of continuous monitoring of emotionally salient stimuli by 
anxious individuals. Subjects with generalized anxiety disorder more 
often direct their attention to threatening faces than subjects with 
depression disorder or healthy subjects. A similar vigilant attentional 
bias might be at play for highly disgust sensitive individuals, but, as 
far as we know, no study yet has directly tested that possibility.  
 
Maintenance Hypothesis 
The maintenance hypothesis predicts that disgust sensitive 
individuals will have more difficulty disengaging from disgust stimuli. 
Like the vigilance hypothesis, this hypothesis builds on the notion that 
emotionally salient stimuli attract attention. However, the 
maintenance hypothesis differs from the vigilance hypothesis in that it 
focusses on what happens after detection of a disgust stimulus. 
According to the maintenance hypothesis, disgust sensitive 
individuals are more likely to keep attending to the disgust stimulus. 
It therefore implies a rather dysfunctional process as these individuals 
are also more likely to experience strong feelings of disgust in 
response to disgust stimuli. Indeed, neuropsychological research has 
shown that disgust sensitive individuals not only show stronger 
activation of disgust related brain regions in response to disgust 
elicitors, but also a weaker activation of regions related to emotion 
regulation (Mataix-Cols et al., 2008). 
While this might sound counterintuitive, there is empirical 
work showing that emotionally salient cues tend to retain attention 
longer. For example, individuals scoring higher on a depression 
inventory take longer to disengage from depression-related images 
(Sears, Thomas, LeHuquet, & Johnson, 2010) and fixate their 
attention longer on negative pictures (Caseras, Garner, Bradley, & 
Mogg, 2007). Similar findings have been reported for trait anxiety, 
with anxious individuals having more difficulty disengaging from 
threat-related stimuli (i.e., faces or words) than non-anxious or less 
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Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; 
Salemink, Van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007). There is also some evidence 
that such a mechanism may be at play for disgust sensitivity and 
disgust stimuli. One study reports an attention bias towards disgust 
words (i.e., faeces) for disgust sensitive individuals (Cisler, Olatunji, 
Lohr, & Williams, 2009) and another study shows sustained 
engagement with disgust stimuli by more disgust sensitive individuals 
(Van Dillen & Vanderveen, 2017). However, these studies are either 
conducted with a small sample or use very brief stimuli exposure 
times (i.e., 120 ms), making it difficult to confirm that disgust 




The avoidance hypothesis predicts that more disgust sensitive 
individuals will have a stronger avoidance reaction to disgust stimuli. 
The idea is that these individuals have a more sensitive pathogen 
threat alert system, which causes them to interpret even the slightest 
cue of contamination as a threat, resulting in an avoidance reaction. 
In other words, according to the avoidance hypothesis, higher levels 
of disgust sensitivity do not lead to a qualitatively different response 
after detecting a disgust stimulus, but come with a lower threshold 
for activating that response.   
Although the theoretical argument behind this idea is 
compelling, the empirical evidence is lacking. Research has shown 
that disgust sensitive individuals are more likely to avoid contact with 
potentially contaminated objects and are less likely to engage in 
behaviors risking such contact (Deacon & Olatunji, 2007; Van 
Overveld, De Jong, & Peters, 2010). Similarly, Olatunji and 
colleagues (Olatunji, Lohr et al., 2007) found that disgust sensitivity 
mediated the relationship between contamination-related OCD 
symptoms and behavioral avoidance in a series of behavioral 
avoidance tasks. As far as we know, only one study shows some 
evidence for attentional avoidance of disgust stimuli for disgust 
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sensitive individuals. Woody and Tolin (2002) found that individuals 
scoring higher on the body envelope violation subscale of disgust 
sensitivity spent less time looking at blood injection pictures than 
individuals scoring lower on this subscale. However, the same study 
reports no such relationship between the animal disgust subscale and 
viewing time of spider pictures, even though these same subjects had 
responded with disgust (in addition to fear) to pictures of spiders in a 
previous study (see Tolin, Lohr, Sawchuk, & Lee, 1997). This study 
therefore only provides weak evidence for a general avoidant 




We test each of the three hypotheses outlined above. 
Attentional processes will be assessed with an eye tracking task. 
Participants will engage in a free viewing task in which they will be 
presented with grids of pictures differing in emotional content (i.e., 
disgust, positive, neutral, and in Study 5.2, negative; see Figure 5.1). 
The benefit of using eye tracking technology over traditional tasks 
assessing attentional processes (e.g., dot probe or Stroop tasks) is that 
it can identify which stimuli grab attention, as well as measure the 
attention process continuously over time. We can therefore separate a 
vigilant attentional bias (i.e., initial orienting and subsequent 
monitoring) from a maintenance attentional bias (i.e., prolonged 
attention) towards a stimulus, while at the same time investigating 
the potential of an avoidant attentional bias (i.e., looking away). For 
each of the three hypotheses, we formulate distinct predictions of eye 
gazing patterns. We do so by investigating four different eye tracking 
measures: Time to first fixation, average visit duration, total visit 
duration, and visit count. We will explain these measures together 
with the exact predictions following from each hypothesis briefly 
below (see also Table 5.1).  
Time to first fixation is the amount of time (in milliseconds) 
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conducted with a small sample or use very brief stimuli exposure 
times (i.e., 120 ms), making it difficult to confirm that disgust 




The avoidance hypothesis predicts that more disgust sensitive 
individuals will have a stronger avoidance reaction to disgust stimuli. 
The idea is that these individuals have a more sensitive pathogen 
threat alert system, which causes them to interpret even the slightest 
cue of contamination as a threat, resulting in an avoidance reaction. 
In other words, according to the avoidance hypothesis, higher levels 
of disgust sensitivity do not lead to a qualitatively different response 
after detecting a disgust stimulus, but come with a lower threshold 
for activating that response.   
Although the theoretical argument behind this idea is 
compelling, the empirical evidence is lacking. Research has shown 
that disgust sensitive individuals are more likely to avoid contact with 
potentially contaminated objects and are less likely to engage in 
behaviors risking such contact (Deacon & Olatunji, 2007; Van 
Overveld, De Jong, & Peters, 2010). Similarly, Olatunji and 
colleagues (Olatunji, Lohr et al., 2007) found that disgust sensitivity 
mediated the relationship between contamination-related OCD 
symptoms and behavioral avoidance in a series of behavioral 
avoidance tasks. As far as we know, only one study shows some 
evidence for attentional avoidance of disgust stimuli for disgust 
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sensitive individuals. Woody and Tolin (2002) found that individuals 
scoring higher on the body envelope violation subscale of disgust 
sensitivity spent less time looking at blood injection pictures than 
individuals scoring lower on this subscale. However, the same study 
reports no such relationship between the animal disgust subscale and 
viewing time of spider pictures, even though these same subjects had 
responded with disgust (in addition to fear) to pictures of spiders in a 
previous study (see Tolin, Lohr, Sawchuk, & Lee, 1997). This study 
therefore only provides weak evidence for a general avoidant 




We test each of the three hypotheses outlined above. 
Attentional processes will be assessed with an eye tracking task. 
Participants will engage in a free viewing task in which they will be 
presented with grids of pictures differing in emotional content (i.e., 
disgust, positive, neutral, and in Study 5.2, negative; see Figure 5.1). 
The benefit of using eye tracking technology over traditional tasks 
assessing attentional processes (e.g., dot probe or Stroop tasks) is that 
it can identify which stimuli grab attention, as well as measure the 
attention process continuously over time. We can therefore separate a 
vigilant attentional bias (i.e., initial orienting and subsequent 
monitoring) from a maintenance attentional bias (i.e., prolonged 
attention) towards a stimulus, while at the same time investigating 
the potential of an avoidant attentional bias (i.e., looking away). For 
each of the three hypotheses, we formulate distinct predictions of eye 
gazing patterns. We do so by investigating four different eye tracking 
measures: Time to first fixation, average visit duration, total visit 
duration, and visit count. We will explain these measures together 
with the exact predictions following from each hypothesis briefly 
below (see also Table 5.1).  
Time to first fixation is the amount of time (in milliseconds) 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































certain picture) for the first time. In other words, this measure 
informs us about the detection speed of a given picture. The vigilance 
hypothesis follows from the idea that disgust pictures are more salient 
to highly disgust sensitive as compared to less disgust sensitive 
individuals. As such, this hypothesis would predict faster detection of, 
and thus a shorter time to first fixation on, disgust pictures by disgust 
sensitive individuals. 
Average visit duration is the average time (in milliseconds) 
participants spend on each visit to a specific area of interest (in our 
case, a certain picture). A visit here means (re-)entering the area that 
defines a certain picture.14 Average visit duration therefore gives us 
an indication of participants’ viewing behaviors after detection of a 
given stimulus, which is relevant to both the avoidance and 
maintenance hypotheses. Importantly, these hypotheses make the 
exact opposite prediction regarding the relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and average visit duration of disgust stimuli. The 
avoidance hypothesis predicts that disgust sensitive individuals will 
have a stronger avoidance reaction to disgust stimuli, which would 
result in shorter average visit durations of disgust stimuli for disgust 
sensitive individuals compared to less disgust sensitive individuals. 
The maintenance hypothesis predicts the opposite; disgust sensitive 
individuals will have more difficulty disengaging from disgust stimuli, 
resulting in longer average visit durations of disgust stimuli for disgust 
sensitive, as compared to less disgust sensitive, individuals.  
Total visit duration is the total amount of time (in 
milliseconds) spent within a specific area of interest (in our case, a 
certain picture). This measure is indicative of a general eye gazing 
strategy and can therefore again distinguish between an avoidance 
and maintenance hypothesis. The predictions following from these 
hypotheses on the relationship between disgust sensitivity and total 
																																								 																				
14 Note that one visit can consist of multiple fixations, as participants can look 
at multiple spots within a given picture without looking away from this 
picture.  
5
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visit duration of disgust pictures are in line with the predictions for 
average visit duration. While the avoidance hypothesis predicts that 
disgust sensitive individuals will have shorter total visit durations of 
disgust pictures, the maintenance hypothesis predicts that they will 
have longer total visit durations of disgust pictures. 
Visit count is the number of times participants (re-)enter a 
specific area of interest (in our case, a certain picture). While findings 
regarding average and total visit duration will be able to distinguish 
between the avoidance and maintenance hypotheses, visit count will 
help us distinguish between the vigilance and avoidance hypotheses. 
According to the vigilance hypothesis, disgust sensitive individuals 
will continuously monitor disgust stimuli, leading to a higher visit 
count of disgust pictures for these individuals. The avoidance 
hypothesis, on the contrary, predicts a lower visit count for disgust 
sensitive individuals as these individuals are more likely to avoid, and 
therefore less likely to return to, a disgust picture.  
For an overview of the predictions regarding the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and each of the eye tracking measure per 




Data collection took place at festivals in 2017, in Tilburg, the 
Netherlands. A first sample was recruited at a music festival and a 
second sample was recruited at a social innovation festival. Sample 
size was in both cases determined by the number of visitors that 
wanted to participate in our study during two festival days (i.e., four 
days of data collection in total). The data of these samples is 
combined for our analyses to increase the power of our study.15 
																																								 																				
15 The questionnaires, data, and syntax used for data analysis for all studies 
can be found in the supplemental materials at the Open Science Framework 




Sample 1.  
Participants. Data collection took place in a large, well-lit room at 
Festival Mundial. The equipment was set up in the corner of this 
room to minimize distraction and no music was played in this room 
during the experiment (although music from outside the building 
could be heard). A marketing team of the university approached 
festival visitors outside of the building with the request to participate 
in the study. After two days of data collection, 99 visitors had 
participated. Participants were excluded when they did not fill out the 
survey (N = 5), did not participate in the eye tracker task (N = 2), 
and when they had substantial missing data in the eye tracking task 
(N = 1). This left us with a final sample of 91 participants (25 males, 
66 females, Mage = 37.62, SD = 14.60).  
Materials. To keep the questionnaire as short as possible, we 
used the pathogen disgust subscale of the  Three Domain Disgust 
Scale (Tybur et al., 2009) to measure disgust sensitivity (7 items, α = 
.85)16 All items were answered on a scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all 
disgusting’ to 7 = ‘Extremely disgusting.’ An example item of this 
scale is “Standing close to a person who has body odor.”   
Forty pictures were taken from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), a well-
validated database of pictures eliciting specific emotions. Ten 
disgusting pictures (e.g., dirty toilet, cockroaches), ten positive 
pictures (e.g., puppies, ice cream), and twenty neutral pictures (e.g., 
shoes, clock) were selected. Positive and disgust pictures were chosen 
for their similarity in complexity, the presence of animals, and the 
presence of people. For the eye tracking task, these pictures were 
presented in ten grids of four pictures (one disgusting, one positive, 
and two neutral). These grids were fixed in picture combination and 
																																								 																				
16 Additional measures were included for exploratory purposes. In Sample 1, 
this was the moral disgust subscale of the Three Domain Disgust Scale (Tybur 
et al., 2009) and in Sample 2, these were 10 moral judgments of the Moral 
Foundations Vignettes (Clifford et al., 2015; see Supplemental Materials). 
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order, meaning that each individual saw the same combinations of 
pictures in the same order. The eye tracking task was conducted with 
the Tobii T60 (Tobii, Stockholm, Sweden). 
Alcohol was available at the festival. To determine blood 
alcohol concentration (BAC) levels we used the AlcoScan AL7000 
breathalyzer (measuring BAC levels in permille). Eighteen 
participants had BAC levels above 0, with a mean BAC level of 
0.375‰ (SD = 0.25).17  
Sample 2. 
Participants. Data collection took place at the Dear Future, 
festival. On the first day, data collection took place in a well-lit and 
soundproof room. However, because the festival did not attract many 
visitors and the location of the room was not on the main path, 
equipment was moved to a more central location on the second day. 
Both days, the researchers themselves approached festival visitors 
with the request to participate in the study. After two days, 47 visitors 
had participated in the study. The same exclusion criteria as in 
Sample 1 were used. Participants were excluded because they did not 
fill out the survey (N = 2) and because they had substantial missing 
data in the eye tracking task (N = 1). This left us with a final sample 
of 44 participants (20 males, 24 females, Mage = 36.73, SD = 14.15).  
Materials. Disgust sensitivity was measured with the 27-item 
Disgust Sensitivity Scale – revised (Haidt et al., 1994; modified by 
Olatunji, Williams et al., 2007, α = .84). The first 14 items of this 
scale are answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = ‘Strongly 
disagree (very untrue about me)’ to 5 = ‘Strongly agree (very true 
about me)’. An example item is “If I see someone vomit, it makes me 
sick to my stomach”. The remaining 13 items are answered on a 5-
point scale ranging from 1 = ‘Not disgusting at all’ to 5 = ‘Extremely 
disgusting’. An example item is “You are about to drink a glass of milk 
																																								 																				
17 As a reference point, the Dutch legal limit for driving is a BAC level of 
0.5‰. Only four participants exceeded this limit. Excluding these participants 




when you smell that it is spoiled”. The scale includes two filler items 
that are excluded from data analysis.   
The same 40 IAPS pictures were used as in Sample 1, but we 
improved our design by randomizing picture presentation. More 
specifically, for each grid one disgusting, one positive, and two 
neutral pictures were randomly selected from the forty pictures 
(without repetition of pictures). Alcohol was again available at the 
festival, but none of the participants had BAC levels above 0. The 
same eye tracking equipment was used as in Sample 1.  
Procedure. The procedure was the same in both samples. The 
first part of the study was administered on a tablet and consisted of 
informed consent and the disgust sensitivity questions. At the end of 
the questionnaire, participants provided demographic information 
and were asked whether they had consumed alcohol. If so, the 
breathalyzer was used to determine the blood alcohol concentration 
level. The second part of the study consisted of the eye tracking task. 
A researcher seated participants about half a meter from the eye 
tracker display and started the eye tracking calibration. After 
successful calibration, participants started the free-viewing task. This 
set-up (i.e., free viewing) was chosen to encourage naturalistic 
information processing.  At the start of each trial, participants saw a 
fixation cross at the center of the screen for 2 seconds. They were 
then presented with one of the picture grids for 6 seconds. This was 
repeated for a total of ten trials. Participants were then debriefed and 















Data Analytic Strategy. As mentioned before, the two samples were 
analyzed together.18 Linear mixed-effects models were used to 
estimate the effects of disgust sensitivity and picture type on each of 
the dependent variables, while taking into account random variance 
of participants, pictures, and samples. The analyses were conducted 
using the “lmer” function in the “lme4” package of R (Bates et al., 
2015; R Core Team, 2017) and the “lmerTest” package was used to 
obtain p-values for coefficients (Kuznetsova et al., 2013). Because 
disgust sensitivity was measured with different answer scales in both 
samples, disgust sensitivity scores were mean-centered and 
standardized within each dataset (generating z-scores). Regarding the 
eye tracking data, fixations and visits were calculated by the authors 
in R using the “saccades” package (Von der Marlsburg, 2015). A 
model including disgust sensitivity (DS; standardized), picture type 
(reference category = neutral pictures), and their interaction as 
independent variables was then fitted to the data to predict each of 
the dependent variables (i.e., time to first fixation; average visit 
duration; total visit duration; visit count). Below, the findings will be 
described for each of the dependent variables separately.  
Time to First Fixation. The vigilance hypothesis predicts that 
more disgust sensitive individuals will be faster in detecting the 
disgust pictures (i.e., have a shorter time to first fixation for disgust 
pictures) than less disgust sensitive individuals. This prediction is not 
supported by the data (see Figure 5.2A). The analyses reveal only a 
main effect of disgust pictures on time to first fixation (b = -369.97,  
																																								 																				
18 Previous research has shown that the pathogen disgust subscale of the 
Three Domain Disgust scale has moderate to high correlations with all 
components of the Disgust Sensitivity Scale – Revised (Olatunji et al., 2012). 
Analyzing the data separately for each disgust sensitivity measure (i.e., 
sample) shows that the overall pattern of results is the same for both 
measures. However, the findings of sample 2 do not always reach 
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SE = 174.83, t[37] = -2.12, p = .04, 95% CI [-727.76, 1.16]), 
showing that individuals were faster in detecting the disgust pictures 
than the neutral pictures. However, there were no main effects of 
disgust sensitivity (b = -33.23, SE = 32.34, t[327] = -1.03, p = .31; 
95% CI [-94.55, 29.17]) and positive pictures (b = -241.80, SE = 
174.83, t[37] = -1.38, p = .17, 95% CI [-583.36, 94.04]), nor any 
interaction effects between disgust sensitivity and picture type (DS  
disgust: b = 32.50, SE = 38.73, t[5731] = 0.84, p = .40, 95% CI [-
38.43, 113.38]; DS  positive: b = -48.89, SE = 38.87, t[5729] = -
1.26, p = .21, 95% CI [-122.88, 27.23]).  
Average Visit Duration. The findings for average visit 
duration are in line with the prediction from the avoidance 
hypothesis, but go against the prediction from the maintenance 
hypothesis (see Figure 5.2B). There were main effects of disgust 
sensitivity, disgust pictures, and positive pictures (DS: b = -31.46, SE 
= 13.20, t[338] = -2.38, p = .02, 95% CI [-58.16, -7.99]); disgust: b 
= 255.97, SE = 38.17, t[37] = 6.71, p < .001, 95% CI [181.60, 
326.93]; positive: b = 144.52, SE = 38.16, t[37] = 3.79, p < .001, 
95% CI [69.93, 213.84]). There was no interaction effect between 
disgust sensitivity and positive pictures (b = -9.54, SE = 14.43, 
t[5187] = -0.66, p = .51, 95% CI [-39.18, 18.18]), but there was a 
significant interaction effect between disgust sensitivity and disgust 
pictures on average visit duration (b = -58.96, SE = 14.38, t[5188] = 
-4.10, p < .001, 95% CI [-85.71, -33.76]). As predicted by the 
avoidance hypothesis, more disgust sensitive individuals spent less 
time viewing disgust, as compared to neutral, pictures on average per 
visit than less disgust sensitive individuals did. 
Total Visit Duration. The findings for total visit duration 
largely mimicked the pattern found for average visit duration (see 
Figure 5.2C). Hence, these findings were again in line with the 
avoidance hypothesis, while going against the maintenance 
hypothesis. There was no main effect of disgust sensitivity (b = -
10.88, SE = 13.80, t[343] = -0.79, p = .43, 95% CI [-40.69, 15.53]), 
but main effects of both disgust and positive pictures (disgust: b = 
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381.71, SE = 52.14, t[37] = 7.32, p < .001, 95% CI [290.39, 
470.52]; positive: b = 336.66, SE = 52.14, t[37] = 6.46, p < .001, 
95% CI [229.33, 447.29]). There was no interaction effect of disgust 
sensitivity and positive pictures (b = 24.65, SE = 20.72, t[5134] = 
1.19, p = .23, 95% CI [-16.20, 69.97]), but there was a significant 
interaction between disgust sensitivity and disgust pictures on total 
visit duration (b = -101.12, SE = 20.64, t[5137] = -4.90, p < .001, 
95% CI [-141.49, -62.11]). As predicted by the avoidance hypothesis, 
more disgust sensitive individuals spent less time viewing disgust, as 
compared to neutral, pictures overall than less disgust sensitive 
individuals did.  
Visit Count. The vigilance hypothesis predicts that more 
disgust sensitive individuals will visit disgust pictures more often than 
less disgust sensitive individuals, while the avoidance hypothesis 
predicts exactly the opposite pattern. However, neither predictions 
were supported by the data (see Figure 5.2D). Main effects were 
found for disgust sensitivity and positive pictures (DS: b = 0.07, SE = 
0.02, t[347] = 3.21, p = .001, 95% CI [0.03, 0.11]; positive: b = 
0.19, SE = 0.05, t[37] = 3.65, p < .001, 95% CI [0.09, 0.28]), but 
not for disgust pictures (b = -0.004, SE = 0.05, t[37] = -0.08, p = 
.94, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.10]). The interaction between disgust sensitivity 
and disgust pictures, as well as the interaction between disgust 
sensitivity and positive pictures, was significant (DS  disgust: b = -
0.06, SE = 0.02, t[5071] = -2.32, p = .02, 95% CI [-0.10, -0.02]; DS 
 positive: b = 0.06, SE = 0.02, t[5070] = 2.70, p = .01, 95% CI 
[0.02, 0.11]). Disgust sensitive individuals visited positive, as 
compared to neutral, pictures more often than less disgust sensitivity 
individuals did. However, while there was an interaction effect of 
disgust sensitivity and disgust pictures, there was no effect of disgust 
sensitivity on visit count for disgust pictures (b = 0.02, SE = 0.03, 
t[167.51] = 0.53, p = .60, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.07]). Rather, this 
interaction effect can be attributed to a positive relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and visit count for neutral pictures (b = 0.06, SE = 
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Our first study primarily supports the avoidance hypothesis, 
showing that individuals high in disgust sensitivity spend less time 
looking at disgust pictures than individuals low in disgust sensitivity. 
We found this pattern for both average and total visit duration of 
disgust pictures. The avoidance hypothesis also predicts that 
individuals high in disgust sensitivity will visit disgust pictures less 
often than individuals low in disgust sensitivity do, but this prediction 
was not supported by the data of Study 5.1. We also found no support 
in Study 5.1 for any of the predictions following from either a 
vigilance or a maintenance hypothesis (see Table 5.1).  
Study 5.1 was set up as an exploratory test and so we aimed 
to replicate these findings in a second study. We improved our study 
with regard to three aspects. First, Study 5.2 was conducted in a 
controlled lab environment instead of in the field. Study 5.1 was 
conducted at festivals, which provided us with the benefit of 
collecting data among a wide variety of people from the general 
public (i.e., a non-student sample). However, this setting also limited 
the level of methodological control over our study because of the 
presence of potential distractors. We will therefore test whether the 
pattern found in Study 5.1 replicates in a more controlled setting. 
Second, we extend our experimental design with the inclusion of 
negative, but not disgusting, pictures. This way we can test whether 
the effects found for disgust sensitivity in Study 5.1 are specific to 
disgust stimuli, or apply to negative stimuli in general. Third, to get a 
more precise estimate of our effect, we increased the number of trials 
in Study 5.2 from 10 to 20. Additionally, we preregistered the three 
hypotheses and their predictions regarding the eye tracking task, as 
well as the statistical analyses we planned to run at the Open Science 
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was not supported by the data of Study 5.1. We also found no support 
in Study 5.1 for any of the predictions following from either a 
vigilance or a maintenance hypothesis (see Table 5.1).  
Study 5.1 was set up as an exploratory test and so we aimed 
to replicate these findings in a second study. We improved our study 
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well as the statistical analyses we planned to run at the Open Science 






Participants. We ran the study for two weeks in the SP-lab at 
Tilburg University. Sample size was determined by the number of 
students that participated in our lab study during this time, with a 
minimum sample size set at 120 participants. In the end, 149 students 
(43 males, 103 females, 3 missing, Mage = 19.95, SD = 2.30, with 1 
missing) participated in our study in return for course credit.  
Materials. The same disgust sensitivity scale as in Sample 2 
of Study 5.1 was used (i.e., Disgust Sensitivity Scale – revised; Haidt 
et al., 1994; modified by Olatunji, Williams et al., 2007, α = .84).19  
Pictures were again selected from the International Affective 
Picture System (Lang et al., 2008). A total 80 pictures were selected 
(which included the 40 pictures from Study 5.1), evenly divided over 
four picture categories: disgust20, negative, positive, and neutral. 
Examples of negative pictures are an airplane crash, a gun, and a 
shark. Picture presentation was again randomized, while ensuring 
that each grid included one disgusting, one negative, one positive, 
and one neutral picture. The same eye tracking equipment was used 
as in Study 5.1.  
Procedure. Participants were seated in individual soundproof 
cubicles in the lab, where they gave consent and answered the 
questions measuring disgust sensitivity. They were then taken to 
another cubicle for the eye tracking task. A test leader seated 
participants about half a meter from the eye tracker display and 
started the eye tracking calibration. After successful calibration, 
participants started the free-viewing task. At the start of each trial, 
																																								 																				
19 The same 10 moral judgment items as in Sample 2 of Study 5.1 were 
included for exploratory purposes (i.e., Moral Foundations Vignettes; Clifford 
et al., 2015), but will not be discussed here.  
20 We later found out that due to a mistake in the design of our study only 19 
different disgust pictures were presented in the task and one disgust picture 
was always repeated.  
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participants saw a fixation cross at the center of the screen for 2 
seconds. They were then presented with one of the picture grids for 
10 seconds. This was repeated for a total of twenty trials. After this 
free viewing task, participants indicated for each of the disgust and 
negative pictures how disgusting [negative] they found the picture on 
a scale from 1 = ‘Not at all disgusting (negative)’ to 7 = ‘Very 
disgusting (negative).’ Participants were then debriefed and thanked 
for their participation.   
 
Results  
Data Analytic Strategy. The data analytic strategy was 
identical to that of Study 5.1, except that there was no need to take 
into account random variance of samples. Statistical analyses were 
first conducted using neutral pictures as the reference category, but 
were also conducted using negative pictures as the reference 
category. By doing this, we could test whether the attentional biases 
associated with individual differences in disgust sensitivity are specific 
to disgust pictures or can be generalized to other negative pictures. 
Because participants rated the disgust and negative pictures on 
disgustingness and negativity, we were also able to conduct a 
manipulation check on these pictures. 
Manipulation Check. For each participant, average 
disgustingness and average negativity scores were calculated for 
disgust and negative pictures. As expected, disgust pictures (M = 
4.93, SD = 0.99) were rated as significantly more disgusting than 
negative pictures (M = 2.32, SD = 1.14; t(149) = 26.75, p < .001). 
However, disgust pictures (M = 4.84, SD = 1.16) were also rated as 
slightly more negative than negative pictures (M = 4.58, SD = 1.15; 
t(149) = 2.76, p = .01). 
Time to First Fixation. As in Study 5.1, findings for time to 
first fixation did not support the prediction from the vigilance 
hypothesis that more disgust sensitive individuals will have shorter 
times to first fixation for disgust pictures (see Figure 5.3A). There 
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shark. Picture presentation was again randomized, while ensuring 
that each grid included one disgusting, one negative, one positive, 
and one neutral picture. The same eye tracking equipment was used 
as in Study 5.1.  
Procedure. Participants were seated in individual soundproof 
cubicles in the lab, where they gave consent and answered the 
questions measuring disgust sensitivity. They were then taken to 
another cubicle for the eye tracking task. A test leader seated 
participants about half a meter from the eye tracker display and 
started the eye tracking calibration. After successful calibration, 
participants started the free-viewing task. At the start of each trial, 
																																								 																				
19 The same 10 moral judgment items as in Sample 2 of Study 5.1 were 
included for exploratory purposes (i.e., Moral Foundations Vignettes; Clifford 
et al., 2015), but will not be discussed here.  
20 We later found out that due to a mistake in the design of our study only 19 
different disgust pictures were presented in the task and one disgust picture 
was always repeated.  
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participants saw a fixation cross at the center of the screen for 2 
seconds. They were then presented with one of the picture grids for 
10 seconds. This was repeated for a total of twenty trials. After this 
free viewing task, participants indicated for each of the disgust and 
negative pictures how disgusting [negative] they found the picture on 
a scale from 1 = ‘Not at all disgusting (negative)’ to 7 = ‘Very 
disgusting (negative).’ Participants were then debriefed and thanked 
for their participation.   
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b = -733.62, SE = 105.06, t[75] = -6.98, p < .001, 95% CI [-918.66, 
-536.77]; positive: b = -515.75, SE = 103.79, t[75] = -4.97, p < 
.001, 95% CI [-731.75, -308.95]; negative: b = -374.57, SE = 103.81, 
t[75] = -3.61, p < .001, 95% CI [-563.97, -181.12]). Regardless of 
disgust sensitivity, participants were faster in detecting disgust, 
positive, and negative pictures than neutral pictures. No main effect 
of disgust sensitivity was found (b = -62.96, SE = 47.43, t[287] = -
1.33, p = .19, 95% CI [-156.38, 34.56]), nor did any of the 
interaction effects between disgust sensitivity and picture type reach 
significance (DS × disgust: b = 9.86, SE = 41.12, t[13929] = 0.24, p 
= .81, 95% CI [-68.30, 90.46]; DS × positive: b = -11.90, SE = 
41.03, t[13933] = -0.29, p = .77, 95% CI [-93.54, 63.85]; DS × 
negative: b = 61.15, SE = 41.10, t[13932] = 1.49, p = .14, 95% CI 
[-19.55, 144.41]).  
Average Visit Duration. Findings for average visit duration 
replicate the pattern found in Study 5.1. The data again support the 
prediction following from an avoidance hypothesis, but not the 
prediction following from a maintenance hypothesis (see Figure 
5.3B). There was no main effect of disgust sensitivity (b = 32.25, SE 
= 27.76, t[228] = 1.16, p = 0.25, 95% CI [-23.14, 85.05]). There 
were main effects of disgust, positive and negative pictures (disgust: b 
= 168.05, SE = 62.40, t[75] = 2.69, p = .009, 95% CI [48.81, 
290.68] positive: b = 462.77, SE = 61.64, t[75] = 7.51, p <.001, 
95% CI [326.52, 583.13], negative: b = 233.90, SE = 61.64, t[75] = 
3.79, p < .001, 95% CI [116.27, 358.29]). However, these main 
effects were qualified by significant interactions between disgust 
sensitivity and each of the picture types (DS × disgust: b = -111.50, 
SE = 21.50, t[12826] = -5.19, p < .001, 95% CI [-151.70, -68.05]; 
DS × positive: b = 94.88, SE = 21.46, t[12829] = 4.42, p < .001, 
95% CI [52.07, 134.13]; DS × negative: b = -72.59, SE = 21.49, 
t[12828] = -3.38, p < .001, 95% CI [-113.68, -28.53]). More disgust 
sensitive individuals spent significantly more time viewing positive, as 
compared to neutral, pictures than less disgust sensitivity individuals 
did. As predicted by the avoidance hypothesis, more disgust sensitive 
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individuals spent less time viewing disgust, as compared to neutral, 
pictures on average per visit than less disgust sensitive individuals 
did. Interestingly, this effect of disgust sensitivity on average visit 
duration of disgust pictures was not significantly different from 
disgust sensitivity’s effect on average visit duration of negative 
pictures (b = -38.92, SE = 21.46, t[10892] = -1.81, p = .07, 95% CI 
[-83.76, 3.01]). Disgust sensitive individuals thus spent less time on 
average per visit looking at both disgust and negative pictures than 
less disgust sensitive individuals.  
Total Visit Duration. The findings for total visit duration 
again mimicked the pattern found for average visit duration, and thus 
supported an avoidance, but not maintenance, hypothesis (see Figure 
5.3C). There were no main effects of disgust sensitivity and disgust 
pictures (DS: b = 49.43, SE = 26.73, t[563] = 1.85, p = .06, 95% CI 
[-4.98, 98.11]; disgust: b = 142.41, SE = 103.43, t[75] = 1.38, p = 
.17, 95% CI [-75.69, 322.22]). There were main effects of negative 
and positive pictures (negative: b = 437.16, SE = 102.16, t[75] = 
4.28, p <.001, 95% CI [216.23, 624.44]; positive: b = 1060.80, SE = 
102.15, t[75] = 10.39, p < .001, 95% CI [841.49, 1254.97]). These 
main effects were qualified by significant interaction effects between 
disgust sensitivity and each of the picture types (DS × disgust: b = -
224.96, SE = 33.52, t[12626] = -6.71, p < .001 , 95% CI [-293.85, -
164.70]; DS × positive: b = 210.30, SE = 33.44, t[12640] = 6.29, p 
< .001, 95% CI [144.68, 276.13]; DS × negative: b = -185.39, SE = 
33.50, t[12636] = -5.53, p < .001, 95% CI [-249.05, -125.57]). More 
disgust sensitive individuals spent significantly more time viewing 
positive, as compared to neutral, pictures than less disgust sensitivity 
individuals did. As predicted by the avoidance hypothesis, disgust 
sensitivity was negatively related to total viewing time of disgust, as 
compared to neutral, pictures. Again, this effect of disgust sensitivity 
was not significantly different for disgust as compared to negative 
pictures (b = -39.57, SE = 33.45, t[11455] = -1.18, p = .24, 95% CI 
[-104.74, 17.69]). Participants high in disgust sensitivity thus spent 
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less time overall looking at disgust as well as negative pictures than 
participants low in disgust sensitivity.  
Visit Count. The avoidance hypothesis predicts that more 
disgust sensitive individuals will visit disgust pictures less often, while 
the vigilance hypothesis predicts exactly the opposite pattern. In 
contrast to Study 5.1, in which neither of the predictions were 
supported, the data now clearly support the prediction following from 
an avoidance hypothesis (see Figure 5.3D). There were no main 
effects for disgust sensitivity and negative pictures (DS: b = -0.03, SE 
= 0.03, t[211] = -0.81, p = .42, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.04]; negative: b = 
0.01, SE = 0.03, t[77] = 0.41, p = .68, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.08]). There 
were main effects for disgust pictures and positive pictures (disgust: b 
= -0.21, SE = 0.03, t[76] = -6.09, p < .001 , 95% CI [-0.28, -0.14]; 
positive: b = 0.25, SE = 0.03, t[77] = 7.23, p < .001, 95% CI [0.18, 
0.31]). These main effects were qualified by significant interaction 
effects between disgust sensitivity and each of the picture types (DS 
× disgust: b = -0.07, SE = 0.02, t[11512] = -2.97, p = .003, 95% CI 
[-0.11, -0.02]; DS × positive: b = 0.05, SE = 0.02, t[11514] = 2.25, 
p = .02, 95% CI [0.01, 0.09]; DS × negative: b = -0.07, SE = 0.02, 
t[11514] = -3.30, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.12, -0.03]). More disgust 
sensitive individuals visit positive, as compared to neutral, pictures 
more often than less disgust sensitivity individuals. As predicted by 
the avoidance hypothesis, disgust sensitivity was negatively related to 
visit count of disgust, as compared to neutral, pictures. However, also 
the effect of disgust sensitivity on visit count was not significantly 
different from disgust sensitivity’s effect on visit count of negative 
pictures (b = 0.01, SE = 0.02, t[11513] = 0.33, p = .74, 95% CI [-
0.04, 0.05]). Participants high in disgust sensitivity thus visit disgust 
as well as negative pictures less often than participants  
low in disgust sensitivity.  
All predictions following from an avoidance hypothesis were 
therefore supported, while none of the predictions following from 
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Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are important to 
many psychological constructs and disorders (e.g., Aharoni & Hertz, 
2011; Crawford et al., 2014; De Jong & Merckelbach, 1998; Inbar et 
al., 2012; Olatunji, Lohr et al., 2007; Wagemans et al., 2018). To 
further improve our understanding of disgust sensitivity, we 
examined the basic information processing strategies associated with 
individual differences in disgust sensitivity. Based on the existing 
literature on disgust sensitivity and research that identified 
attentional biases for other personality traits, we formulated three 
hypotheses that each predict different attentional biases for disgust 
stimuli as a function of individual differences in disgust sensitivity. 
The first two hypotheses build on the notion that emotionally salient 
stimuli tend to attract our attention. The vigilance hypothesis predicts 
that disgust sensitive individuals will be more attentive towards 
disgust stimuli, resulting in a quick drawing of attention towards and 
continuous monitoring of disgust stimuli. The maintenance 
hypothesis differs in that it focusses on what happens after detection 
of disgust stimuli. This hypothesis predicts that disgust sensitive 
individuals have more difficulty disengaging from disgust stimuli, 
resulting in longer dwell times on disgust stimuli after detection. The 
last hypothesis, the avoidance hypothesis, argues that disgust 
sensitive individuals have a more sensitive pathogen threat alerting 
system, resulting in a stronger avoidance reaction. It is incompatible 
with the first two hypotheses as it predicts that disgust sensitive 
individuals will spend less attention on disgust stimuli.  
In two studies, we used eye tracking methodology to 
simultaneously test these three hypotheses and found strong support 
for the avoidance hypothesis. Disgust sensitive individuals showed 
strong attentional avoidance of disgust stimuli, with these individuals 
spending less time looking at disgust stimuli, per visit and overall, 
and less often returning their gaze to these stimuli. None of the 
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predictions following from the vigilance and maintenance hypotheses 
were supported by our data (for an overview see Table 5.1).  
This supports the idea that more disgust sensitive individuals 
have a more sensitive pathogen threat alert system than less disgust 
sensitive individuals. Interestingly, our second study reveals that this 
attentional avoidance bias associated with individual differences in 
disgust sensitivity may not be specific to disgust stimuli alone. Disgust 
sensitive individuals show the exact same attentional avoidance bias 
for other negative stimuli. While this finding suggests that disgust 
sensitivity may be indicative of a more general defensive strategy than 
previously thought, it could also be that more disgust sensitive 
individuals perceive contamination threats even when, objectively, 
there is no threat present. If this is the case, more disgust sensitive 
individuals have a stronger signal detection problem than less disgust 
sensitive individuals, characterized by a higher false alarm rate 
(Oaten et al., 2009). This would suggest that the pathogen threat 
alert system of disgust sensitive individuals is not only more sensitive, 
but also oversensitive to cues of contamination. We used the data of 
Study 5.2 on disgust sensitivity and perceived disgustingness ratings 
of negative stimuli for a preliminary test of this idea. When selecting 
these negative stimuli, we ensured that they were free of cues that 
typically elicit pathogen or moral disgust. Nevertheless, we find that 
more disgust sensitive individuals perceived negative stimuli to be 
more disgusting than less disgust sensitive individuals (r[147] = .33, 
p < .001). Although this looks promising, future research should 
more directly investigate whether disgust sensitive individuals indeed 
perceive contamination threats in pathogen-free environments.  
These findings can benefit our understanding of disgust 
sensitivity’s relationship to other constructs and serve to inspire 
testable hypotheses. For example, in the introduction we highlighted 
how the relationship between disgust sensitivity and attitudes 
towards outgroups can be the result of, at least, two different 
information processing strategies (i.e., avoidance and maintenance). 
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more disgust sensitive individuals perceived negative stimuli to be 
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p < .001). Although this looks promising, future research should 
more directly investigate whether disgust sensitive individuals indeed 
perceive contamination threats in pathogen-free environments.  
These findings can benefit our understanding of disgust 
sensitivity’s relationship to other constructs and serve to inspire 
testable hypotheses. For example, in the introduction we highlighted 
how the relationship between disgust sensitivity and attitudes 
towards outgroups can be the result of, at least, two different 
information processing strategies (i.e., avoidance and maintenance). 
Our studies distinguished between these strategies and revealed that 
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disgust sensitive individuals display attentional avoidance of disgust 
and negative stimuli. Based on this, one testable hypothesis that our 
work can suggest is that it might be the case that disgust sensitive 
individuals hold more negative attitudes of outgroup members 
because the heightened perception of a disease threat leads them to 
avoid contact with these groups. In line with intergroup contact 
theory (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), this avoidance hinders disgust 
sensitive individuals to overcome prejudices that are typically 
associated with these groups. However, our results also indicate that 
disgust sensitive individuals might even perceive such a 
contamination threat in the absence of actual contamination risks. 
Avoidance of outgroups could therefore be instigated by the 
perception of any negative act, as disgust sensitive individuals seem 
to respond with strong avoidance to generally negative cues as well.  
The current findings might also be relevant for research on 
and treatment of disorders in which disgust sensitivity plays a role. 
The attentional avoidance bias suggests that disgust sensitive 
individuals have an oversensitive pathogen threat alert system. When 
designing targeted interventions to reduce this information processing 
bias in disgust sensitive individuals, those aimed at desensitizing the 
pathogen threat alert system might be most successful. While studies 
investigating traditional exposure therapy for disgust show mixed 
results (e.g., McKay, 2006; Olatunji, Wolitzky-Taylor, Willems, Lohr, 
& Armstrong, 2009), the effectiveness of alternative interventions, 
such as counterconditioning or conceptual reorientation, still has to 
be determined (for an overview, see Mason & Richardson, 2012).  
A limitation of our study is that we did not compare disgust 
sensitivity’s biases directly to those of another personality trait, such 
as trait anxiety. Several studies have shown disgust sensitivity’s close 
relationship to anxiety disorders (De Jong & Merckelbach, 1998; De 
Jong et al., 2002; Matchett & Davey, 1991; Mulkens et al., 1996; 
Muris et al., 1999). Interestingly though, the attentional bias 
associated with stronger disgust sensitivity does not match the 
attentional bias found for highly anxious individuals. While anxious 
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individuals show prolonged engagement with threat-related stimuli 
(Amir et al., 2003; Fox et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2002; Salemink, et al., 
2007), we find that more disgust sensitive individuals display 
stronger avoidance of negative stimuli. It therefore seems that 
individual differences in trait anxiety and trait disgust lead to changes 
in distinct components of information processing. The findings for 
trait anxiety point to difficulties in effective responding to emotionally 
salient cues for highly anxious individuals (i.e., an inability to dismiss 
threatening cues). For more disgust sensitive individuals, on the 
contrary, the response to disgust stimuli seems unaffected (i.e., 
avoidance), but the perception of stimuli is different. To further 
improve our understanding of the respective roles of trait anxiety and 
trait disgust in anxiety disorders, future research should investigate 
these traits simultaneously and determine how these separate 
information processing components complement each other in the 
development of these disorders.  
Another avenue for future research concerns the causal 
nature of attentional biases and individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity. While our studies show that individual differences in 
disgust sensitivity are associated with an attentional avoidance bias, 
the directionality of this relationship has yet to be determined. One 
possibility, as described above, is that individual variation in disgust 
sensitivity influences the perception of a contamination threat. More 
disgust sensitive individuals perceive stimuli as more of a 
contamination threat and will therefore show a stronger avoidant 
attentional bias. However, this causal relationship could also be 
reversed. An individual’s information processing style could cause a 
vulnerability to certain stimuli or events (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2002). With regard to the current research, it could be that avoiding 
visual or physical contact with disgust stimuli hampers habituation, 
ultimately resulting in higher levels of disgust sensitivity. A third 
possibility is that the relationship between disgust sensitivity and an 
avoidant attentional bias is bidirectional. Future research could 
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trait anxiety point to difficulties in effective responding to emotionally 
salient cues for highly anxious individuals (i.e., an inability to dismiss 
threatening cues). For more disgust sensitive individuals, on the 
contrary, the response to disgust stimuli seems unaffected (i.e., 
avoidance), but the perception of stimuli is different. To further 
improve our understanding of the respective roles of trait anxiety and 
trait disgust in anxiety disorders, future research should investigate 
these traits simultaneously and determine how these separate 
information processing components complement each other in the 
development of these disorders.  
Another avenue for future research concerns the causal 
nature of attentional biases and individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity. While our studies show that individual differences in 
disgust sensitivity are associated with an attentional avoidance bias, 
the directionality of this relationship has yet to be determined. One 
possibility, as described above, is that individual variation in disgust 
sensitivity influences the perception of a contamination threat. More 
disgust sensitive individuals perceive stimuli as more of a 
contamination threat and will therefore show a stronger avoidant 
attentional bias. However, this causal relationship could also be 
reversed. An individual’s information processing style could cause a 
vulnerability to certain stimuli or events (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2002). With regard to the current research, it could be that avoiding 
visual or physical contact with disgust stimuli hampers habituation, 
ultimately resulting in higher levels of disgust sensitivity. A third 
possibility is that the relationship between disgust sensitivity and an 
avoidant attentional bias is bidirectional. Future research could 
investigate this directionality by, for example, testing whether 
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individuals’ disgust sensitivity is affected by experimental inductions 
of attentional biases. One way to do this is by means of a modified 
dot probe task in which participants are trained to either avoid or 
attend to a disgust stimulus. Research on trait anxiety has shown 
some evidence that such attentional training tasks using threat-
related stimuli affect individuals’ trait anxiety after multiple sessions 
(Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Matthews & MacLeod, 2002), 
suggesting that information processing strategies can indeed 
influence one’s sensitivity to experience a certain emotion. Another 
possibility to test the relationship between disgust sensitivity and 
information processing strategies is by examining attentional biases 
towards disgust stimuli at several points in time with groups that 
have naturally occurring changes in disgust sensitivity, such as 
pregnant women (Fessler, Eng, & Navarrete, 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
Disgust sensitivity is associated with various phenomena in 
the field of social, political, and clinical psychology. One way of 
improving our understanding of disgust sensitivity’s role in these 
phenomena is by examining the information processing strategies that 
are associated with individual differences in disgust sensitivity. We 
therefore tested to what extent individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity were characterized by 1) a vigilant attentional bias towards 
disgust stimuli, 2) difficulty disengaging with disgust stimuli, or 3) an 
avoidant attentional bias of disgust stimuli. While strong evidence is 
found for the idea that more disgust sensitive individuals display an 
avoidant attentional bias, this information processing strategy is 
found for both disgust stimuli as well as negative stimuli. This 
suggests that high levels of disgust sensitivity are indicative of an 



























The aim of this dissertation was to shed more light on the 
nature of the association between individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments. To this end, I tested the domain 
specificity of disgust sensitivity’s relationship to moral decision-
making and subsequently explored the (psychological) mechanisms 
underlying this relationship. Additionally, I investigated the 
information processing styles associated with individual differences in 
disgust sensitivity to further improve our understanding of this 
personality trait. In this last chapter, I will outline the main findings 
of my work and discuss their implications and limitations, as well as 
ways in which my own studies and future research could address or 
investigate these issues.  
 
Main Findings 
The aim of Chapter 2 was to determine whether disgust 
sensitivity has a domain-specific or more general relationship with 
moral decision-making. To this end, we derived three hypotheses 
from the moral psychology literature. The primarily purity hypothesis 
predicts that disgust sensitivity is most strongly related to moral 
judgments in the purity domain, as compared to moral judgments in 
any of the other moral domains. The primarily binding hypothesis 
focusses on the distinction between binding (i.e., purity, authority, 
and loyalty) and individualizing (i.e., care, fairness, and liberty) 
moral domains and predicts that disgust sensitivity is primarily 
related to judgments in the binding moral domains. The last 
hypothesis, the equal strength hypothesis, opposes these domain-
specific predictions and proposes that disgust sensitivity relates to 
moral judgments across all domains equally. We pitted these 
competing perspectives against each other in five studies and an 
internal meta-analysis.  
Strong evidence was found for the primarily purity 
hypothesis. Individual differences in disgust sensitivity relate most 




domain. No such consistent and robust link was found between 
disgust sensitivity and moral judgments in any of the other moral 
domains. These findings are therefore in line with predictions from 
pluralistic accounts of morality, such as Moral Foundations Theory 
(Graham et al., 2013), which argues that some people are more 
sensitive to a certain set of moral issues, but not to other sets of moral 
issues.  
While supporters of moral pluralism interpret this finding as 
evidence for the distinctiveness of moral domains, anti-modularity 
accounts argue that the domain-specific relationship might be caused 
by factors unrelated to moral content. While I will discuss these 
factors more elaborately later in this chapter, I will now highlight our 
main findings regarding the role of pathogen cues, weirdness, and 
harmfulness. A first factor that might play a role is the presence of 
pathogen cues in purity transgressions; however, this seems unlikely. 
We show that adding pathogen cues to other types of transgressions 
(e.g., a burglar peeing on a carpet) does not increase the strength of 
their relationship to disgust sensitivity.  
A second factor that has been suggested is transgression 
weirdness (Gray & Keeney, 2015). The general idea is that a sampling 
bias in the selection of purity transgressions has resulted in purity 
scenarios that are considerably weirder than scenarios of other moral 
domains (Gray & Keeney, 2015). In Chapter 3, we investigated the 
possibility that transgression weirdness accounts for the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of the purity 
domain. Findings show that this is not the case. While purity 
transgressions are indeed weirder than transgressions of any other 
moral domain and weirdness is associated with harsher moral 
judgments, this weirdness cannot account for the stronger 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of the 
purity domain.  
Chapter 3 was also set up to test the plausibility of perceived 
harmfulness as an overarching factor explaining morality. One of the 
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weirdness (Gray & Keeney, 2015). The general idea is that a sampling 
bias in the selection of purity transgressions has resulted in purity 
scenarios that are considerably weirder than scenarios of other moral 
domains (Gray & Keeney, 2015). In Chapter 3, we investigated the 
possibility that transgression weirdness accounts for the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of the purity 
domain. Findings show that this is not the case. While purity 
transgressions are indeed weirder than transgressions of any other 
moral domain and weirdness is associated with harsher moral 
judgments, this weirdness cannot account for the stronger 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of the 
purity domain.  
Chapter 3 was also set up to test the plausibility of perceived 
harmfulness as an overarching factor explaining morality. One of the 
most recent monist perspectives on morality, the Theory of Dyadic 
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Morality, argues that perceptions of harm determine our moral 
evaluations (Gray, Young et al., 2012; Gray & Schein, 2012). Simply 
put, if a person perceives more harm in a certain act, it is deemed to 
be more immoral. Results show that controlling for transgression 
harmfulness does not affect the relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments of purity. However, perceptions of 
harm do mediate the relationship between disgust sensitivity and 
purity moral judgments to some extent, such that more disgust 
sensitive individuals perceive more harm in purity moral 
transgressions and subsequently make harsher moral judgments.   
 In Chapter 4, we flip the perspective and look at the 
weirdness of items measuring disgust sensitivity. Disgust is often 
experienced in response to atypical situations or stimuli, and 
measures of disgust sensitivity reflect this weirdness in their items. It 
was reasoned that individuals who are more sensitive to weird disgust 
situations may also be more sensitive to other weird situations, such 
as the weird transgressions representing the purity domain. In line 
with this idea, we find that weirdness of disgust sensitivity items is 
associated with moral judgments of purity, but not care 
transgressions. Interestingly, eliminating these weird items from 
disgust sensitivity measures does not affect the tendency for the 
association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments to be 
especially strong for purity transgressions. We therefore concluded 
that also weirdness of disgust sensitivity items cannot account for the 
stronger association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments 
of purity transgressions, as compared to other types of transgressions.  
The aim of Chapter 5 was to further improve our 
understanding of disgust sensitivity’s relationship to moral decision-
making by zooming in on disgust sensitivity itself. More specifically, 
we investigated the information processing biases associated with 
individual differences in disgust sensitivity in relation to disgust 
stimuli. Again, three plausible hypotheses were derived from the 
existing literature, each predicting distinct attentional biases for 




hypotheses both build on the notion that emotionally salient stimuli 
tend to attract our attention, but they predict attentional biases at 
different times. The vigilance hypothesis, on the one hand, concerns 
the ability of disgust pictures to grab the attention of an individual. It 
therefore predicts that more disgust sensitive individuals will be more 
attentive towards disgust stimuli, resulting in a quick detection and 
continuous monitoring of disgust stimuli. The maintenance 
hypothesis, on the other hand, argues that disgust sensitive 
individuals will have difficulty disengaging from disgust stimuli and is 
thus focused on what happens after detection of a disgust stimulus. 
More specifically, it predicts that disgust sensitive individuals will 
dwell longer on disgust stimuli. The third and last hypothesis, the 
avoidance hypothesis, contradicts predictions from the first two 
hypotheses. It argues that more disgust sensitive individuals have a 
more sensitive pathogen threat alerting system and therefore predicts 
that higher disgust sensitivity will be associated with stronger 
avoidance of disgust stimuli. 
To test these competing hypotheses against each other, we 
used an eye tracking task to measure eye gazing behaviors 
continuously over time. Strong support was found for the avoidance 
hypothesis, while no such support was found for a vigilance and 
maintenance hypothesis. Individuals high in disgust sensitivity spend 
less time looking at disgust pictures and return less often to disgust 
pictures than individuals low in disgust sensitivity. Interestingly, 
though, this avoidance response associated with disgust sensitivity 
was not only found for disgust stimuli, but also for other negative 
stimuli.  
 
The Structure of Morality 
 Chapters 2 to 4 focus on the relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments, but the findings also have 
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less time looking at disgust pictures and return less often to disgust 
pictures than individuals low in disgust sensitivity. Interestingly, 
though, this avoidance response associated with disgust sensitivity 
was not only found for disgust stimuli, but also for other negative 
stimuli.  
 
The Structure of Morality 
 Chapters 2 to 4 focus on the relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments, but the findings also have 
implications for the broader debate on the structure of morality. In 
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particular, for the distinction between moral monism and moral 
pluralism. As explained in the Introduction, moral monism is the idea 
that all morality can be understood by one all-encompassing factor, 
while moral pluralism argues that morality can be divided into 
distinct components. The work presented in this dissertation supports 
a pluralist, but not a monist, account of morality for two reasons. 
First, we find that disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to moral 
judgments of one moral domain (i.e., purity) than to moral judgments 
of other moral domains. Second, this disgust sensitivity-purity 
relationship cannot be explained by perceptions of harm (i.e., as 
proposed by one theory of moral monism). Below, I will explain more 
elaborately why I believe that these findings provide evidence for a 
pluralist over a monist account of morality.  
 
Disgust Sensitivity-Purity Link  
 Accounts of moral monism and moral pluralism predict 
different relationships between disgust sensitivity and moral 
judgments. Moral monism, on the one hand, refutes the idea that 
morality can be divided in moral domains and, as such, can only 
predict domain general processes (e.g., Cameron et al., 2015). 
According to this view, disgust sensitivity should therefore relate to 
moral judgments across all domains equally. Moral pluralism, on the 
other hand, allows for domain specific associations between moral 
judgments and personality traits (Graham et al., 2013). The 
personality trait of disgust sensitivity is thought to sensitize people to 
concerns of the purity domain as these likely result from the same 
evolutionary problems as disgust. This account would therefore 
predict that individual differences in disgust sensitivity are more 
strongly related to moral judgments in the purity domain than to 
moral judgments in any of the other moral domains.  
In Chapter 2, these competing predictions were tested against 
each other. Across five studies and an internal meta-analysis, we 
found that disgust sensitivity is more strongly associated with moral 




other moral domain (a pattern that was again replicated in Study 3.2 
and Study 4.1). This finding is in line with pluralistic accounts of 
morality and provides direct evidence against moral monism. If all 
moral domains would be representative of the same construct (i.e., 
the main argument of moral monism), moral judgments of these 
domains should also show equivalent relationships to other 
constructs. Instead, our data show that disgust sensitivity has a 
consistently stronger relationship to moral judgments of one moral 
domain (i.e., purity). This domain specific finding highlights the 
distinctiveness of moral domains and is therefore incompatible with a 
monist perspective on morality.  
 
Harm as a Mediator 
In Chapter 3, we directly tested one prominent theory of 
moral monism: The Theory of Dyadic Morality. This theory proposes 
that perceptions of harm are the essence of morality (Gray & Schein, 
2012). For the disgust sensitivity-purity association specifically, this 
would imply that perceptions of harm can account for the stronger 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of 
purity. The idea is that more disgust sensitive individuals perceive 
more harm in purity transgressions than less disgust sensitive 
individuals, which in turn leads them to make harsher moral 
judgments of these purity transgressions. Our data only provides 
partial support for this reasoning. While Study 3.2 shows that 
transgression harmfulness does indeed mediate the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of purity, it does not 
support the idea that taking transgression harmfulness into account 
eliminates the interaction effect of disgust sensitivity and moral 
domain on moral judgments (without harmfulness: b = 0.71, SE = 
0.13, p < .001, with harmfulness: b = 0.27, SE = 0.09, p = .003). 
Disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to moral judgments of 
purity, as compared to other types of transgressions, even when 
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Adding harmfulness as a mediator did diminish the 
interaction effect of disgust sensitivity and moral domain considerably 
(z = 2.72, p = .007). It could therefore be argued that the Theory of 
Dyadic Harm is largely supported by our data. However, the central 
premise of the Theory of Dyadic Morality is not that harmfulness is 
simply associated with perceptions of morality, but that “all morality 
is understood through the lens of harm” (Gray, Young et al., 2012, p. 
108). This is not what we find. Our data show that perceived 
harmfulness can only partially account for the relationship between 
disgust sensitivity and purity moral judgments. The data also show 
that perceptions of harm are important to morality (at least in our 
Western samples), however, this finding is neither new nor 
controversial (e.g., Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Hofmann et al., 
2014). However, accepting this partial explanation of the disgust 
sensitivity-purity link by harmfulness as evidence for dyadic morality 
would imply discarding the theory’s most defining proposition: That 
harmfulness is the single factor underlying morality. It can therefore 
be concluded that while the Theory of Dyadic Morality provides an 
attractive parsimonious solution for morality, our data shows that it 
lacks the explanatory power to account for the link between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgments of purity transgressions (see Haidt, 
Graham, & Ditto, 2015a and 2015b for a further discussion on the 
explanatory power of Dyadic Morality).21 
 
																																								 																				
21 Dyadic Morality was introduced as a monist account of morality (e.g., Gray, 
Young et al., 2012), but later it was argued that Dyadic Morality advocates 
harm pluralism, proposing that “different moral content such as purity and 
loyalty are (less prototypical) varieties of perceived harm” (Schein & Gray, 
2015, p. 1150). However, this “pluralistic” version of Dyadic Morality not 
only keeps its main argument of a monist nature (i.e., that all morality can be 
reduced to perceived harm), it also merely rephrases the question that needs 
to be answered in order to understand morality (i.e., from “what predicts 
moral judgments of domains?” to “what predicts harmfulness of domains?”). 





 The moral domain of purity is originally thought of as an 
evolutionary adaption against coming into contact with pathogens, 
parasites, or other contamination threats (Haidt, 2012). It therefore 
includes beliefs about physical purity, but also extends to concerns 
about spiritual purity. However, there is some debate about what 
exactly constitutes the purity domain and whether it even exists. One 
point of concern is that there is a bias in the selection of purity 
transgressions, resulting in transgressions that are not only weird, but 
that also often include direct references to pathogen cues (Gray & 
Keeney, 2015; Kayyal, Pochedly, McCarthy, & Russell, 2015; Piazza, 
Landy, Chakroff, Young, & Wasserman, in press; Royzman, Atanasov, 
Landy, Parks, & Gepty, 2014). This raises two questions. First, is the 
stronger relationship between disgust sensitivity’s and purity moral 
judgments primarily due to factors that are not related to morality 
(i.e., pathogen cues and weirdness)? And second, what features, 
other than pathogen cues or weirdness, define purity transgressions? 
In other words, it calls for an explanation of what makes purity 
transgressions distinct from other moral transgressions. 
Both issues will be discussed in the following sections by 
considering the implications of pathogen cues in purity transgressions 
and usage of weird purity transgressions with regard to the research 
presented in this dissertation. Subsequently, I will describe what 
characterizes purity transgressions, other than their weirdness and 
the presence of pathogen cues. And finally, I will address the debate 
on the existence of a moral purity domain.  
 
Pathogens in Purity Transgressions 
 Moral purity is closely tied to concerns about physical 
contamination (Haidt, 2012). It is therefore not surprising that many 
transgressions representing the purity domain include references to 
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judgments primarily due to factors that are not related to morality 
(i.e., pathogen cues and weirdness)? And second, what features, 
other than pathogen cues or weirdness, define purity transgressions? 
In other words, it calls for an explanation of what makes purity 
transgressions distinct from other moral transgressions. 
Both issues will be discussed in the following sections by 
considering the implications of pathogen cues in purity transgressions 
and usage of weird purity transgressions with regard to the research 
presented in this dissertation. Subsequently, I will describe what 
characterizes purity transgressions, other than their weirdness and 
the presence of pathogen cues. And finally, I will address the debate 
on the existence of a moral purity domain.  
 
Pathogens in Purity Transgressions 
 Moral purity is closely tied to concerns about physical 
contamination (Haidt, 2012). It is therefore not surprising that many 
transgressions representing the purity domain include references to 
core disgust elicitors, either directly or via behaviors that are 
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associated with contamination (e.g., sexual acts). While this is not 
necessarily a problematic feature for other research on moral purity, 
it is a potential confound when investigating disgust sensitivity’s role 
in moral decision-making. Therefore we directly tested whether the 
presence of a pathogen cue in a moral transgressions was sufficient to 
establish an association between moral judgments of these 
transgressions and disgust sensitivity in Chapter 2. We reasoned that 
if the relationship between moral judgments of purity transgressions 
and disgust sensitivity is based solely on the presence of pathogen 
cues, then adding such a cue to other types of moral transgressions 
should result in a similarly strong relationship with disgust sensitivity. 
This is not what we find. The presence of pathogen cues in moral 
transgressions of non-purity domains (i.e., care, fairness, and loyalty) 
did not strengthen the association between moral judgments of these 
transgressions and disgust sensitivity. It therefore seems unlikely that 
disgust sensitivity’s stronger relationship to moral judgments of purity 
transgressions can only be attributed to the presence of pathogen cues 
in purity transgressions. This fits with a theory recently put forward 
by Rottman and colleagues, that there is more to the origin of disgust 
than pathogen avoidance alone and that the socio-moral component 
may be more important than previously assumed (Rottman, DeJesus, 
& Gerdin, in press).   
 
Weirdness of Purity Transgressions 
 Purity transgressions are considerably weirder than 
transgressions of the care domain (Chakroff & Young, 2015a; Gray & 
Keeney, 2015), which might be the result of a sampling bias. There 
are two ways in which this weirdness might play a role in disgust 
sensitivity’s stronger relationship to moral judgments of purity 
transgressions. First, it could be that individuals who are more easily 
disgusted are more sensitive to any kind of deviation from what is 
normal, and thus also to these weird or bizarre scenarios representing 
the purity domain. Second, weirdness might be a shared characteristic 




In this dissertation, I tested both explanations, but come to 
the conclusion that there is little reason to assume that weirdness 
explains why disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to moral 
judgments of purity, as compared to other types of, transgressions. 
This conclusion is based on three pieces of evidence. First, individual 
differences in disgust sensitivity are unrelated to a general sensitivity 
to deviation (Study 2.4), showing that more disgust sensitive 
individuals are not necessarily more sensitive to any type of deviation. 
Second, transgression weirdness cannot account for the interaction 
effect of disgust sensitivity and moral domain on moral judgments 
(Study 3.1 and Study 3.2). While we do find that disgust sensitive 
individuals perceive purity transgressions to be weirder than less 
disgust sensitive individuals, we also find that this is not specific to 
the purity domain. Any kind of moral transgression, purity and non-
purity, is perceived to be weirder by disgust sensitive individuals, 
which is why weirdness cannot account for the stronger relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and moral transgressions of the purity 
domain, as compared to other moral domains. Third, the overlap in 
weirdness in measures of disgust sensitivity and moral purity cannot 
explain the disgust sensitivity-purity link. Study 4.1 showed that 
weirdness of disgust sensitivity items was associated with moral 
judgments of purity transgressions, however, there was no evidence 
that the inclusion of weird disgust sensitivity items explains the 
interaction between disgust sensitivity and moral domain. I therefore 
agree with the notion that purity transgressions are weirder than 
other types of transgressions (a finding replicated in Study 3.1 and 
Study 3.2), but this weirdness does not explain the finding that 
disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to purity moral judgments.  
 
What Characterizes Purity Transgressions? 
As described above, purity transgressions are often characterized 
by weirdness and the presence of pathogen cues. However, research 
has found other ways in which transgressions of the purity domain 
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individuals are not necessarily more sensitive to any type of deviation. 
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weirdness in measures of disgust sensitivity and moral purity cannot 
explain the disgust sensitivity-purity link. Study 4.1 showed that 
weirdness of disgust sensitivity items was associated with moral 
judgments of purity transgressions, however, there was no evidence 
that the inclusion of weird disgust sensitivity items explains the 
interaction between disgust sensitivity and moral domain. I therefore 
agree with the notion that purity transgressions are weirder than 
other types of transgressions (a finding replicated in Study 3.1 and 
Study 3.2), but this weirdness does not explain the finding that 
disgust sensitivity is more strongly related to purity moral judgments.  
 
What Characterizes Purity Transgressions? 
As described above, purity transgressions are often characterized 
by weirdness and the presence of pathogen cues. However, research 
has found other ways in which transgressions of the purity domain 
systematically differ from other types of transgressions (especially 
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harmful transgressions). In line with the idea that the purity domain 
serves to protect the self against contamination, research has found 
that purity transgressions are typically self-directed and have no clear 
victim other than the self (Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013). 
Additionally, a transgressor’s intent is found to be less relevant to 
moral judgments of impure as compared to harmful transgressions 
(Chakroff et al., 2016; Young & Saxe, 2011; also see Chakroff & 
Young, 2015b), which is likely due to the belief that physical or 
spiritual contamination occurs regardless of an individual’s 
intentionality. Harmful and impure transgressions also lead to 
different attributions. Impure transgressions lead to stronger 
inferences about the transgressor’s moral character, while harmful 
transgressions are attributed to situational factors (Chakroff & Young, 
2015a; Sabo & Giner-Sorolla, 2017; Uhlmann & Zhu, 2013). They can 
be further distinguished by the facial expressions they elicit, with 
transgressions of the care domain evoking a facial expression similar 
to anger (i.e., activation in the corrugator supercilii) and purity 
transgressions evoking a facial expression similar to disgust (i.e., 
activation in the levator labii; Cannon et al., 2011). Lastly, while 
moral transgressions of the purity and care/harm domains activate 
overlapping brain areas, purity transgressions typically elicit more 
activation in brain systems associated with affect (Borg et al., 2008; 
Parkinson et al., 2011). Together, these studies show several ways in 
which the purity domain can be meaningfully distinguished from 
other moral domains. In sum, purity transgressions are 1) self-
directed acts, 2) reveal something about the transgressor’s moral 
character, 3) emotionally arousing (i.e., especially disgust), and 4) 
moral judgments of purity transgressions are less dependent on 
situational factors.   
 
Purity as a Moral Domain? 
While the previous paragraph illustrates the many ways in 
which purity transgressions can be distinguished from other types of 




purity domain has a clearly distinct moral component, leading them 
to dispute the notion of purity as a meaningful moral domain (e.g., 
Gray & Keeney, 2015; Gray, Young et al., 2012). However, advocates 
of Moral Foundations Theory argue that this argument is grounded in 
a Western (i.e., liberal) perspective and does not incorporate more 
traditional cultures (Graham et al., in press; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 
Koleva & Haidt, 2012; Shweder et al., 1997). In line with this 
reasoning, research has shown that the purity domain is more 
strongly endorsed by conservatives than liberals (Graham et al., 
2009). The importance of purity concerns may not be immediately 
evident in liberal societies, but this in itself does not imply that purity 
is not a meaningful moral domain.  
In many traditional or religious cultures, purity concerns are 
prominently present in everyday life and individuals in these cultures 
typically have strong beliefs related to purity (Shweder et al., 1997). 
This is not only reflected in norms about physical purity, such as 
practices revolving around eating, death, child birth, and marriage, 
but many religions also promote spiritual purification. Meditation, 
refraining from watching pornography or engaging in sexually 
promiscuous behaviors, baptism, oblations (i.e., offerings), resisting 
lustful or other evil thoughts, confessing one’s sins, and avoiding 
contact with members of other castes are all examples of moral norms 
that are followed for purity reasons. While for many individuals in 
Western societies the concept of purity is not based on religious 
considerations, some behaviors or ideas are rejected because they are 
perceived as violating some unseen natural order or as going against 
nature. For example, disapproval of issues such as abortion, same-sex 
marriage, genetically modified foods, animal biotechnology, and 
euthanasia can all be linked to purity concerns (Koleva et al., 2012; 
Pivetti, 2007; Tenbült, De Vries, Dreezens, & Martijn, 2005). While 
the purity domain is thus strongly endorsed in religious and 
traditional cultures, purity concerns are also still relevant in many 




harmful transgressions). In line with the idea that the purity domain 
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moral transgressions of the purity and care/harm domains activate 
overlapping brain areas, purity transgressions typically elicit more 
activation in brain systems associated with affect (Borg et al., 2008; 
Parkinson et al., 2011). Together, these studies show several ways in 
which the purity domain can be meaningfully distinguished from 
other moral domains. In sum, purity transgressions are 1) self-
directed acts, 2) reveal something about the transgressor’s moral 
character, 3) emotionally arousing (i.e., especially disgust), and 4) 
moral judgments of purity transgressions are less dependent on 
situational factors.   
 
Purity as a Moral Domain? 
While the previous paragraph illustrates the many ways in 
which purity transgressions can be distinguished from other types of 




purity domain has a clearly distinct moral component, leading them 
to dispute the notion of purity as a meaningful moral domain (e.g., 
Gray & Keeney, 2015; Gray, Young et al., 2012). However, advocates 
of Moral Foundations Theory argue that this argument is grounded in 
a Western (i.e., liberal) perspective and does not incorporate more 
traditional cultures (Graham et al., in press; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 
Koleva & Haidt, 2012; Shweder et al., 1997). In line with this 
reasoning, research has shown that the purity domain is more 
strongly endorsed by conservatives than liberals (Graham et al., 
2009). The importance of purity concerns may not be immediately 
evident in liberal societies, but this in itself does not imply that purity 
is not a meaningful moral domain.  
In many traditional or religious cultures, purity concerns are 
prominently present in everyday life and individuals in these cultures 
typically have strong beliefs related to purity (Shweder et al., 1997). 
This is not only reflected in norms about physical purity, such as 
practices revolving around eating, death, child birth, and marriage, 
but many religions also promote spiritual purification. Meditation, 
refraining from watching pornography or engaging in sexually 
promiscuous behaviors, baptism, oblations (i.e., offerings), resisting 
lustful or other evil thoughts, confessing one’s sins, and avoiding 
contact with members of other castes are all examples of moral norms 
that are followed for purity reasons. While for many individuals in 
Western societies the concept of purity is not based on religious 
considerations, some behaviors or ideas are rejected because they are 
perceived as violating some unseen natural order or as going against 
nature. For example, disapproval of issues such as abortion, same-sex 
marriage, genetically modified foods, animal biotechnology, and 
euthanasia can all be linked to purity concerns (Koleva et al., 2012; 
Pivetti, 2007; Tenbült, De Vries, Dreezens, & Martijn, 2005). While 
the purity domain is thus strongly endorsed in religious and 
traditional cultures, purity concerns are also still relevant in many 
Western and liberal societies, albeit to a lesser extent. 
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Although this indicates that purity concerns can be important 
to individuals, it does not necessarily show that these norms are 
moralized. Whether that is the case depends largely on how one 
defines moral norms. Several requirements have been proposed for 
norms to be considered moral. Some commonly used criteria are that 
1) they should be applied equally across individuals or contexts (i.e., 
universally; Hare, 1981), 2) evaluating transgressions of moral norms 
should be accompanied by an emotional reaction (Bicchieri, 2006; 
Nichols, 2004; Prinz, 2006), and 3) witnessing transgressions of 
moral norms should evoke an action motivation (Mackie, 1982; Prinz, 
2006). There are indications that the latter two criteria of morality 
are met by the purity domain. Purity transgressions elicit disgust 
(e.g., Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013), and 
people distance themselves from individuals with different purity 
beliefs or transgressors of purity norms (Dehghani et al., 2016; 
Kemper & Newheiser, 2017). It is less clear though to what extent 
purity norms live up to the first criterion. While many religions seem 
to apply purity norms universally (e.g., purity is always a prerequisite 
for going to heaven/Indralok/Jannah), there are, to my knowledge, 
no studies systematically testing whether individuals apply purity 
norms equally across persons and contexts. Most research 
investigating purity moral judgments, including my own, uses designs 
with an unidentified other person. Future research could directly test 
whether purity norms are universally applied by comparing moral 
judgments of purity transgressions conducted by perpetrators with 
different identities (e.g., on relational closeness; see Skitka, Bauman, 
& Sargis, 2005). If purity norms are moral, then individuals who 
strongly endorse such purity norms should not distinguish between 
these perpetrators with regard to their moral judgments.   
It should be noted that these three requirements are by no 
means the only three criteria proposed to distinguish conventional 
from moral norms. Researchers have argued that several other factors 
play a role, such as feelings of guilt (Elster, 2009) or the contingency 




could therefore evaluate the moral potential of purity more broadly 
and also compare this evaluation with well-established forms of 
morality (e.g., harm).  
 
Disgust Sensitivity 
Disgust is experienced across cultures, but there is 
considerable individual variation in the sensitivity to disgust. This 
variability is called disgust sensitivity and it has been related to many 
psychological constructs (e.g., moral decision-making, political 
ideology, disorders). In Chapter 5, we looked at the information 
processing biases associated with individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity by means of eye tracking methodology. More specifically, it 
was tested whether individuals high and low in disgust sensitivity 
have different attentional biases when encountering disgust stimuli. 
While some perspectives predict that emotionally salient stimuli 
attract attention, we find that more disgust sensitive individuals show 
a stronger avoidant attentional bias towards disgust stimuli (i.e., the 
stimuli that are emotionally salient to them). However, Study 5.2 
shows that individual differences in disgust sensitivity not only 
predict visual avoidance of disgust stimuli, but also of other negative 
stimuli. This goes against the idea that disgust sensitivity reflects a 
sensitivity to disgusting stimuli specifically, and suggests that it might 
be indicative of a more general sensitivity towards negative stimuli. 
Indeed, our data showed that more disgust sensitive individuals not 
only perceived disgust stimuli to be more disgusting, but they also 
perceived general negative stimuli to be more disgusting than less 
disgust sensitive individuals. This would be in line with the idea that 
disgust sensitive individuals have a more sensitive pathogen threat 
alerting system, which might alert them to a contamination threat 
even when, objectively, no pathogens are present.  
The findings of Chapter 5 might also help explain the disgust 
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could therefore evaluate the moral potential of purity more broadly 
and also compare this evaluation with well-established forms of 
morality (e.g., harm).  
 
Disgust Sensitivity 
Disgust is experienced across cultures, but there is 
considerable individual variation in the sensitivity to disgust. This 
variability is called disgust sensitivity and it has been related to many 
psychological constructs (e.g., moral decision-making, political 
ideology, disorders). In Chapter 5, we looked at the information 
processing biases associated with individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity by means of eye tracking methodology. More specifically, it 
was tested whether individuals high and low in disgust sensitivity 
have different attentional biases when encountering disgust stimuli. 
While some perspectives predict that emotionally salient stimuli 
attract attention, we find that more disgust sensitive individuals show 
a stronger avoidant attentional bias towards disgust stimuli (i.e., the 
stimuli that are emotionally salient to them). However, Study 5.2 
shows that individual differences in disgust sensitivity not only 
predict visual avoidance of disgust stimuli, but also of other negative 
stimuli. This goes against the idea that disgust sensitivity reflects a 
sensitivity to disgusting stimuli specifically, and suggests that it might 
be indicative of a more general sensitivity towards negative stimuli. 
Indeed, our data showed that more disgust sensitive individuals not 
only perceived disgust stimuli to be more disgusting, but they also 
perceived general negative stimuli to be more disgusting than less 
disgust sensitive individuals. This would be in line with the idea that 
disgust sensitive individuals have a more sensitive pathogen threat 
alerting system, which might alert them to a contamination threat 
even when, objectively, no pathogens are present.  
The findings of Chapter 5 might also help explain the disgust 
sensitivity-purity link found in the Chapters 2 to 4. It may be the case 
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that disgust sensitive individuals react with stronger moral 
condemnation to purity transgressions because they perceive them to 
be more of contamination threat than less disgust sensitive 
individuals. This prediction of contamination perception as a 
mediator of the disgust sensitivity-purity link should be tested in 
future research. However, the finding that individual differences in 
disgust sensitivity are not only predictive of an individual’s avoidant 
attentional bias of disgust stimuli, but also of negative stimuli is more 
difficult to interpret with regard to disgust sensitivity’s relationship to 
moral judgments. This finding would be more in line with a domain 
general association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments 
as it shows that disgust sensitivity’s rejection impulse is equally strong 
for stimuli that elicit disgust and other negative stimuli. However, this 
domain general hypothesis is not supported by our data. In all our 
studies, disgust sensitivity is primarily related to moral judgments of 
only one domain: Purity. This suggests that the information 
processing styles associated with individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity are not directly reflected in moral decision-making, but 
future research could more directly test this possibility.  
 
Trait and State Disgust  
The work presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this 
dissertation demonstrates that individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity have a consistently stronger relationship to moral 
judgments of purity transgressions. This finding may seem in contrast 
to the conclusion drawn in the Introduction that there is little 
evidence that inductions of disgust amplify moral judgments. 
However, the reasoning behind state and trait disgust’s association to 
moral judgments differ in important ways. Most research 
investigating the amplification effect of disgust on moral 
condemnation induced incidental feelings of disgust (e.g., Eskine et 
al., 2011; Schnall, Haidt et al., 2008). However, moral values are 
thought to be deeply held beliefs about what is right and wrong and 




especially when this disgust does not come from the moral 
transgression at hand.  
Trait disgust (i.e., disgust sensitivity), on the contrary, 
corresponds more directly with moral cognition. Personality traits and 
moral intuitions are thought to be based on a combination of innate 
psychological mechanisms and culture (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). The 
innate mechanisms and cultural factors that shape an individual’s 
disgust sensitivity and concern about moral purity are likely to be the 
same for a large part, as both disgust sensitivity and moral purity can 
be traced back to a motivation to stay clear of physical and mental 
contamination. Contrary to state disgust, trait disgust therefore does 
not merely influence our moral judgments. Instead, trait disgust and 
moral purity concerns might be two products of the same basic 
developmental process.  
 However, it should be noted that based on the studies 
presented in this dissertation, no claims can be made about the 
directionality of the relationship between disgust sensitivity and 
moral judgments of purity. All my studies used cross-sectional designs 
and can therefore not provide insights into the causal nature of this 
relationship. While we originally thought that manipulating state 
disgust would be a promising way to investigate the causal impact on 
moral judgments, it seems that such manipulations do not affect 
moral decision-making (Landy & Goodwin, 2015; also see 
Introduction). However, there are some ways in which the causal 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of 
purity can be tested more directly. As described in Chapter 5, some 
groups have naturally occurring changes in disgust sensitivity (e.g., 
pregnant women) and one could examine whether moral judgments 
of purity transgressions follow these changes. 
 To conclude, our findings outline the role of disgust 
sensitivity in moral decision-making. Comparing the strength of 
disgust sensitivity’s association to distinct moral domains revealed a 
particularly strong relationship with moral judgments of the purity 
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especially when this disgust does not come from the moral 
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Trait disgust (i.e., disgust sensitivity), on the contrary, 
corresponds more directly with moral cognition. Personality traits and 
moral intuitions are thought to be based on a combination of innate 
psychological mechanisms and culture (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). The 
innate mechanisms and cultural factors that shape an individual’s 
disgust sensitivity and concern about moral purity are likely to be the 
same for a large part, as both disgust sensitivity and moral purity can 
be traced back to a motivation to stay clear of physical and mental 
contamination. Contrary to state disgust, trait disgust therefore does 
not merely influence our moral judgments. Instead, trait disgust and 
moral purity concerns might be two products of the same basic 
developmental process.  
 However, it should be noted that based on the studies 
presented in this dissertation, no claims can be made about the 
directionality of the relationship between disgust sensitivity and 
moral judgments of purity. All my studies used cross-sectional designs 
and can therefore not provide insights into the causal nature of this 
relationship. While we originally thought that manipulating state 
disgust would be a promising way to investigate the causal impact on 
moral judgments, it seems that such manipulations do not affect 
moral decision-making (Landy & Goodwin, 2015; also see 
Introduction). However, there are some ways in which the causal 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments of 
purity can be tested more directly. As described in Chapter 5, some 
groups have naturally occurring changes in disgust sensitivity (e.g., 
pregnant women) and one could examine whether moral judgments 
of purity transgressions follow these changes. 
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